scheme, was to cross the Balkan, ob- 12. Two other more delicate subtain Roumelia with Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and portions of Asia Minor, so as to secure to her the command of the Straits. Austria was to be gratified with Macedonia, except Salonica, in addition to Bosnia and Servia; and France, besides Albania, Greece, Cyprus, and the Isles of the Archipelago, was to be gifted with Egypt, while the Turks were to be banished to the eastern extremity of their empire on the Euphrates. But these vast projects of spoliation came to nothing, from the impossibility of coming to an understanding as to which party was to obtain possession of Constantinople-a city, as Napoleon justly observed, in the finest position in the world, and itself worth a kingdom. 11. In return for so many concessions, he procured from Alexander a promise to aid France with a considerable force in the event of a war with Austria, and conceded to his earnest entreaties a considerable relaxation of the oppressive burdens under which Prussia had so long groaned. The arrear of contributions fixed at140,000,000 francs, by the treaty of 8th September, was reduced to 125,000,000; and a more important relaxation took place in the form of payment, by which, in consideration of 50,000,000 of francs received by Daru on the 5th November, and 70,000,000 more for which promissory notes were granted, the royal revenues were to be restored to the Prussian authorities; and the French troops, which were urgently required in the Peninsula, were, with the exception of the garrisons of Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau, entirely to evacuate the Prussian dominions. Thus had Napoleon the address to make his disasters in Spain, which imperatively required the removal of the French troops from the north of Germany, the means of gratifying Alexander by an apparent concession to his wishes, and diminishing the irritation of Prussia, which, in the event of hostilities with Austria, might prove, even after all its disasters, a formidable enemy in his rear. jects of discussion were, after being touched on, averted rather than settled by the diplomatic skill of the two Emperors, and left the seeds of inextinguishable future jealousy in their minds. The first was a proposal by Napoleon, who already had resolved to divorce Josephine, for the hand of the Grand-duchess Catherine Paulowna, the favourite sister of the Emperor: an overture which the astute Russian evaded by referring the matter, not to the reigning Empress, whose ambition its brilliancy might have dazzled, but to the Empress-dowager, whose firmness of character was proof against the seduction. She hastened to terminate the dangerous negotiation by alleging religious scruples, and shortly after marrying her daughter to Prince Oldenburg. The second was, an amicable but resolute contest for the possession of Constantinople. Napoleon, as he himself has told us,* could not bring his mind to cede to his rival the Queen of the East: Alexander, with justice, regarded it as the outlet to his southern dominions-the backdoor of his empire-and was earnest that its key should be placed in his hands. Fearful of interrupting their present harmony by any such irreconcilable theme of discord, the subject was, by common consent, laid aside: the City of Constantine was suffered to remain in the hands of the Turks, who in every other respect were abandoned to Muscovite ambition. But the tender point had been touched-the chord which jarred in the hearts of each struck; and the inestimable prize formed the secret subject of hostility, which, as much as jealousy of English power, afterwards led the French legions to Borodino and the Kremlin. 13. Immediately after the conference at Erfurth, a formal treaty was "We talked," says Napoleon, "of the affairs of Turkey at Erfurth. Alexander was very desirous that I should agree to his obtaining possession of Constantinople, but I could never bring my mind to consent to it. It is the noblest harbour in the world, is placed in the finest situation, and is itself worth a kingdom."-LAS CASES, iv. 231; and O'MEARA, i. 362. concluded with Prussia, by which the October, he arrived at Bayonne on the alleviations to her miseries provided 3d November, and immediately disfor by the arbiters of Europe were re- posed his forces for active operations. duced to writing; and in a short time The effect of the vigorous exertions the evacuation of the Prussian states, which he had made to strengthen his with the exception of the three retain- armies in that quarter was now begined fortresses, took place. Restored by ning to display itself. The fifty thouthis removal, and the recovery of the sand soldiers who in the middle of right of collecting his revenue, in a August were concentrated on the certain degree to his rank of an inde- Ebro, dejected by disaster, had swellpendent sovereign, Frederick-William, ed by the end of September, as if by in company with his beautiful Queen, enchantment, to ninety thousand men returned to the capital, and made his present under arms in Navarre, bepublic entry into Berlin amidst the sides twenty thousand, under St Cyr, transports and tears of his subjects. in Catalonia. This body, already so The results of the secret conference formidable, subsequently received vast at Erfurth soon developed themselves. accessions of force from the troops arMurat was declared by Napoleon King riving from Germany, especially the of Naples and Sicily; and, leaving the Imperial Guard, and the corps of Soult, theatre of his sanguinary measures and Ney, and Mortier, all of which were veterash hostility in the Peninsula, has-rans from the Grand Army, confident tened to take possession of his newly- in themselves, and inured to victory. acquired dominions. He was received 15. During the whole of October, with universal joy by the inconstant the road from Bayonne to Vittoria was people, who seemed equally delighted crowded with horsemen and carriages; with any sovereign sent to them by through every opening in the Pyrenees, the great northern conqueror. His foot-soldiers were pouring in endless entry into Naples was as great a scene multitudes to reinforce the grand of triumph, felicitations, and enthusi- muster in Navarre. Conformably to asm, as that of Joseph had been. his general custom, Napoleon divided Shortly afterwards, however, he gave the whole army into eight corps, comproof of the vigour which was to at-manded by as many marshals, whose tend at least his military operations, by a successful expedition against the island of Capri, which the English had held for three years, but now yielded with a small garrison under Sir Hudson Lowe, which capitulated, and was sent back to England, to a vigorous and well-conceived attack from the French forces. 