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China's fear of having her army and politics controlled by outsiders. She remembers bitterly the disasters she has suffered in the past at the hands of spies and consequently she is very nervous about any step that might bring her toward the same path of danger. It should also be noted that with the existence in China of consular jurisdietion, which exempts foreigners from her courts and thereby makes them a privileged class, very few persons who would become good citizens find it profitable to take Chinese nationality. Whatever liberal grant of political rights she may accord to naturalized aliens, she will not succeed in inducing many respectable persons into her nationality, but, instead, she simply opens a way to evildoers to carry out their machinations. With all this in mind, we can easily see that Article VIII is but a step of necessary precaution under existing circumtsances.

That part of the law that deals with expatriation perhaps needs special explanation. Article XI says: "Any Chinese intending to acquire an alien character must first obtain a discharge; " and Article XVIII declares in unmistakable language that all persons who have become naturalized as aliens without permission from the Chinese authorities shall be deemed Chinese, regardless of circumstances. As for those persons who, prior to the operation of the law, had become naturalized, the law requires them duly to inform the local authorities of their change of character within one year after the law goes into effect, failing which they are to be deemed Chinese, if found residing in the interior or holding official positions. These several provisions taken together, are fraught with great consequences. Apart from the fact that they amount to a direct denial of the so-called inherent right of expatriation, they are inconsistent with the generally accepted principle that the acquisition of a new nationality ipso facto extinguishes a previous existing one; they necessarily give rise to double nationality. For instance, if a Chines is naturalized in a country which does not trouble itself to inquire whether he has obtained dismissal from the Chinese Government, both countries will claim him as a subject, the one by reason of his naturalization and the other on the ground that he has not observed the rules of expatriation. At the present time when the troubles resulting from double nationality have been fully brought home to

the lawmakers, it is strange that the Chinese Government should create more of them by embodying in her law the state-consent clause in addition to the jus sanguinis, which as opposed to the jus soli alone affords ample material for conflicts between states. This could hardly have been due to hastiness or incomplete consideration. The law was the result of a long preparation. It was first drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conjointly with the Special Commissioner for the Codification of Laws, then revised by the Constitutional Investigation Board and finally submitted to the Grand Council for approval. Moreover, the task of drafting and revising was put into the hands of law students who were familiar with similar laws of other countries. Such being the case, how shall we then account for this state-consent clause which is now-a-days never so strongly emphasized in the law of any other country and which, as must have been foreseen, would become a source of conflicts with other nations?

The answer to this question is not far to seek. As already explained, one of the two objects of the law is to minimize the abuses of the lax naturalization laws of some foreign countries as applied to their colonies. That China has in the past suffered very greatly from these evils and must at once put a stop to them is self-evident. It only remains to be decided what steps she should take for their suppression. As she has, in spite of her repeated efforts, failed to induce the foreign governments concerned to modify their laws, it is but natural that she should turn to any means, such as the consentclause, that may, notwithstanding all its disadvantages, give some measure of relief. To be sure, the consent-clause is too arbitrary and results in exceptional cases of hardship, but here China will plead that it is the only course open to her.

Thus we see that China is confronted with two alternatives, neither of which is wholly desirable but one of which must be taken. The alternatives are: on one hand the unchecked abuses of lax foreign naturalization laws, and on the other, the consent-clause which will necessarily give rise to double nationality. The former is a menace to the security of the country, nay, the sapping of her vitality. The latter is productive of international controversies which, however, are rare. Therefore, as a lesser evil the consent-clause is taken.

Nor need we push the interpretation of the state-consent clause too far. China does not seek to forbid the denationalization of her subjects. All that she demands is that she should be informed be forehand of the design of one of her subjects to expatriate himself and to examine whether by reason of crime, debts, or unfulfilled duties to the state, it is necessary to retain him longer. This point is fully set forth in Article XII, which says: Permission of discharge shall be granted if the petitioner is not (1) involved in any pending civil or criminal case, (2) bound to military duties, (3) in arrears with any state or communal tax, or (4) holding any governmental position or vested with official rank.

Another point that should be explained in order to avoid misunderstanding, is the attitude which the law takes towards the settlements in the treaty ports. The supplemental provisions of the law forbid under penalty of expulsion the residence in the "Interior" of all persons who have lost Chinese character. Foreign settlements in the treaty ports are not mentioned in this connection, but by a reasonable interpretation of these provisions it may be safely concluded that the Chinese Government tacitly permits such persons to reside and hold property in those places. Such a discriminating attitude is rendered necessary by the peculiar conditions existing in the treaty ports. It must not be inferred, however, that China has ceased to exercise her sovereign jurisdiction over these places, and, as a corollary, that foreign governments can naturalize her nationals in such ports as Shanghai, Canton and Tientsin. One of the estab lished principles of international law is that a state can confer citizenship upon aliens only in virtue of its territorial sovereignty. In the case of foreign settlements in China, the sovereign jurisdiction of the Chinese Government is maintained in treatics and upheld by legal decisions. Therefore, whatever concessions China may grant to foreign settlements can in no wise destroy her sovereignty. At the most, they only serve to cast a sidelight on the limitations of China's actual jurisdiction over these places.

Enough has been said to demonstrate the importance of the law. It has been in operation for almost a year and the consensus of opinion is that it has so far worked smoothly. While an examination in detail brings out many flaws in its construction, it is nevertheless

an ingenious fabric and will remain a most important landmark in the history of Chinese law-making. It is a remarkable example of the dexterous handling which the present Chinese legislators attempt to apply to their remedial measures. If the foreign consuls in China continue to respect the law both in spirit and in letter, it will surely prove beneficial to the relations between China and the outer world. TSAI CHUTung.

BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, State University of Iowa.

DAVID J. HILL, Berlin, European Editor.

GEORGE, W. KIRCHWEY, Columbia University.
ROBERT LANSING, Watertown, N. Y.

JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Columbia University.
WILLIAM W. MORROW, San Francisco, Cal.
LEO S. ROWE, University of Pennsylvania.
OSCAR S. STRAUS, Washington, D. C.
GEORGE G. WILSON, Brown University.
THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, Yale University.

Editor in Chief

JAMES BROWN SCOTT, George Washington University.

Business Manager

GEORGE A. FINCH, P. O. Box 226, Washington, D. C.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MARITIME LAW The Third International Conference on Maritime Law met at Brussels on September 28, 1909, and adjourned October 8, to meet again next April. Germany, Argentina, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Chili, Cuba, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Holland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, and the United States were the participating nations, with a total membership of sixty-two delegates. The object of the Conference was chiefly to secure uniformity of law upon four subjects: collisions, salvage, liability of ship owners, and liens; tentative conventions as to the first two, and projects as to the last two were adopted.1

1 See SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, pp. 115-126.

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