In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton 446, decided in 1827, Chief-Justice Marshall held that the importer of liquors upon which duties had been paid in accordance with an act of Congress, could not by a State law be subjected to a license for the privilege of selling them, so long as the liquors remained in the original casks or packages in which they had been imported; but after the package had been broken or after the first sale had been made, they became subject to tax or the owner subject to license under the State law.

Twenty years later, in 1847, the celebrated "License Cases" came before the Court. These were, Thurlow v. Massachusetts, Fletcher v. Rhode Island and Pierce v. New Hampshire; consisting of appeals taken by the first named parties respectively, who had been convicted of selling without license, in their respective States. The cases were argued and decided together. They were considered of great importance, and were argued exhaustively and with great ability. Chief-Justice Taney delivered the opinion, and the judgment was concurred in by all the judges, though they did not agree on all the points under discussion; separate opinions being filed by Justices McLean, Catron, Daniel, Woodbury and Greer.

The State law was sustained in each case, on the broad ground that it was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State.

"The license acts of Massachusetts," said Justice McLean, "do not purport to be a regulation of commerce. They are essentially police laws. Enactments similar in principle are common to all the States."-(5 Howard, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 588.)

Again: "If the foreign article be injurious to the health and morals of the community, a State may, in the exercise of that great and conservative police power which lies at the foundation of its prosperity, prohibit the sale of it.”—(Ibid. p. 592.)

"I admit as inevitable," said Justice Catron, in his separate opinion, "that if the State has the power of restraint by licenses to any extent, she has the discretionary power to judge of its limit, and may go to the length of prohibiting sales altogether, if such be her policy.”—(License Cases, 5 Howard, 610.)

See also opinion of Justice Woodbury in the same cases. Speaking of the police powers of the States, he said: "The powers seem clearly to exist in the States, and ought to remain there." (Ibid. p. 630.)

The License cases had been so ably discussed, and so thoroughly considered by the Court, all the judges participating in the decision, that they were considered as settling the law upon the subject. It was not until 1873, that the question, in a somewhat different shape, came up again, in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wallace, 132.

Justice Miller, giving the opinion of the Court in that case, said, that up to the time of the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the regulation, or even the total prohibition of the liquor traffic, had been considered as falling within the police regulations of the States, left to their judgment, and subject to no other limitations than such as were imposed by the State Constitution or by the general principles supposed to limit all legislative power.

"All rights are held subject to the police power of the State;" said Justice Bradley, in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 32; (1887).

In the same case it was held, that "as a measure of police regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States."-(97 U. S. 25, 33.)

We come now to the cases which have attracted so much attention of late years.

The first was Foster v. Kansas, decided in 1884. ChiefJustice Waite, giving the opinion of the Court, said:

"In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, it was decided that a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, was not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. This was re-affirmed in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, and that question is now no longer open in this Court."-(112 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 206.)

In this case, the Court affirmed the judgment of the State court, removing from office one Foster, who had neglected and

refused to prosecute persons who were guilty of selling intoxicating liquors in the county, in violation of a statute of the State known as the prohibitory liquor law.

In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 666, decided in 1887, Justice Harlan, giving the decision of the Court, said: "The question now before us arises under what are, strictly, the police powers of the State, exerted for the protection of the health, morals and safety of the people. The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated, in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent man."-(123 U. S. 668, 669.) In Kidd v. Pearson, decided last year, the decision in Mugler v. Kansas was affirmed.-(128 U. S. 1.)

What is the police power of a State, which is so often referred to in these decisions?

"By public police and economy," says Blackstone, "I mean the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the State, like members of a well governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners, and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations."--(Black. Com. IV, p. 162.)

"The acknowledged police power of a State," said Justice McLean, in his opinion in the License Cases, "extends often to the destruction of property."-(5 How. 589.)

Justice Greer, in the same cases, speaking of the police power, said:

Without attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of the power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the restraint or punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health and morals, must come within this category."-(Ibid. p. 631.)

Such is the police power of a State. Now it is proposed that his power be surrendered and transferred to the general govern

ment, in one of the most important branches of its exercise. In the first place, a State has no right to surrender such a power. To do so, would be equivalent to abnegating its jurisdiction over its own citizens.

"A State cannot part with its police power."-(Wm. Wharton Smith, in a Treatise on Private Corporations, Phil. 1889, p. 25.)

This doctrine has been applied so as to sustain a State in passing laws in the nature of police regulations, which are apparently in violation of a contract, evidenced by a charter of a private corporation.

"It has been often decided by the American courts, Federal and State, that the State cannot barter away, or in any way curtail its exercise of any of those powers which are essential attributes of sovereignty, and particularly the police power, by which the actions of individuals are so regulated as not to injure others; and any contract by which the State undertakes to do this, is void, and does not come within the constitutional protection."—(Tiedeman's book on the Limitations to Police Power, p. 580.) See also Bank of Columbia v. Oakly, 4 Wheat. 235; Ex parte N. E. and S. W. R. R. Co. 37 Ala. N. S. 679; Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593.

In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 816, the Supreme Court of the U. S. said, in substance, that a State could not divest itself of its police power. See also Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. 111 U. S. 751, and New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. 115 U. S. 650, 672.

"The Legislature cannot part with any of the police powers of the State which are matters that affect the public peace, public health, public morals and public convenience.”—(Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 270; Allerton v. City of Chicago, 6 Fed. Rep. 555; in Re Wong Yung Quy, 2 Fed. Rep. 624; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25.)

A State has no more right to transfer its police power to another government than to a private corporation. In either case, it abnegates its authority, and ceases to be a State.

But, it will be asked, has the United States no police power? Certainly, it has full power over the territories, over the Dis

trict of Columbia, and over American vessels on the high seas. It has also throughout the Union, even in the States, so much police power as is necessary to perpetuate the existence and to carry on the operations of the national government. It has thus much power and no more, and more cannot be given it without breaking up entirely our federative form of government.

The use of alcoholic liquors as a beverage is a great-a crying evil. I would it were entirely prohibited in every place under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and by State authority in every State in the Union. The proposed amendment provides that "the manufacture, importation, exportation, transportation, and sale of alcoholic liquors as a beverage shall be, and hereby is, forever prohibited in the United States, and in every place subject to their jurisdiction."

Now such an amendment could not be carried into execution, for vagueness and uncertainty. Who is to decide what alcoholic liquors are imported into this country "as a beverage?" The casks are not marked, one, "This is to be used as a beverage;" another, "This is for medicinal purposes," etc. All the federal government does is to authorize the importation of the liquors; and the Supreme Court says, that under a proper construction of the Act of Congress, a State cannot tax the liquors in the hands of the importer or require that he take out a license for the privilege of selling them, so long as they remain in the same form-the same casks or packages in which they were imported. But the moment they come within the jurisdiction of a State, they become subject to State laws, with the single exception named. After the packages are broken, or after the first sale, the authority is complete. And even if the first sale should be made for the purpose, on the part of the purchaser, of retailing the liquor as a beverage, he would be powerless to carry out that purpose in a prohibition State, and should he undertake to do so, the liquor would be destroyed. How, then, can the Committee say, as they do in their Report, that "at the present time the police power in the States is fettered and thwarted in its efforts to suppress this evil within the limits of the States, respectively, by the