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they would have indicated, among the reasons for challenging the judge, the marriage relation existing between the judge and his wife, acting as advocate for one of the parties. This consideration, which escaped the attention of the Turin Court, might have been invoked in Italy, against the admission of women to the bar.

Our Code of Civil Procedure has nothing of the kind; it fails to mention as a reason for challenging a judge, the relationship or alliance between judge and advocate, hence the preceding argument which has its raison d'etre in Italy, cannot be used by our opponents.

A son may plead before his father, the magistrate; a wife could also do so before her husband, who most assuredly would have the tact to decline to sit as judge during the trial.

But our opponents will further urge, the work at the bar, the intellectual toil, so intense, continuous and absorbing, would it not injure the health of a woman? Those peculiar and periodic conditions to which the laws of nature subject her, would these not interfere with her endurance of the fatigue of the profession? Would she not be prevented from the prompt performance of her legal duties?

Advocates, as a general thing, are complaining that the number of new associates seems to increase proportionately to the decrease in the number of suits brought, and most of them lament this state of business stagnation. The work at the bar then, is not so absorbing as our adversaries would have us think, doubtless to help out their case.

The fitness of woman for a medical career or that of a pharmacist is recognized, yet physicians and pharmacists must hold themselves at the disposal of their patients at every minute of the day and night. Do not these professions occasion much severer fatigue than that of the advocate?

The health of women is thought of too late. If this pity which some persons pretend to feel for the sufferings of working women were sincere, it ought to be exercised toward those who, five hundred feet beneath the surface of the earth, are risking their lives in the mines, and avaricious employers should be forbidden to abuse the strength of women by putting upon

them tasks which are beyond their strength. Before denying women access to the bar on the ground of their health, we ought to prevent them from poisoning themselves in factories, in unhealthy workshops and weave-shops, where anæmia, chlorosis and consumption are permitted to make their frightful ravages upon emaciated frames, whose health is decaying, while hardly any one cares for the sickly offspring to which they give birth.

As to the peculiar physiological conditions which have been invoked, are not the millions of women who earn their living by their labor, subjected to them? (The Rector, M. Wasseige invokes these physiological conditions as an argument against the practice of medicine by women. Discours rectoral, 1886-7,

p. 17 et seq.)

Are female students assigned to particular times for their examinations? Do classes have a holiday when their teachers are ill? Are the patients in hospitals left to treat themselves, during the periodical illness of the internes?

Do the thousands of women who practice medicine, leave their patients to die when they are suffering from catamenial disturbances? (In New York and Brooklyn, there are more than 900 women practicing medicine at the present time.)

In those courts in the United States where women practice as lawyers, is the regularity and expedition of procedure interfered with? And however numerous may be the peculiarities which differentiate the Yankee race from ours, I do not know that American women are subject to other physiological laws than those affecting our Belgian women.

FEDERAL SUFFRAGE.

THE LAW OF FEDERAL SUFFRAGE; an argument in support of. By Francis Minor, of the St. Louis Bar.

After noticing the decision of the U. S. Sup. Ct., in Ex parte Yarbrough (110 U. S., March, 1884), when Minor v. Happersett (21 Wallace, U. S.) was distinguished, the author goes on to say, as a result of that decision, that "Men do not vote for members of Congress by reason of their sex, or because they are men, but because they are citizens of the U. S. and members of the national body politic. The right of women to vote is based on the same ground and for the same reason. They constitute a part of the 'people' or 'citizens.' There is not a word as to the sex of the electors."

There has been a surprising change, during the past few years, on the subject of woman suffrage.

When it does come fairly into politics, the opposition will be able to furnish no better arguments, than fear for existing institutions, for the position of women in society (not in the community), and for the future of practical politics as a lazy way of getting a living. There will be a parade of the same impure statements as greeted the co-education of the sexes; there will be the same old chivalrous talk as an apology for the ownership of the wife or daughters; texts will be wrenched out of the Book of books; all the devices of conservatism will be worked over again; until the daring and novelty of a change will make a break somewhere, and then a few years will make woman suffrage an accomplished fact. Then women will be found to be the most conservative of all the voters.-Current Comment.

INJURY TO PASSENGER FROM UNKNOWN CAUSE.

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.

A question of considerable novelty in the law applicable to common carriers of passengers arose in the case of Pennsylvania Co. v. McKinny, decided recently by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and reported in 17 Atlantic Reports, 14. It appears that the plaintiff, while a passenger on a train in rapid motion, was struck over the eye by a hard substance, thought by surgeons to be coal, and was severely injured. Another train was at the time passing, and the engine was opposite plaintiff. There was no evidence to show where the missile came from. The operators of plaintiff's train testified that they knew nothing to cause it, and those of passing trains testified that nothing was thrown or escaped from their trains. There was evidence that the appliances and machinery of the trains were in good order.

In his charge to the jury the Court, among other things, said: "The rule of law, as applicable to this case, is that the mere happening of an injurious accident to a passenger while in the hands of the carrier will raise prima facie a presumption of negligence, and throws the onus that it did not exist on the carrier."

"Under this principle and the facts in this case, the jury will begin their consideration with the fact established that the injuries were the result of negligence of the defendant. This fact must be rebutted or answered by evidence. In other words, the defendant must show by evidence that it was not negligent. If it has not done this the verdict must be for the

plaintiff." In immediate connection therewith, he said to the jury: "It is your duty, of course, to consider all the evidence in the case and to come to a conclusion on this question of negligence. If you find that the defendant was negligent, then the question of damages must be considered by you."

Mr. Justice Sterrett, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, admitted that the rule stated by the trial court was well settled and of general application in cases of injury to passengers while in the course of transportation, and that the only question was whether it is one of such universal application that it can be invoked without proof of something more than the mere fact of an injurious accident to a passenger while in the hands of the carrier in the absence of any admission or evidence tending to connect the carrier or its servants or any of the appliances of transportation with the happening of the injury.

"The rule in question has been frequently recognized, and the presumption of negligence applied in a variety of cases, among which are stage coach accidents, resulting from breaking an axle, etc., railroad accidents, including derailment of cars, collisions, breaking of machinery, falling of berths of sleeping-cars, violent out-break among other passengers on train, explosion on passenger vessels, etc.: Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp., 79; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick., 109; Hipeley v. Railroad Co., 27 Am. & E. R. Cases, 287; Feital v. Middlesex R. R. Co., 109 Mass., 398; Edgerton v. Railroad Co., 39 N. Y., 229; Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 237; Railroad Co. v. Wolrath, 8 Am. & E. R. R. Cases, 371; Railroad Co. v. Pollard, 76 Pa. St., 510, 513; Spear v. Railroad Co., 119 Id., 61; Packet Co. v. McCool, 8 Am. & E. R. R. Cases, 390; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. St. 481; Holbrook v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y., 236; Railroad Co. v. Anderson, 94 Id. 351; Story on Bailments, 592, 601; Sherman & Redfield on Negligence, §§ 280a, and notes.

"In nearly every case in which the rule under consideration has been applied, it will be found that the injury complained of was shown to have resulted from breaking of machinery, collision, derailment of cars, or something improper and unsafe in

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