kinds, upward and downward movement, contraction, dilatation, and going, or motion in general.

The fourth category, community (sāmānya), is the source of our notion of genus. In its highest degree it expresses only existence, a property common to all, but it usually denotes qualities common to many objects. It denotes

species also, as indicating a class. These genera and species have a real, objective existence. The Bauddhas deny this, affirming that individuals only have existence, and that abstractions are false conceptions. It is the quarrel revived in the Realist and Nominalist theories of the medieval schoolmen.

The fifth category, particularity (visesha), denotes simple objects, devoid of community. These are soul, mind, time, place, the ethereal element, and also atoms in their ultimate form.

The sixth category, co-inherence or inseparable connection (samavāya), denotes the connection of things that in their nature must be connected so long as they exist, as yarn and the cloth of which it is formed; for so long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains.

The seventh category, subsequently added, negation or privation (abhāva), is of two kinds, universal and mutual. Universal negation includes three species: (1.) antecedent, a present negation of what will be at some future time, as in yarn before the production of cloth; (2.) emergent, which is destruction or cessation of an effect, as in a broken jar; (3.) absolute, implying that which never existed, as fire in a lake.

Mutual privation is essential difference, a reciprocal negation of identity, as in cloth and a jar.

The system of Kaṇāda, in its modern form at least, is

essentially a dualism; eternal atoms existing together with eternal soul, whether the latter term be confined to individual souls or includes the Supreme Soul (Paramātman). In every Hindu system of philosophy, Matter is supposed to be eternal, generally as a real and distinct entity in itself, except in the school of the Vedantists, by whom it is regarded as māyā, the illusive manifestation of the One Supreme Brahma, who is himself the All.

Gotama and Kaṇāda, like Kapila, could see no higher aim or blessing for mankind than a complete deliverance from pain. They agree with him in maintaining that this deliverance must be wrought out by knowledge, meaning thereby a knowledge of philosophy, and that the state to which the soul may rise by knowledge, its best and final state, is that of a tranquil unconscious passivity, in which all thought and emotion and the sense of personality have passed away for ever.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

ON THE ORGANS OF THE SOUL IN THE SYSTEM OF KAPILA.

Distichs 22, 24, 26, 34.

THE Intellect (buddhi), the first emanation of Nature (Prakriti), is an organ or instrument of the Soul, for by it all material things are brought within the view of the Soul, which is immaterial. From it Consciousness or Mind-stuff emanates, and from Consciousness, affected by the mode of Nature called "goodness," issue the eleven organs (indriyāni), which are the Mind (manas), the five organs of sensation and the organs of action. From it also emanate the five subtle elements of matter when it is affected by the mode called "darkness," and from the subtle elements the grosser elements are evolved. The five organs of sensation are called "intellect-organs" (buddhiindriyani), and in Distich 34 they are said to be the domain of specific and non-specific elements (as Lassen translates the passage), or to concern objects specific and unspecific (as Colebrooke translates it). The meaning is obscure, and, as usual, the Hindu commentators throw no light on the darkGauḍapāda assumes that by non-specific objects are meant such as are apprehended by the gods. If so, they would have no place in the system of Kapila.

ness.

His meaning

may probably be ascertained by noting that he regards these organs as a direct emanation from Consciousness, affected by "goodness," and therefore as being more subtle productions than even the subtle elements of what are usually called material things or gross existences. But the eye, for instance, as an organ of sight belongs to this last class. It is formed entirely of gross matter. It seems then that Kapila meant by "intellect-organs" something of a very different nature. The organ of sight is, in his theory, twofold: (1.) a subtle organisation in which the faculty of seeing dwells; and (2.) an instrument, the eye, which is formed of grosser elements. The faculty by which we see was connected by Kapila directly with Consciousness, and by it a sense-perception, which is defined by the manas, is gained. Without it the eye could no more see than in the case of a dead body. Sometimes the faculty and its instrument are united in one expression. Hence, I think, we may explain Distich 34 as meaning that the "intellect-organs" are composed of nonspecific substances, i.e., of the more subtle or ethereal forms of matter in the faculty of seeing, and of specific or the grosser elements in the instrument, i.e., the eye. This distinction seems to have partly suggested itself to the author of the "S. Tattwa Kaumudi," for he supposes that by "non-specific " are meant such objects as are too subtle in their nature to be seen by ordinary men. Whether Kapila meant farther to say that this finer element or organisation could be known through the buddhi to Soul, is an inquiry that we may lay aside as having no practical importance.

If this interpretation is correct, the theory of Kapila has some resemblance to the conclusions of modern science. "Sensation proper is not purely a passive state, but implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism."

"Numerous facts prove demonstrably that a certain application and exercise of mind on one side is as necessary to the existence of sensation as the occurrence of a physical impulse on the other" (Morell, Elements of Psychology, pp. 107, 108).

NOTE B.

ON THE MEANING OF Sat AND Asat.

There is a general misunderstanding of these terms as used in the philosophy of the Hindus, especially in the system of Kapila. Sat is supposed to mean existence per se, and asat is therefore represented as its logical opposite, or rather contradictory; the negation of being, or non-existence. Thus Dr. Muir writes: "These ideas of entity and nonentity seem to have been familiar to the Vedic poets, and we find it thus declared (R.-V. x. 72, 2, 3), that in the beginning nonentity was the source of entity. In the earliest age of the gods entity sprang from nonentity; in the first age of the gods entity sprang from nonentity [asat].' In the Atharva-Veda (x. 7, 10) it is said that both nonentity and entity exist within the god Skambha;' and in v. 25 of the same hymn, 'Powerful indeed are those gods who sprang from nonentity. Men say that that nonentity is one, the highest member of Skambha.' The Taittiriya Upanishad also (p. 99) quotes a verse to the effect: This was at first nonentity. From that sprang entity [sat]."" And in a note he adds: "This phrase is also applied to Agni in R.-V. x. 5, 7, where it is said that that god, being 'a thing both asat, non-existent (i.e., unmanifested), and sat, existent (i.e., in a latent state or in essence), in the highest heaven, in the creation of Daksha, and in the womb of Aditi, became in a former age the first-born of our ceremonial, and is both a bull and a cow'" (Progress of the Vedic Religion, Journal A. S., 1865, p. 347). So also Pro