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of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism."
This was re-affirmed in Maynard v. Hill, 8 S. C. Reporter, p. 726.
There can be no question, therefore, of the power of a Territorial legislature to define the qualifications of electors within the limitation, that the elector must be a citizen, or a person who has declared his intention to become such.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE REVISION OF THE STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.—This is to be determined by the repeal clauses and the interpretation clauses of the Revised Statutes, in connection with the Constitution.
Sec. 5596, R. S. U. S. repealed the Organic acts of all the Territories then existing, and left in force only the sections of the Revised Statutes applicable to the several Territories.
The word "citizen” is then to be determined by the Revised Statutes of 1874.
The word "citizen” is used generically in these statutes; and provisions where it is so used—where masculine pronouns are used, as in the naturalization law—are to be construed as including both sexes. This is a well-known rule of law; and is enforced in the enacting clause of the Revised Statutes:
“In determining the meaning of the Revised Statutes, or of any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to Feb. 25, 1871, words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things; words importing the plural number may include the singular; words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females.”—(R. S. p. 1.)
"The Revised Statutes must be treated as the legislative declaration of the statute law on the subjects which they embrace on the first day of December, 1873. When the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised, to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Congress.”—(United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 513; Arthur v. Dodge, 101 U. S. 36.)
“No reference, therefore, can be had to the original statutes
to control the construction of any section of the Revised Statutes, when its meaning is plain, although in the original statutes it may have had a larger or more limited application than · that given to it in the revision.”—(Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 402.)
The power of the legislature of Washington Territory is to be determined by the letter of the Revised Statutes, unless controlled by the interpretation clauses or by the constitution. As the term "citizen of the United States" was not limited to males prior to the Revision, and is not so limited by the Revision, it cannot by any true rule of interpretation be limited in Sec. 1860, to “male” persons only.
As to declaratory statutes, the Supreme Court of the United States held:
“Both in principle and authority, it may be taken to be established, that a legislative body may by statute declare the construction of previous statutes so as to bind the courts in reference to all transactions occurring after the passage of the law, and may in many cases thus furnish the rule to govern the courts in transactions which are past, provided no constitutional right of the party is violated."--(Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. 331.)
VI. THE TRUE RULE OF INTERPRETATION.—Where the legislative meaning is plain, there is not only no occasion for rules to aid the interpretation, but it is contrary to the rules to employ them. The judges have simply to enforce the statute according to its obvious terms.-(Bishop on Statutory Crimes, sec. 72; Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y., 258, 260; Benton et al. v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 328; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11. N. Y. 601; Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 N. Y. 262; Wilkinson v. Leland, et al. 2 Pet. 662.)
“In construing these laws, it. has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature; but this intention is to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to convey it.”--(Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 7 Cranch, 60.)
“The courts must give effect to the intention of Congress as manifested by the statute. They cannot make, but can only
declare the law."--(Burnett v. United States, 116 U. S. 161.)
“But with language clear and precise and with its meaning evident, there is no room for construction, and consequently no need of anything to give it aid."—(United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 221.)
“Our duty is to read the statute according to the natural and obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending its operation."--(Waller v. Harris, 20 Wend. [N. Y.] 561; Pott v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 735.)
“When the language is plain, we have no right to insert words and phrases so as to ivcorporate in the statute a new and distinct provision.”—(United States v. Temple, 105 U. S. 99.)
Vattel's first general maxim of interpretation is that 'it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation,' and he continues: “When a deed is worded in clear and precise terms—when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion—there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning which such, deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in order to restrict or extend it, is but to elude it.”--(Vattel's Law of Nations, 244.) Here the words are plain and interpret themselves.--(Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 534.).
There is, therefore, no reason founded on the language or policy of the clause to insert a restriction and locality which have not been expressed by the legislature. On the contrary, upon general principles of interpretation, when the words are general, the court is not at liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enactment.-(United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 80. Also see Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 261.)
Another rule of interpretation is that words are to be interpreted for the protection of rights, and a liberal construction is adopted for that reason. This applies as well to political rights as to civil rights.
In many States the courts have held that the right to regulate suffrage, especially in regard to registration laws, must
not be used to disfranchise any voter who has the constitutional qualifications. Under this rule, the essential qualifications for suffrage in the territories are: Citizenship, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen, residence, and having attained the age of twenty-one years.
This confers no authority to disfranchise any one on account of sex; and beyond question does not demand that it shall be done. · Under this rule, the legislation of Congress in regard to the disfranchisement of women in Utah, affects that Territory alone. That was an amendment of the law of 1882, which disfranchised bigamists and polygamists, and the women who cohabited with them. The same rule was applied to both sexes. This law did not prevent an amendment of the election laws in any territory which might abolish sex as a disqualification for voting or for holding office.
The Organic law of Washington Territory, Sec. 1860, R. S. U. S., is ample authority for the Act of January 18, 1888, defining the qualifications of voters. The words, "citizens of the United States” have included both sexes since the nation existed, and especially since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The courts are bound by that Amendment, and have no authority to interpolate the word “male," under any pretense that the history of the times in 1853, excluded women from political rights, and they are, therefore, not citizens of the United States. The words are plain. Their duty is equally plain. The question is not the policy or the impolicy of granting women the right to vote on equal terms with men; but the duty of courts to follow the plain language of the Constitution of the United States in construing laws made by Congress. Seattle, W. T.
W. S. Bush.
OF THE CHICAGO BAR.
JAMES R. DOOLITTLE.
Side by side with ex-Senator Trumbull, and scarcely less distinguished, stands ex-Senator Doolittle. A parallel might be drawn, which would exhibit many points in common.-Both having been upon the bench—both having 'had a brilliant career in the United States Senate—both going into the Senate as republicans, and retiring therefrom as democrats—both when returning to the practice of their profession, gravitating to the queen city of the West as the one offering the best field for the exercise of their forensic powers, and for the enjoyment of the rewards of a well-earned reputation.
James R. Doolittle was born in Hampton, Washington County, New York, January 3, 1815. His father was Reuben and his mother Sarah (Rood) Doolittle. His father was a farmer and mill-owner, the founder of a school and church, and a man of beneficent and generous impulses.
After going through the ordinary course of preparatory education, James R. entered Geneva College in Western New York, and graduated in 1834, taking the highest honors of his class in scholarship.
He then studied law in Rochester, and was admitted to the bar in 1837, by the Supreme Court of New York. Moving to Wyoming County, he there engaged in a successful practice. Though a democrat, he was elected district attorney in a whig county, and served with general satisfaction. In those days he was an active politician.