Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice

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MIT Press, 16.02.1999 - 506 Seiten
Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate aswell as business school students. This text is the first to provideboth a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety ofreal-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law.

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

 

Inhalt

CHAPTER
3
CHAPTER
4
258
17
3
35
630
63
R 6
75
CHAPTER 7
91
CHAPTER 8
103
17
249
OPEC
257
18
266
Commons PROBLEM
275
CHAPTER 17
290
FOUR
291
CHAPTER 19
293
GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
309

Natural MONOPOLY ANd Bankruptcy
121
CHAPTER 10
139
PART
150
Research anD DEVELOPMENT
179
CHAPTER 11
191
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
193
FINITELY REPEATED GAMES
209
3
219
CHAPTER 15
229
IN THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET
243
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION IN A COURNOT DUOPOLY
331
MECHANISM DESIGN THE REVELation Principle AND SALES TO AN UNKNOWN BUYER
349
AUCTIONS
367
SIGNALING GAMES and the LEMONS PROBLEM
383
FIVE FOUNDATIONS
401
CALCULUS AND OPTIMIZATION
403
PROBABILITY AND EXPECTATION
421
UTILITY AND EXPECTED UTILITY
433
EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
451
INDEX
465

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Autoren-Profil (1999)

Prajit Dutta is Professor in the Department of Economics at Columbia University.

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