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of the motive. A man, that has lost a friend and patron, may fátter himself, that all his grief arises from genes rous sentiments, without any mixture of narrow or interested considerations : But, a man that grieves for a valuable friend; who needed his patronage and protection : how can we suppose, that his passionate tenderness arises from some metaphysical regards to a self-interest: which has no foundation or reality? We may as well imagine, thạt minute wheels and springs, like those of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon; as, acoount for the origin of passion from such abstruse reflections.

Animals are found susceptible, of kindness, both to their own species and to ours; nor is there, in this case, the least suspicion of disguise or artifice, . Shall we account for all their sentiments, too, from refined deduce tions of self-interest? Or if we admit a disinterested be. nevolence in the inferior species, by, what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the superior? de · Love between the sexes begets a complacency and good. will, very distinct from the gratification of an appetite.

Tenderness to their offspring, in all sensible beings, iscommonly able alone to counterbalance the strongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependance on that affection. What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief; when freed, by its death, from the slavery of that attendance?

Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality Have we no satisfaction in one man's company above another's, and no desire of the welfare of our friend, even though absence or death should prevent us from all -participation, in it? Qr what is it commonly, that gives

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üs ahý párticipation in it, even while alive and present, but our affection and regard to him ? -**

These and a thousand other instances are marks of a ges heral benevolence in human nature, where no real interest binds us to the object. And how an imaginary interest, known and avowed for such, can be the origin of any pašo sion or emotion; seems difficult to explain. No satisfactory hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability, that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable success.

But farther, if we consider rightly of the matter, we shall find, that the hypothesis, which allows of a disinterested' benevolence, distinct from self-love, has really more simplicity in it; and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to resolve all friendship and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily wants or appetites; acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of these prima. * ry appetites arises a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination, that is secondary and interested. In the same manner, there are mental passions, by which we are impelled immedi‘ately to seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to interest; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of self-love, and a desire of happiness. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases, there is a passion which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions, which afterwards arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affections. Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could scarcely ever exert itself ; because we should, in that case, have felt few and slender pains or pleasures, and have little misery or happiness to avoid or to pursue.

Now, where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combiñed motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment? Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be so eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest, or safety; and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an enemy *? And what a malignant philosophy must it be, that will not allow, to humanity and friendship, the same privileges, which are indisputably granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment? Such a philosophy is more like a satire than a true delineation or description of human nature; and may be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad one for any serious argument or reasoning. 12 ye

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* Animasque in vulnere ponunt. ". .

VIRG. Dum alteri noceat, sui negligens, says Seneca of Anger. De Ira, l. ii.

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TO- JUSTICE, et - .. lis

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The intention of this Appendix is to give some more particular explication of the origin and nature of Justice, and to mark some differences between it and the other virtues.

The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately by a direct tendency or in. stinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his child, transported by that natural sympathy, which actuates him, and which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like, circumstances. A generous man cheerfully embraces an opportunity of serving his friend; because he then feels himself under the dominion of the beneficent affections ; por is he concerned whether any other person in the universe were ever before actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their influence. In all these cases, the social passions have in view a single individual object, and pursue the safety or happiness alone of the person loved and esteemed.

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Within this they are satisfied: - In this they acquiesce. And as the goodjoresulting from their benign influence, is in itself corkplete and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of tapprobation, without any reflection on farther consequences, and without any more enlarged views of the concurrence of imitation of the other members of society. On the contrary, were the generous friend or disinterested patriot to stand alone in the practice of beneficence; this would rather enhance his value in our eyes, and join the praise of rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits..

The case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely nécessary to the well-being of mankind: But the benefit, resulting from them, is not the consequence of every individual single act; but arises from the whole scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the society. General peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from thë possessions of others: But a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently, considered in itself, be productive of pernicious consex quences. The result of the individual acts is here, in many instances, directly opposite to that of the whole system of actions, and the former may be extremely hurto ful, while the latter is, to the highest degree, advant tageous. Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man's hand, the instrument of mischiefs. The right of succession may, in one instance, be hurtful: wdts benefit arises only from the observance of the general rules and it is sufficient, if compensation beisthereby made for all the ills and inconveniencies which flow front particular characters and situations. bpre 4mbe 91 9*873 20 e pode somigo.

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