act, because knowledge could alone accomplish more for the soul than these religious rites; but on this account it did not commend itself to the people of India. It was therefore supplemented and made more popular by Pataǹjali, of whom, however, little is known. He probably lived about 200 years B.C.; but almost all that we know of him is that he is reputed to be the author of a book called the "Yoga Sutra," in which the theistic form or modification of Kapila's system is expounded. The modifications which Patanjali made in this system are not many in number, but they are important both in themselves and in their bearing upon the inner and outer life of mankind. They were mainly (1.) the doctrine of a Supreme Spirit, who directed and presided over the workings of Nature (Prakriti); and (2.) the enjoining of yoga, i.e., the concentration of the soul on the Supreme Being by abstract meditation as the means of obtaining finally Nirvāṇa, or absorption into the Divine Essence.1 Hence this system is called the Seswara or Theistical Sānkhya, and Kapila's the Nirīśwara or Atheistical; a term which may also be applied to Buddhism, which apparently owed its origin to the system of Kapila. "God" (Iswara, the supreme Ruler), according to Patanjali, "is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ills with which all men are beset, unconnected with good or bad deeds and their consequences. In him is an absolute omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of the Hindu mythology), himself infinite, unlimited by 1 In the full attainment of yoga, or a mystic union with the Deity, all the affections and the senses are either wholly overcome and destroyed, or they act only as far as necessity requires. time." Here is an essential difference between the master and his pupil; for Kapila taught that the existence of thought or instruction is dependent on Consciousness, not upon Iswara, and Consciousness is from the great principle, Buddhi (Intellect). The means of attaining to Yoga are (1.) Yama, selfrestraint; (2.) Niyama, necessary religious duties; (3.) Asana, postures; 2 (4) Prāṇā-yāma, restraint of breath; (5.) Pratyāhāra, subjugation of the senses; (6.) Dhārāṇa, fixed control; (7.) Dhyāna, contemplation; (8.) Samādhi, pious meditation. The aim of the Yogi or devotee under this system is to destroy all movement and all thought, that the soul may be absorbed in passive meditation. But as all cannot rise to this elevation, various means of subduing the senses by severe ascetic rites are set forth and commended, and a frequent repetition of the mystic syllable OM is enjoined. By these means the Yogi might attain to a state called videha (incorporeal) or kēvala (abstracted or purely spiritual). In such conditions he is endowed with supernatural wisdom and power. He can enter into the body of another, and even into his mind, and thus may read his thoughts. The attracting power of the earth cannot bind him. He can soar in the air as if carried up by a balloon. He can understand all mysteries of this world and of other worlds. Both the past and the future may lie distinctly before his view. In short, there is no marvel of modern spiritualism that was not equalled, and even surpassed, in India, according to the Yoga system and the popular belief, two thousand years ago. 1 Yoga-Śāstra, i. 23, 24, 26–29; Colebrooke, i. 264. Practically the system of Patanjali, though setting forth a very sublime aim, has resulted in the practice of cruel and degrading rites, of almost incredible devices for self-torture, which have no high or purifying purpose, but, on the contrary, often conceal a base and even sensual life. The Yogi is frequently regarded as a mere sorcerer, and in this character he appears in many an Indian drama and popular tale. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTICE OF THE NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA SYSTEMS. THESE systems are generally classed together, for they agree upon the subjects of which they treat in common, but are distinct in their chief purpose. The Nyāya is not properly a system of philosophy, but an introduction to all such systems, for it treats mainly of the objects and the laws of thought. The Vaiśeshika system is a system of physical science as taught by Kaṇāda, the reputed author of the Vaiśeshika-Sutra, in which this system is explained. From the singular absence or deficiency of historical data in India, little is known of Gotama or Gautama, the author of the Nyāya, or of Kaṇāda. The former has become the subject of fanciful legend almost to the same degree as Kapila, the author of the Sankhya system. He is said to have been born in Northern India at the beginning of the Treta Yuga, or second age of the world, and to have married Ahalya, the daughter of Brahma. We can only infer from these statements that he was probably a Brahman, and may have been of noble descent. He is the Aristotle of India, and his Sūtras have always been a popular study among the Hindus, whose acuteness finds a suitable field in the discussion of dialectic subtleties. A large number of commentators have explained and com mented on the system of Gotama, in order to adapt it to popular use. It is set forth in a treatise called the Nyāya Sūtra, which comprises five divisions or readings, each containing two lessons. These are divided into sections or prakaranas, relating to distinct topics. In practice, this system is commonly combined with that of Kaṇāda, as in the Bhasha-parichchheda, the popular text-book in India. It is not always easy to distinguish, in the modern schools, what belongs to each system. Both Gotama and Kaṇāda observe the following order in discussion: (1.) enunciation (uddeśa); (2.) definition (lakshana); and (3.) investigation (parikshā). Enunciation declares by name the subject to be discussed. Definition is the defining of the subject by its peculiar properties or differentiæ. Investigation is an examination of the subject with regard to its peculiar properties. The first reading or division of the Nyaya Sūtra consists of sixty aphorisms, and the first Sūtra gives a list of the subjects to be discussed. These are sixteen in number: (1.) Pramāņa, or the means by which a right knowledge may be gained; (2.) Prameya, or the objects of thought; (3.) Doubt; (4) Motive; (5.) Instance, or example; (6.) Dogma, or determinate truth; (7.) Argument, or syllogism; (8.) Confutation; (9.) Ascertainment; (10.) Controversy ; (11.) Jangling; (12.) Objection, or cavilling; (13.) Fallacy; (14.) Perversion; (15.) Futility; and (16.) Conclusion, or the confounding of an adversary. Of these, the first two are the chief; the others being only subsidiary, as indicating the course which a discussion may take, from the setting forth of a doubt to the final confutation of the doubter. Proof or evidence (pramāņa) is of four kinds: (1.) |