The result was one of the greatest triumphs of the age, and although he did not wholly free himself and his friends from persecution, he left such an impress upon the times, that it has ever since been cited as a warning to all persecutors, whether kingly or judicial in their character.

It is no wonder that since kingly prerogative has ceased to be the rule, that all Englishmen should delight in insisting, that as between man and man, there shall be "fair play."

It is the glory of England in her patronage of the arts, to adorn her public buildings by frescos and paintings illustrative of scenes and incidents in her history that are worthy of remembrance and commemoration.

In the corridors of "The New Palace of Westminster," where sits her immortal House of Commons, are paintings which represent the lineage of her Kings and Queens, great battles by land and sea, and the struggles of the people for free govern

ment.

There the God of Light smiles on the fruitful earth, and angels hold shields emblazoned with the armorial bearings of the barons who wrested Magna Charta from King John.

There are scepters and orbs, emblems of royal power, with crowns; the scales indicative of justice, mitres and croziers, symbols of religion, and blunted swords of mercy, and there one may read the story of the Saxon, the Norman, the Plantagenet, the Tudor, the Stuart, and the Hanoverian Houses.

There "The Spirit of Justice," "The Spirit of Religion” and "The Spirit of Chivalry" are all commemorated. There the attention of the observer is arrested by that noble fresco of "Prince Henry acknowledging the authority of Judge Gascoigne," and of "Speaker Lenthal asserting the privileges of the House of Commons against Charles I. when the attempt was made to seize the five members." There the mind of the American is carried back to "The Embarkation of the Puritan Fathers to New England," and the landing of the Mayflower.

There, too, in the great Hall of St. Stephen, which now forms the long entrance to the House of Commons, on either side, raised aloft on pedestals, which stand out in bold relief, are marble busts of the wisest and the best statesmen of former

days, to whom England owes her gratitude for their patriotism and virtue. There are Selden, Hampden, Lord Falkland, Lord Clarendon, Lord Somers, Sir Robert Walpole, Lord Chatham, Lord Mansfield, Burke, Fox, Pitt and Grattan-but Cromwell, Eliot, Vane, Algernon Sidney, John Milton and William Penn have been omitted.

As you wander through the mausoleums of the dead, and through those long galleries filled with the treasures of art and with the busts and portraits of those who labored, fought and perished in the one great cause of freedom and truth, there come before us the great trials of those forgotten heroes, who were immured in prison, and died upon the block, and their memories will be hallowed by men of every kindred and every tongue in the Old and the New World.

But not in Westminster Abbey, nor in the ancient hall of St. Stephen, not in the corridors of the House of Lords or Commons, is there one incident or one scene which has been there commemorated by the hand of the sculptor, or with the brush of the painter, either on canvas or by fresco, which surpasses in thrilling interest or in its results, the defense of William Penn when arraigned by the partisan judges of Charles II., for attempting to preach in front of the old Quaker Meeting-House in Grace Church Street.

Elliott Anthony.

THE WOMAN LAWYER.

BY DR. LOUIS FRANK.

Translated from the French, for the Chicago Law Times, by Mary A. Greene, LL.B., of the Suffolk, [Mass.] Bar.

IV.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION.-As it seems to us impracticable to make a general and systematic exposition of the subject of the woman lawyer, we shall confine ourselves to examining in succession the various objections which may be raised to the admission of women to the bar. In an impartial analysis we shall show how slight is the foundation of each of these possible objections. We are persuaded that those who are not alarmed at innovations, those whose common sense is not obscured by foolish prejudice, those who are enlightened, guided and persuaded by reason alone, will conclude with us, that no serious ground exists for opposing the practice by a woman of the profession of advocate.

In the first place, it is necessary to discover whether, as the Belgian Pandects claim, the profession of advocate is a public function. (Pandectes belges, Avocat. no. 10, 10 bis, col. 852 et 853.)

In our opinion, there can be no doubt on this point; an advocate is not a functionary; he merely practices a profession.

From the fact that the advocate takes the oath required of him by Article 14 of the decree of 1810, modified by Article 2 of the decree of July 20, 1831, one cannot conclude that he is a functionary, for, if that deduction were admissible, it would also be necessary to infer from the fact that Article 312 of

the code of criminal practice compels a juror to take a special oath, that a juror is a public functionary, in the ordinary sense of the word. Yet this second conclusion would be truer and more rational than the first, since our penal code gives to a juror, by reason of his duties, a special protection by Article 282-a protection which the advocate does not enjoy.

If the advocate were a functionary in the administration of justice, he would hold an executive power, vested in him by reason of his functions. This was the established system in Austria, prior to 1868, where, as we have already stated, the advocate was nominated by Government. At present, advocates are functionaries in but one country, namely, Japan, where they are nominated and appointed by a decree of the Minister of Justice.

If the advocate were a functionary, any injury which might be inflicted upon him in or during the performance of his duties, could be punished by the imposition of a penalty for the insult. Such is not the case.

Moreover, a foreigner, who is incompetent in Belgium, to discharge any public function, could not be an advocate.

To complete the demonstration, that the opinion of the Belgian Pandects is erroneous, one last argument will suffice.

The law of May 26, 1848, declared a parliamentary mandate to be incompatible with the functions and employments paid for by the State, ministerial functions excepted. The Chamber of Representatives decided that an advocate of a ministerial department, an advocate receiving a salary from the State, could be a delegate. Whence we are warranted in concluding, a fortiori, that any advocate whatever, not an attaché of a ministerial department, and not receiving a fixed and definite salary from the State, cannot in any wise be considered a public functionary.

Having said this, we do not believe it necessary to recall, on the authority of Dalloz, the distinction made by Dupin, Procurer-General, and admitted in law, between the oath of the advocate and that of the functionary.-(Dalloz, Répert. vo. Avocat, nos. 48, 277, 68, 73. Cass. fr. 23 Sept. 1831. Id. vo. Serment, no. 39.)

Besides, even in case the profession of advocate should be held to be a public function, women would have still a right to practice it, seeing that no provision, either constitutional or legal, excludes women from public functions. By force of Article 6 of the Constitution, all Belgians, male and female, are equal before the law. All are "eligible to civil employments, with such exceptions as may be established by law to meet special cases."

Therefore, supposing that the profession of advocate does constitute a public office, a special law would be needful to pronounce against woman her incapacity to discharge that function.

Is it true, as some may possibly say, that an express and formal provision of law can alone qualify woman for the practice of an advocate's profession?

In Belgium, four thousand women are now in the service of the State, as teachers, regents, school directors or inspectors of instruction. And there are not only female public functionaries among the corps of educators, but also in the civil service of the departments of Government.

In 1869, M. Jamar, Minister of Public Works, proposed, at a session of the Council of Ministers, that women be admitted to the corps in his department. After a lively debate, the question was decided in favor of women. At the beginning of 1888, according to a census taken by us, the Minister of Railroad, Postal and Telegraph Service had two hundred and forty women in his department. Now, the Belgian legislature has never interposed for the purpose of granting to women the right to become public functionaries. Why should a law be necessary to enable a woman to practice the simple profession of advocate, when a law has never been considered indispensable in order to admit women to the civil service?

In order to exclude women from the bar, it is not sufficient to prove that the profession of advocate is a public function; it is further essential to prove that in conformity with the Roman law, the act of assuming the defense of another, constitutes a virile office, which the feminine sex cannot fill; Alienam suscipere defensionem virile est officium, et ultra sexum muliebrum