show towards them all the respect which it is proper to observe toward the more delicate sex. Moreover, a woman might at times be compelled to deal ex professo, with questions which the excellent rules of polite society do not allow to be discussed in the presence of respectable women."

This argument is, under a new form, a reproduction of that text of the Roman law which forbade women to plead, because it would be opposed to the modesty and reserve befitting their

sex.

The Turin Court seems to overlook the laws of human nature. The world moves, ideas change, and customs, far from being immutable, become modified. The progress of civilization ought to prevent our considering it a thing contrary to modesty and the destiny of the feminine sex that women should mingle in the assemblies of men.

If, as the Turin Court feigns to fear, an advocate, in the flow and excitement of debate, should so far forget the most elementary rules of etiquette and gallantry as to allow himself to omit the deference which every gentlemanly man owes to a woman, there is not a single tribunal that would hesitate a moment, to recall such a misguided advocate to a respect for proprieties.

Because an advocate might some day be wanting in politeness to a feminine colleague, we cannot see why, in view of the slight likelihood of such an occurrence, this should be a reason for pronouncing the exclusion of women from the bar.

As to the third point raised by the Turin Court, if it were well founded, it would be necessary to prevent women from undertaking medical studies, but at the present time most countries, even the most conservative, recognize their right to practice medicine. Is it not much more opposed "to the modesty and reserve" imposed on women, to see our fair competiters, side by side with young men pursuing courses of medical study, and in attendance in the dissecting room? In all such places, women, young girls, are allowed, almost every day, to listen to lectures from professors who do not restrain themselves on account of their feminine auditors, from "ana-. lyzing physiological phenomena, dissecting the generative or

gans, separating the principal constituents of urine, or from discussing the mysteries of syphilis.”—(Ad. Wasseige, De l'exercise de la medicine parles femmes. Inaugural address at the University of Liege, 1886, p. 25.)

Besides, just as women physicians do not select as a specialty, the treatment of the various maladies pertaining solely to the masculine sex, so women lawyers will not seek to make for themselves a reputation, by appearing in scandalous causes, which moreover, are only of occasional occurrence. (In the United States, in the States where there were formerly mixed juries, women were excused from sitting during the trial of scandalous cases.)

The Turin Court has also mentioned "the risk which the gravity of legal proceedings might run, if one should sometimes see the toga covering the strange and bizarre garments which fashion often imposes upon women, or the cap placed upon not less extravagant coiffures."

This fear of the Italian magistracy seems entirely chimerical. A woman who shows enough stability of character to pursue to completion her legal studies, will not become fickle and frivolous at the bar. Her seriousness is a pledge that she will not try to render herself ridiculous by senseless adornments. Be assured, we may trust women for their skill in remaining women, even at the bar.

This reason of the Turin Court, appears to us even more bizarre than the garments of which they speak. Pray, when did fashion become a legal argument?

The robe worn by a deformed and misshapen advocate, is it not more ridiculous than the toga which covers the shoulders of a woman? The plea made by a stammerer, or an advocate whose tones resemble the voice of a chorister in the Sistine Chapel, does not this much more than the presence of a woman at the bar, excite a hilarity prejudicial to the dignity of judicial debates?

If the argument of the Turin Court had anything of a serious character, we ought to adopt in Belgium that provision of the German law as to advocates which excludes from the bar all persons tainted with physical inrmities.

Akin to this argument of costume, is the matter of wearing a moustache and whiskers.

A decree of the legislature of Paris in 1540, forbade advocates and judges to wear beards and moustaches. Ah! some of our despairing opponents will triumphantly exclaim, behold the proof that the profession of advocate is a virile office! It might have been so in 1540, but no one will pretend that this decree of that epoch has not fallen into desuetude. Besides, the wearing of the moustache is prohibited, so that such an argument could only have been invoked against women in case the contrary prescription had been imposed.

On the other hand, lawyers, says Article 6 of the decree of Nivose, An. XI., still in force, shall wear either long or clipped hair. If we are to adopt as true the famous definition of which Schopenhauer, the most rabid of mysogynists, has given us, of woman ("Woman has long hair and short sense"), they much better than men, could fulfill the condition of Article 6 of the Decree of Nivose.

