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the present case of almost secular standing. Many of the documents in this case are prior to the independence of the United States of America, some of them go as far back as the seventeenth century. Upwards from 1818, during more than ninety years, the questions implicated in the present arbitration have been the subject of almost uninterrupted diplomatic correspondence and transaction, and more than once they have brought the two great seafaring nations of Europe and America to the verge of the extremities of war.

And now these two nations, to which the world is indebted for so much of its progress in every sphere of human thought and action, have agreed to submit their longstanding conflict to the arbitration of this Tribunal.

In doing so, they have expressed their full confidence in this peaceful mode of resolving international differences, which the first Conference of 1899 has recognized as the most efficacious and at the same time the most equitable method of deciding controversies which have not been settled by diplomatic means.

In doing so, these Governments have set an example for the whole community of nations and have acquired a new merit in the sublime cause of international justice and peace, to the progress of which they have contributed perhaps more than any other nation, especially under the peaceful reign of a great King, whose premature and sudden loss his vast Empire lamented in the last weeks, and under the presidency of that illustrious Statesman who has the historical merit of having initiated the first meeting of this Court in the "Pious Fund" case.

Having been appointed by agreement of the Parties to be the Umpire in this arbitration and being therefore called to the high honor of presiding at these debates, it is my first duty to thank Their Excellencies the President and the Members of the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court for honoring the opening of these proceedings by their presence.

Then I may be permitted to offer a most hearty welcome to my eminent Colleagues and to the honorable and distinguished Agents and Counsel of the two litigant Parties.

Only consciousness of being at your side, my dear and most honored Colleagues, and of being assisted by your experience, your tact and your knowledge has inspired me with the courage to accept the functions so noble, but also so responsible and so difficult, incumbent on me in this arbitration.

Let me express to you once more in public, what I have said already to you in private, that I consider it the greatest distinction in my life to sit in your company in this historic proceeding.

My illustrious Colleagues and myself have studied in these last months with all care and assiduity the voluminous and highly interesting documents which have been presented to us by the Parties; but we have deliberately forborne to form a definite opinion on the arduous questions involved in the case, before having had the most. valuable I may say the indispensable assistance from the speeches of those eminent lawyers and statesmen, who have accepted the functions of Counsel in this case.

Be assured, gentlemen representing the litigant Parties, that all we arbitrators are imbued with the sense of our responsibility not only to the Governments which honored us with their confidence and to the two great nations they represent, but also to the noble idea of international arbitration, so dear to all of us.

We are fully aware that with the end of promoting this peaceful mode of settling international differences the award we have to pronounce must by the force of its motives meet with the approval of all who by their unbiased knowledge of international law are entitled to criticize us.

Every sentence rendered by this Court ought to be by virtue of its impartiality and equity a new marble pillar to sustain the ideal palace of Justice and Peace, the symbol of which is to be that noble edifice which has been dedicated to this town by the munificence of a man. whose name is dear to both litigant nations.

Being conscious of our responsibilities, we shall do our best to render justice to those "captains courageous" and hardy fishermen of both nations, who in the uproar of the sea and at the risk of their lives pile the treasures of the Ocean for the benefit of men. In doing our duty in that way, we hope to settle peacefully and definitely

a difference, which for so long a time has agitated the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race.

May we, with the help of Him who bade His peace to all who are of good will, succeed in promoting the progress of mankind through Justice to Peace, per justitiam ad pacem.

HENRI LAMMASCH.

THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE RULES OF BLOCKADE IN

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Every new agreement between nations changes the sources from which court decisions on subjects pertaining to international law are taken. In some cases, as that of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the rules laid down by a multipartite convention become almost the sole source of facts upon which they touch. Decision after decision of the courts goes no further than that Declaration for the rules as to blockade and neutral goods. Judges whose predilection for extensive citations of authorities is well known consider its provisions of so authentic a nature that they forego further investigation in cases where the point at issue is simple enough to be covered by the laconic statements of the Declaration.

But, on the other hand, the Declaration of Paris was a mere phrasing of principles generally recognized and for many decades before frequently laid down as almost axiomatic. Thus the Declaration of Paris can be considered best as a conventional statement of law previously established. This is generally the case with multipartite conventions, for the nations frequently have points of view too divergent to accept other principles than those already noncontestable or contestable to a slight degree only. Add the results of much compromising on specific points, and the general origin of the multipartite convention is stated.

To how great an extent the Declaration of London 2 will become for judicial purposes the source beyond which there will be no need of going must, of course, await the event to be ascertained. The rules of blockade phrased in it ought to suffice in a great majority of cases, for it includes the gist of the judicial decisions recognized as most authoritative. A comparison has been made between the text of the Declaration and adjudicated cases as published in Scott's Cases on International Law and some other sources, especially re

1 Printed in SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, Vol. I (April, 1907), p. 89.
2 Printed in SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, Vol. III (July, 1909), p. 179.

ports. Realizing that the London Conference was participated in by European nations as well as by Great Britain and the United States, some attention has also been paid to the European point of view regarding the matters considered as expressed, for the most part, in Bonfil's Manuel de Droit International (cinquième édition, Paris, 1908). This study seemed particularly appropriate in view of the purpose of the Conference as stated in the preliminary provision:

The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

The British delegates in their final report phrased this differently:

The purpose of the Conference has been, above all, to note, to define, and, where needful, to complete what might be considered as customary law.

The latter statement is perhaps preferable because the term international law is, for Anglo-Saxons, an indefinite one making no distinction between adjudicated law and the dicta and conclusions of text writers which are higher in favor among the Latin races as authorities than in the United States and Great Britain.

In may be said at the outset that the statement of the British delegates is an excellent one. A careful study of Chapter I of the Declaration and comparison of its provisions with the volumes mentioned above shows that the Conference did note, define and complete to a large extent what was already to be found in international. legal rules.

In Chapter I, regarding blockade in time of war, fully half of the twenty-one articles is devoted to "completing" the dicta of customary law. This is perfectly natural, for a set of rules must necessarily lay down practical methods of carrying out their provisions, and this is a matter of which courts take little cognizance. Rules coming under this head are contained in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 relative to the contents of a declaration of blockade and the methods of notification; Article 13 relative to notification when a blockade is voluntarily raised; provisions in Articles 15 and 16 rela

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