declare the law."-(Burnett v. United States, 116 U. S. 161.) "But with language clear and precise and with its meaning evident, there is no room for construction, and consequently no need of anything to give it aid."-(United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 221.)

"Our duty is to read the statute according to the natural and obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending its operation."—(Waller v. Harris, 20 Wend. [N. Y.] 561; Pott v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 735.)

"When the language is plain, we have no right to insert words and phrases so as to incorporate in the statute a new and distinct provision."-(United States v. Temple, 105 U. S. 99.)

Vattel's first general maxim of interpretation is that 'it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation,' and he continues: "When a deed is worded in clear and precise terms-when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion-there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning which such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in order to restrict or extend it, is but to elude it."-(Vattel's Law of Nations, 244.) Here the words are plain and interpret themselves.-(Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 534.).

There is, therefore, no reason founded on the language or policy of the clause to insert a restriction and locality which have not been expressed by the legislature. On the contrary, upon general principles of interpretation, when the words are general, the court is not at liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enactment.-(United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 80. Also see Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 261.)

Another rule of interpretation is that words are to be interpreted for the protection of rights, and a liberal construction is adopted for that reason. This applies as well to political rights as to civil rights.

In many States the courts have held that the right to regulate suffrage, especially in regard to registration laws, must

not be used to disfranchise any voter who has the constitutional qualifications. Under this rule, the essential qualifications for suffrage in the territories are: Citizenship, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen, residence, and having attained the age of twenty-one years.

This confers no authority to disfranchise any one on account of sex; and beyond question does not demand that it shall be done. Under this rule, the legislation of Congress in regard to the disfranchisement of women in Utah, affects that Territory alone. That was an amendment of the law of 1882, which disfranchised bigamists and polygamists, and the women who cohabited with them. The same rule was applied to both sexes. This law did not prevent an amendment of the election laws in any territory which might abolish sex as a disqualification for voting or for holding office.

The Organic law of Washington Territory, Sec. 1860, R. S. U. S., is ample authority for the Act of January 18, 1888, defining the qualifications of voters. The words, "citizens of the United States" have included both sexes since the nation existed, and especially since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The courts are bound by that Amendment, and have no authority to interpolate the word "male," under any pretense that the history of the times in 1853, excluded women from political rights, and they are, therefore, not citizens of the United States. The words are plain. Their duty is equally plain. The question is not the policy or the impolicy of granting women the right to vote on equal terms with men; but the duty of courts to follow the plain language of the Constitution of the United States in construing laws made by Congress.

Seattle, W. T.

W. S. Bush.

OF

REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

THE CHICAGO BAR.

JAMES R. DOOLITTLE.

Side by side with ex-Senator Trumbull, and scarcely less distinguished, stands ex-Senator Doolittle. A parallel might be drawn, which would exhibit many points in common.-Both having been upon the bench-both having had a brilliant career in the United States Senate-both going into the Senate as republicans, and retiring therefrom as democrats-both when returning to the practice of their profession, gravitating to the queen city of the West as the one offering the best field for the exercise of their forensic powers, and for the enjoyment of the rewards of a well-earned reputation.

James R. Doolittle was born in Hampton, Washington County, New York, January 3, 1815. His father was Reuben and his mother Sarah (Rood) Doolittle. His father was a farmer and mill-owner, the founder of a school and church, and a man of beneficent and generous impulses.

After going through the ordinary course of preparatory education, James R. entered Geneva College in Western New York, and graduated in 1834, taking the highest honors of his class in scholarship.

He then studied law in Rochester, and was admitted to the bar in 1837, by the Supreme Court of New York. Moving to Wyoming County, he there engaged in a successful practice. Though a democrat, he was elected district attorney in a whig county, and served with general satisfaction. In those days he was an active politician.

In 1848, General Cass was the candidate of the Democratic, and General Taylor of the Whig party, for President of the United States. Before his nomination Gen. Cass had written the celebrated "Nicholson Letter," in which he had said the best way to destroy slavery, was to spread it all over the territories. A good many in the Democratic party were opposed to this principle of "diffusion," and Mr. Doolittle was among the number. He was in the State Convention of New York, and though at that time a very young man, he introduced in the Convention the following resolution:

"Resolved, That while the democracy of New York, represented in this convention, will faithfully adhere to all the compromises of the Constitution, and maintain all the reserved rights of the States, they declaresince the crisis has arrived when that question must be met-their uncompromising hostility to the extension of slavery into any territory now free, which may be hereafter acquired by any action of the government of the United States."

This was the doctrine of the famous Wilmot Proviso; and to understand the full import of the resolution it must be borne in mind that our armies were then in possession of Mexico, and a treaty was pending by which we were about to acquire California and New Mexico-free territories, into which the "diffusion" doctrine of Gen. Cass was intended to introduce slavery.

The resolution was rejected by a majority of one vote. By the president of the convention it was indignantly torn in pieces. On that rejected resolution a convention was called and the Free-soil party was organized. The result was, the nomination of Van Buren as the Free-soil candidate for president. As a consequence Gen. Taylor was elected-the "diffusion" of slavery was defeated, and California admitted as a 'free State.

In 1851, Mr. Doolittle removed to Wisconsin, and there engaged in the practice of his profession. His decided abilities and noble traits of character were at once recognized, and he entered upon an eventful and successful career. He soon ranked among the ablest and best lawyers in the State. He was retained by Governor Farwell in important cases involving the interests of the State, and in other important litigations. He successfully competed in the courts with older attorneys

and held his own among the able lawyers for which Wisconsin was noted at that time. 151 15

In 1852, he gave his support to Gen. Pierce for president, not considering there was longer any ground of controversy between himself as a Free-soil democrat, and the Democratic party, as the compromise of 1851 excluded slavery from all the Territories acquired from Mexico, and both political parties pledged themselves to abide by it, and not agitate the slavery. question, in or out of Congress.

In 1853, after a residence in the State of but two years, he was elected judge of the First Judicial Circuit, the most populous judicial district in the State. As a jurist he ranked among the ablest and most impartial in the Northwest. He brought to the bench a thorough knowledge of law, varied learning, and a clear perception of right and justice. In March, 1856, he resigned his office and retired from the bench. In the summer of 1856, occurred the border-ruffian invasion and subjugation of Kansas, and the subsequent dead-lock in the two houses of Congress. The House had inserted a provision in the army appropriation bill, that no part of the money should be used to enforce the laws passed in Kansas by the border-ruffian Legislature; laws by which slavery was declared to be a divine institution, and any man who questioned it was liable to be fined and imprisoned. The Senate struck it out. There was a tremendous struggle. At last the law was passed, and means were put into the hands of the President to sustain slavery in the Territory of Kansas, from which it had been excluded by the Missouri Compromise.

The time had now come when Mr. Doolittle must again break with his party. Until the last moment he had hoped the House would prevail. But when that noble band with whom his sympathies were so strongly enlisted, were overcome -when finally the Senate had prevailed, he could not longer remain silent. His first speech was at Raçine. Referring to this speech afterward, he said:

"When I came to speak my soul went out with all the earnestuess and intensity of thought, feeling and expression of which it is capable; all the more earnest and intense because I had hoped till Congress adjourned, that the House would prevail-that the Senate would yield. I spoke at Racine