It will be objected that a woman would be an advocate incapable of performing all the duties demanded of the profession; the party which she might defend could not call her to the duties of arbitrator; she would be an advocate disqualified for nomination as magistrate, or for becoming a member of a jury, or of a Council of the Order, since the Council is occasionally called upon to act as judge, and a woman could not be a judge.

We shall not attempt in this place to solve the problem as to whether a woman can be called to the duties of arbitrator.(Dalloz, Arbitre, no. 332.) We confine ourselves to the recollection of the hesitancy of jurisprudence in this respect. But even if woman were considered incapable of rendering a judicial award, this incapacity would in no wise take away her right to practice at the bar.

Is a woman incapable of being an advocate because she does not fulfill the conditions requisite to become a member of a jury? Are foreign advocates and Doctors of Law less than thirty years of age, better qualified than women to be members of a jury? Jurors, moreover, are not chosen from among

advocates exclusively. Engineers, doctors of medicine, of science, of letters, make up a class of citizens proper to be chosen as jurors. Should a woman be forbidden to become a physician, because she might be placed on the list of jurors?

Must woman be excluded from the bar, because she could not be nominated as magistrate? There is no law forbidding the King to appoint a woman to judicial offices. A court of appeal would have no right to refuse the oath of office to a woman merchant, for instance, nominated as consular judge and appointed by the King.

At the time of the discussion of the law of 1876, M. FrereOrban, with the most exact precision, drew the distinction between the practice of the profession of advocate and eligibility to judicial functions.

All those whose moral character is unquestionable, and who hold a diploma of a Doctor of Law, duly confirmed, possess all the requisite qualifications to become members of the bar, while the qualifications required for admission to the magistracy are quite different. The advocates constitute a class of persons from whom the King may make a selection to fill vacancies in the judicial corps, but the Crown has power to choose also from other classes of persons.

The admission of a woman to the bar will not compel the government to nominate her for a magistrate; the executive power remains free to nominate its judges as it sees fit, and if it fears social revolt, it will not impose women judges upon its citizens.

The practice of the advocate's profession is entirely independent of the question of eligibility to the magistracy. This is so well settled that it is a fact that a foreigner can be an advocate in Belgium, although he is excluded from judicial offices, Belgians only being eligible to these latter.

By admitting that the woman lawyer might be looked upon as an incomplete advocate, we do not concede in any wise that she should be excluded from the bar. Is a woman forbidden to become a public trader? And yet a woman is but an incomplete merchant, for she cannot be enrolled upon the list of consular electors, nor according to the theory of our opponents,

18 she capable of being called to membership in a commercial tribunal.

We have two special cases to consider. First, that of a married woman lawyer, whose spouse is likewise a member of the bar. Husband and wife might be intrusted with conflicting interests in the same cause. Let us even suppose that the parties, have confided to their counsel, privileged documents not to be communicated to the adverse party.

In such an event professional secrecy might be violated. By reason of their situation, the spouses might by a fortuitous chance or otherwise, gain a knowledge of the contents of these secret documents.

A more unlikely circumstance cannot be imagined, for the adversaries would be too much interested to be guilty of the imprudence of revealing to their spouse their respective points of defense. Brothers, or a father and son very frequently practice at the bar at the same time, and one never sees such near relatives appear in court in behalf of opposite interests.

In the western States of America, according to information furnished us by Miss Robinson, there are at present, twenty law offices presided over by husband and wife. In most of the eastern States, this is impossible, as the laws do not allow a partnership between husband and wife.

In Belgium, the usage of the bar prescribes permanent partnerships between advocates. As a father and son, dwelling under the same roof, would not be looked upon as partners, so an office occupied in common by husband and wife ought to be allowed, for there would not be anything of a speculative character in it, or of the nature of a commercial enterprise, which is the real reason for the interdiction of such partnerships.

The other case is that of the woman lawyer whose husband is a judge. The Italian Code.of Civil Procedure, Article 116, sec. 10, states that objections may be made to the judge in the following case: "When one of his relatives or connections in the direct or collateral line to the third degree, undertakes the exclusive defense of a cause, as advocate or attorney." If the legislature had thought of admitting women to the bar,