Blythe Island. 3. The power of attorney contains no express authority to execute this bond, or a bond like this; nor is such authority comprehended within any general words used in the instrument. For these reasons I advise that the bond be treated as no bond at all. I am, sir, very respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of State. J. S. BLACK. BLYTHE ISLAND. The act of the Legislature of Georgia, giving consent to the purchase of Blythe Island, in that State, for naval purposes, is sufficient to authorize the expenditure of money in its purchase. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, transmitting a copy of an act of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, giving its consent to the purchase of a part of Blythe Island, in that State, for naval purposes; and you ask my opinion as to the effect of the exception contained in the first section. The third resolution of September 11, 1841, (5 Stat. at Large, 468,) prohibits the expenditure of public money on lands thereafter to be purchased for public purposes, until the Attorney General shall have certified the title to be valid; and "also the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the land or site may be situated shall be given to the said purchase." This does not require the cession of jurisdiction, either exclusive or otherwise. When the Legislature consents to the purchase, the 8th section of the Constitution provides for exercising exclusive legislation, which is full jurisdiction, "over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be," for Authenticated Power of Attorney. the erection of dock-yards, &c. In the act in question, the "consent" of the Legislature to the purchase is complete; and having been given, the Constitution carries with it the authority and jurisdiction required by the resolution of 1841. This will authorize the expenditure of money upon the purchase. The Georgia act also cedes jurisdiction; but reserves certain privileges, which are understood to mean the right to serve process. This is substantially the common reservation made in nearly all the acts of consent or cession of jurisdiction. The late Attorney General fully examined the cases where similar cessions were made, and came to the conclusion that they were sufficient under the resolution in question. (See 7 Op., 628.) I see no reason to question the correctness of his conclusions. Upon both grounds, I am of opinion that the Georgia act is sufficient to meet the requirements of the resolution of Congress. Very respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. ISAAC TOUCEY, J. S. BLACK. Secretary of the Navy. AUTHENTICATED POWER OF ATTORNEY. A power of attorney of Francis Iturbe to P. A. Hargous is sufficiently authenticated. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, December 14, 1857. SIR: I have attentively examined the letter of attorney from Francis Iturbe to P. A. Hargous, and am of opinion that it is sufficiently authenticated. I am clear, also, that in its terms it authorizes Mr. Hargous to transfer the stock referred to in your letter. Very respectfully, Hon. HOWELL COBB, Secretary of the Treasury. J. S. BLACK. Computation of Time. DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. When there is a vacancy in the office of district judge, the circuit judge cannot designate a district judge to hold court in that district, the act of Congress only authorizing such designation in cases of sickness or other disability. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have read the letter of the clerk of the United States district court for North Carolina, who suggests the propriety of the appointment of a district judge from some other district, by the presiding judge of the fifth circuit, to hold a court in place of the late Judge Potter, under the act of the 29th of July, 1850. (9 Stat. at Large, 442.) On examining that act, I have come to the conclusion that it does not apply to the case which has occurred. The circuit judge is authorized to designate a district judge to hold a district court"in case of the sickness or other disability of any district judge." This does not extend to the case of vacancy, which, under the present law, can only be supplied by the appointment of a successor. I have no reason to doubt but that the duty of appointing a successor will be performed within a reasonable time. Very respectfully, Hon. JACOB THOMPSON, Secretary of the Interior. J. S. BLACK. COMPUTATION OF TIME. 1. It is the universal rule, in the computation of time for legal purposes, not to notice fractions of a day.. 2. When the law allows a thing to be done within a certain number of days, the modern rule in England is to exclude the first day from the calculation. 3. The American courts have, in innumerable cases, applied the general principle, that where time is to be computed from an act done, the day on Computation of Time. which the act is done shall be excluded, unless it is apparent that a different computation was intended. 4. Though divisions of a day may be allowed sometimes, to make priorities or give other advantages in private transactions, they are always excluded in public proceedings. 5. Under the act of Congress organizing the territorial government of Kansas, the Governor had three clear days to consider a bill passed by the Territorial Legislature, and if he failed to return it, such bill did not become a law unless the Assembly was in session three days after the day on which the bill was passed. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE. March 10, 1858. SIR: The question you propound to me is on the construction of the following clause, in the act organizing and establishing the territorial government of Kansas: "If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Assembly by adjourning prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law." Does this give the Governor three clear days to consider a bill? Or is he bound to return it on the third day, counting in the day on which it is presented as one of the three? It is the universal rule, in the computation of time for legal purposes, not to notice fractions of a day. When the law allows a thing to be done within a certain number of days, you cannot take a fractional part of one day at the beginning and add it to another fraction at the end, in order to make up one whole day. But whether the fraction at the commencement of the time shall be counted as a whole day, or whether it shall be excluded from the calculation altogether, was a much vexed question, on which both the English judges and the doctors of the civil law disputed so long and so earnestly, that it was called the controversia controvertissima. (18 How., 158.) The weight of the judicial authorities in England, especially in the more recent cases, is in favor of the doctrine which excludes the first day from the count. Chitty sums up Computation of Time. their effect by pronouncing that to be the modern rule of construction. (Gen. Pr., 109-10.) In this country, although there may be cases in which the peculiar words of a statute or a contract would require the first day to be counted, it may safely be declared as the settled law, universally understood and accepted, that a fractional part of the day, from which time is computed, cannot be counted at all. A lease for one year from the first of April does not expire until the first day of April following. It would expire on the thirty-first of March, if the day on which the term began were not excluded. When a bill is payable ten days after sight, the day of presentation is not one of the ten. When the decree of a court requires an act to be done within four days, the party cannot be put in contempt until the expiration of four whole days after the day on which the decree is dated. When a policy of insurance stipulates for two days' notice of a fire, the day of the fire is not included. A right by statute to redeem lands sold for taxes within sixty days after the sale, means sixty days without counting the day of the sale. These are a few of the innumerable cases to which the American courts have applied the general principle that, where time is to be computed from an act done, the day on which the act is done shall be excluded, unless it is apparent that a different computation was intended. The case under consideration is a stronger and clearer one for the application of the rule than either of those I have mentioned. Though divisions of a day may be allowed sometimes, to make priorities or give other advantages in private transactions, they are always excluded in public proceedings. (5 Washb., 653.) If the fraction of a day, on which the bill in this case was presented to the Governor, cannot be counted as a fraction, and added to the fraction of the day on which the Assembly adjourned, (as it manifestly cannot,) then it must be left out of the count altogether, by the plain words of the act of Congress. The act says that the Governor shall have three days after the bill is presented. To count the whole of the first day |