invited, opens with a definition of citizenship—not only citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the States. No such definition was previously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of much discussion in the courts, by the executive departments, and in the public journals. It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided always in the District of Columbia, or in the territories, though in the United States, were not citizens. Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided. But it had been held by this Court, in the celebrated Dred Scott case, only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United States.

"It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, citizens of the United States."

From the date of the adoption of that amendment, every statute containing the words "citizens of the United States," has had the meaning of that section; and if the Statute originally had a different meaning, that amendment defined its true reading thereafter. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 389, that "the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to remove from the State Constitution, or render inoperative, that provision which restricts the right of suffrage to the white race."

The same rule makes all acts of Congress, all organic laws of the territories, conform to the definition of citizen in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.

That section, as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States, does not regulate the right of suffrage in a State. But where the qualification for a voter is that of being a "citizen of the United States," it defines the meaning of

that term. As it is a term used with reference to civil and not political rights in that section, the term cannot be used to disqualify women from voting. The section knows no sex. "Citizen" is used in the sense of a member of the "body politic."

In Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 664, the Supreme Court of the United States qualify the expression in the case of Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, that "The Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one," by saying:

"But the court was combating the argument that this right was conferred on all citizens, and therefore upon women as well as upon men."

In the case of Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 690, where a Chinaman, who was a resident of California, claimed the benefit of the statutes protecting the civil rights of "citizens," the court held: "The person on whom the wrong to be punishable must be inflicted, is described as a citizen. In the Constitution and laws of the United States the word 'citizen' is generally, if not always, used in a political sense, to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State or of the United States. It is so used in section 1 of Art XIV of the amendments of the Constitution, which provides that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,' and that 'no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' But it is also sometimes used in popular language to indicate the same thing as resident, inhabitant, or person.'

The statute referred to, made no distinction of sex as to civil rights. Nor did the court.

III. THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES.-All the territory of the United States originally belonged to the States. The right to vote in the States was regulated by State constitutions. The right to vote in the Territories depended on the acts of Congress, or on the acts of the Territorial legislatures. Some of the Territorial courts

claim that under the full legislative power given them, the Territories can disfranchise classes of citizens for other causes than crime.

The question is not involved in this case. Sec. 1860 has imposed the limitations upon the power of the Territorial legislatures, and does not require that the voters shall be "males."

Under the second section of the Fourteenth amendment, the right to vote within the States, on the part of adult male citizens of the United States, residents of the State, is protected against encroachments on the part of Congress or of the State legislatures, except for crime. This amends the old constitution. The section did not forbid States to enfranchise women. It did prohibit the States from disfranchising any adult male citizen of the United States, resident in the State, except for crime.

AS

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. held by the court in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 389, this amendment became the supreme law, and defined the meaning of the term "citizens of the United States" in the first section.

The second section defined and protected the rights of "male inhabitants" of a State, who were "citizens" of the United States within the meaning of the first section of the amendment. It does not limit the political rights of citizens of the United States to "male" voters.

As held by Judge Cranch of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in The United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 162, "The constitution was made for the benefit of every citizen of the United States, and there is no such citizen, whatever may be his condition, or wherever he may be situated within the limits of the territory of the United States, who has not a right to the protection it affords."

The unlimited legislative power over the rights of citizens claimed by some courts, was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 662, in which the court held: "It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property

of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism."

This was re-affirmed in Maynard v. Hill, 8 S. C. Reporter, p. 726.

There can be no question, therefore, of the power of a Territorial legislature to define the qualifications of electors within the limitation, that the elector must be a citizen, or a person who has declared his intention to become such.

V. THE EFFECT OF THE REVISION OF THE STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.-This is to be determined by the repeal clauses and the interpretation clauses of the Revised Statutes, in connection with the Constitution.

Sec. 5596, R. S. U. S. repealed the Organic acts of all the Territories then existing, and left in force only the sections of the Revised Statutes applicable to the several Territories.

The word "citizen" is then to be determined by the Revised Statutes of 1874.

The word "citizen" is used generically in these statutes; and provisions where it is so used-where masculine pronouns are used, as in the naturalization law-are to be construed as including both sexes. This is a well-known rule of law; and is enforced in the enacting clause of the Revised Statutes:

"In determining the meaning of the Revised Statutes, or of any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to Feb. 25, 1871, words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things; words importing the plural number may include the singular; words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females."—(R. S. p. 1.) "The Revised Statutes must be treated as the legislative declaration of the statute law on the subjects which they embrace on the first day of December, 1873. When the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised, to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Congress."—(United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 513; Arthur v. Dodge, 101 U. S. 36.)

"No reference, therefore, can be had to the original statutes

to control the construction of any section of the Revised Statutes, when its meaning is plain, although in the original statutes it may have had a larger or more limited application than that given to it in the revision."-(Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 402.)

The power of the legislature of Washington Territory is to be determined by the letter of the Revised Statutes, unless controlled by the interpretation clauses or by the constitution. As the term "citizen of the United States" was not limited to males prior to the Revision, and is not so limited by the Revision, it cannot by any true rule of interpretation be limited in Sec. 1860, to "male" persons only.

As to declaratory statutes, the Supreme Court of the United States held:

"Both in principle and authority, it may be taken to be established, that a legislative body may by statute declare the construction of previous statutes so as to bind the courts in reference to all transactions occurring after the passage of the law, and may in many cases thus furnish the rule to govern the courts in transactions which are past, provided no constitutional right of the party is violated."-(Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. 331.)

VI. THE TRUE RULE OF INTERPRETATION.-Where the legislative meaning is plain, there is not only no occasion for rules to aid the interpretation, but it is contrary to the rules to employ them. The judges have simply to enforce the statute according to its obvious terms.-(Bishop on Statutory Crimes, sec. 72; Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y., 258, 260; Benton et al. v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 328; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11. N. Y. 601; Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 N. Y. 262; Wilkinson v. Leland, et al. 2 Pet. 662.)

"In construing these laws, it. has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature; but this intention is to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to convey it."-(Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 7 Cranch, 60.)

"The courts must give effect to the intention of Congress as manifested by the statute. They cannot make, but can only