Chapter I

The changed

United States.

the great Republic of the West had almost become a negligible quantity in the calculations of European diplomats.

This is not the occasion to discuss the wisdom of

position of the this policy, or of its modification. It is sufficient to emphasize the fact, as well as the momentous and permanent change which occurred when the people of the United States, with singular unanimity and zeal, but still with grave and serious purpose, drew the sword to put an end to an intolerable situation in Cuba. It was a war of aggression - but the American people felt that it was aggression for a high and noble object; and the fact that the great Republic was capable of such idealism-the spec

tacle of hundreds of thousands of volunteers crowding to enlist in a cause offering absolutely no material inducements served to deepen the impression made upon the rest of the world. The campaign, both on land and sea, was perhaps more remarkable for the hidden possibilities which it revealed than for actual demonstrations. The general expectation, however, of many continental critics, that the American army and navy would first encounter defeats which might perhaps be retrieved ultimately by the mere force of physical and numerical preponderance, was doomed to disappointment, and gave way, on the part of observers not blinded by jealousy or prejudice, to expressions of sincere respect for American prowess and efficiency.

The revelation of the fundamental solidarity, in

of the Anglo

both feelings and interest, on the part of the two Chapter I great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race was beyond The solidarity doubt the most important incidental result of the Saxon race. war. The people of the British Empire stood almost alone in their unwavering belief in the sincerity and unselfishness of the avowed purposes of the United States, and consequently in their warm sympathy and hope for American success. Without a formal alliance, without anything even in the nature of a diplomatic understanding, the world was surprised to observe that the two great English-speaking peoples of the world appeared to think and feel in unison; that all minor differences and causes of misunderstanding seemed to be forgotten, and that the feeling of kinship-free from all hostility against any other power, and without the slightest impairment of national independence or separate interests, but still strong and true-dominated public and private opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. It is needless to add that this fact opened up to the continental statesman vistas of which he had never dreamed before, and that it necessitated a more or less complete revision of previous calculations, plans, and combinations.

Prince Bis

The death of Prince Bismarck was the outward The death of sign of the end of a period of European history, marek. justly called, after its dominant figure and his motto, the Bismarckian Epoch, or that of Blood and Iron. For more than a human generation the titanic mind of the Iron Chancellor had dominated the international policy of Europe, and so potent

Chapter I

Bismarck a friend of

peace.

had his ideas become, in Germany, that they had compelled even Science to bend to their support the masterly but "barrack-trained" minds of men like Treitschke and his pupils. The attempt was made, not entirely without success, to give a scientific and even a systematized philosophical basis to the policy of the most consistent and reckless realist and opportunist since Napoleon. There is probably little danger that this school of political science and philosophy will long outlive its mighty creator, but its very existence bears witness to the stupendous force of a master mind which could hold sway, even in a realm hitherto sacred to absolute freedom of thought and of teaching.

History cannot fairly question the great Chancellor's right to be known as a sincere friend of peace. The problems which demanded solution at the outset of his career could not have been settled, humanly speaking, otherwise than with blood and iron.

Germany at that time was little more than a geographical expression, and, at the threshold of the stupendous industrial and commercial development of the last fifty years, the German people were two centuries behind other Western nations politically and economically. The vastly greater part of the nation had no legal access to the sea, and the entire country bade fair to become an object of barter or division among powerful surrounding states, whose designs were but imperfectly concealed. The rivalry of Austria and Prussia had become too acute for

longer continuance, and both the unity and indepen- Chapter I dence of the German nation could no longer be saved except by a triumphant display of force. Questions of national independence or unification such as these, and the similar ones which confronted Italy forty years ago, demanded the stern arbitrament of war, by which alone the right to independence or to national unity can be vindicated, but when these achievements had once been confirmed, the one end of Prince Bismarck's policy was the maintenance of peace in Europe. In this he was successful, so far as the entire continent, with the exception of the Balkan peninsula, was concerned. His domination has given to Europe, with this one exception, thirty years of unbroken peace the longest period of repose in

modern history.

a con

his policy.

But the basis of his policy was avowedly not so The basis of much a love of peace for its own sake, as, on the contrary, the fear of the consequences of war, and his method was the simplest imaginable, sistent and continually increasing preparation for war by universal military service, and the avowed determination to be ready to strike the first blow, when necessary, with greater swiftness and effectiveness than any possible opponent. After the peace of Frankfort, the conviction was well-nigh unanimous in the German Empire, that what had been won by the sword would ere long have to be defended by the sword; and the trend of public discussion in France has even yet hardly been calculated to remove that impression. It was, therefore,

Chapter I

Advantages of universal military

service.

comparatively easy, in the first flush of national exultation, to establish the system of the utmost possible preparation for war, as practically the only guarantee of peace so far as the German Empire was concerned. Nor is it fair, even from a cosmopolitan or philosophical point of view, wholly to condemn the system of universal military service, as it was first established in Prussia and is now in vogue in continental Europe. That it is a great school of manliness and discipline may readily be admitted, and the undoubted democratic element which its absolute impartiality introduces into a military monarchy is deeply significant and of far-reaching importance. During the continuance of Prince Bismarck in office the slightest criticism, even of the details of this system, seemed almost sacrilegious. Had he died in office, the force of tradition would probably have upheld his ideas almost, if not quite, up to the economic breaking point. The retirement of the great Chancellor eight years before his death must be considered in many respects one of the most fortunate occurrences for the German people. It afforded a period of transition of incalculable value. The reduction of the term of service from three years to two1 is the outward sign of a change which would have been diffi

1 This proposal was adopted in 1896, and seems to have given general satisfaction, but the mere suggestion of such a change was denounced under Bismarck with a fury which, according to Georg von Bunsen, one of the noblest and most attractive of modern Germans, envenomed and wasted the best years of a life full of the brightest promise. See Marie von Bunsen, Georg von Bunsen, p. 182.