Parmenides. Theaetetus. Sophist. Statesman. PhilebusOxford University Press, 1892 |
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abstract admit affirm ANALYSIS animals answer appears argument ARISTOTELES assert attribute become older begin better bipeds body called Certainly conception connexion Cratylus dialectic dialogue difficulty distinction distinguish divided divine division doctrine Eleatic elements equal Eristic evil existence false opinion falsehood Gorgias greater hear Hegel Hegelian Heracleitus human ideas ignorance imagine imitation implies infinite INTRODUC kind king knowledge language less mankind mean measure Megara Megarian mind motion nature never not-being objects opposite pain Parmenides partake perceive perception person Phaedrus phantastic Philebus philosophy Plato pleasure principle Protagoras Protarchus Psychology question reason relation relativity of knowledge rest seems sensation sense Sophist sort soul speak Statesman STRANGER suppose surely syllable tell term Theaet Theaetetus Theod Theodorus things thought TION true opinion truth unity unlike whole wisdom words YOUNG SOCRATES younger youth Zeno
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 233 - When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him...
Seite 380 - And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that, being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?
Seite 49 - And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water? I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.
Seite 51 - Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question? What question? I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind is as follows: - You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.
Seite 133 - I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet.
Seite 204 - I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly ; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man — that was not within the range of their ideas ; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong...
Seite 47 - I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and half deceives us into believing that he is saying what is new.
Seite 50 - But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain forms or ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they are named; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; And that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?
Seite 404 - And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake ? Theaet.
Seite 124 - ... which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery — you would think so?