14. Secured by the conferences at Erfurth from all danger in his rear, Napoleon speedily returned to Paris; and, after presiding over the opening of the legislative assembly, then resolved, with his wonted vigour, to set out for the Pyrenees. He was determined by a sudden attack to disperse the Spanish armaments and capture Madrid, before either the English auxiliaries could acquire a solid footing in the Peninsula, or Austria could gain time to put in motion the extensive armaments she was preparing on the Danube. Leaving Paris in the end of names, already rendered immortal in Third corps, Moncey, Duke of Fourth corps, Lefebvre, Duke of Fifth corps, Mortier, Duke of Tre- 33,054 37,690 25,984 26,713 Sixth corps, Ney. Duke of Elchingen, 38,033 Eighth corps, Junot, Duke of Reserve, Napoleon in person," 42,107 25,730 42,382 14,060 819,690 almost entirely Galicians, but with hardly any cavalry, and only twentysix guns, was stationed on the rocky mountains near Reynosa, from whence the Ebro takes its rise. Thus, seventyfour thousand infantry and two thousand horse, with eighty-six guns, were all that the Spaniards could rely upon for immediate operations on the Ebro; for although considerable reserves were collecting in the rear, yet they were too far from the scene of action, and their discipline and equipment were not in a sufficient state of forwardness to permit of their either arriving in time at the theatre of conflict, or taking any useful part in it, if they were there.t Seventy thousand Spanish infantry and two thousand Spanish cavalry could never be considered a match for a hundred and fifty thousand French foot, and thirty thousand horse, even under the most favourable circumstances. Least of all could they be relied on, when the French occupied a central position, defended by almost inaccessible mountains, and were guided by one commander of consummate abilities; while their undisciplined antagonists, scattered over a circumference two hundred miles in length, and separated from each other by deep ravines, rapid rivers, and impassable_ridges, were under the command of different and independent generals, jealous of each other, and gifted with comparatively moderate military talents. Grand Army. After deducting the troops in Catalonia, and those which required to be maintained in garrison in the northern fortresses, and the sick and absent, at least a hundred and eighty thousand could be relied on for offensive operations on the Ebro. But the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least formidable part of its character. It was its incomparable discipline, spirit, and equipment, the skill and vigour of its officers, the docility and experience of its soldiers, the central and impregnable position which it occupied among the mountains of Navarre, and the unity of design which it was well known would soon be communicated to its operations by the consummate talents of Napoleon, which constituted its real strength, and rendered the friends of freedom in Europe justly fearful of the collision of such a host with the divided and inexperienced armies of the Spanish provinces.* 16. These armies, though very numerous on paper, and in considerable strength in the field, were far from being in a situation, either from discipline, equipment, or position, to make head against so formidable an enemy. The Spanish troops were divided into three armies; that of the right under Palafox, consisting of eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, occupied the country between Saragossa and Sanguessa, and was composed almost entirely of Aragonese. The centre, under Castanos, which boasted of the victors of Baylen in its ranks, was twenty-eight thousand strong, including thirteen hundred horse, and had thirty-six pieces of cannon; it lay at Tarazona and Agreda, right opposite to the centre of the French position. The left, un-effectual assistance. Sir John Moore's der Blake, thirty thousand in number, * Before assuming the command of the army, Napoleon had said, in his opening address to the legislative body at Paris, "In a few days I shall set out to place myself at the head of my army, and, with the aid of God, crown at Madrid the King of Spain, and plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon!"— Discourse, 25th Oct. 1808; Moniteur, 26th Oct. 1808; and THIB. vii. 86. And Imperial Muster-Rolls, NAPIER, i. 88, Appendix. †These reserves were stated to be as fol 17. The British forces, it is true, under Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird, were rapidly approaching the scene of action; but their distance, notwithstanding all their efforts, was still such as to preclude the hope of their being in a situation to render any forces, which set out on their march Castilians at Segovia, about 150 12,000 13,000 14,000 18,000 57,000 stationed at the Escurial, Salamanca, and Astorga, distant eighty or a hundred miles from each other, and without any common base or line of operations; and the Spaniards, a hundred miles further in advance, were also divided into three armies, separated by like distances from each other; while Napoleon lay with a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops clustered round the basin of Vittoria. It was easy to see that the allies, exhibiting in this respect a melancholy contrast to their antagonists, were but novices in the art of war, and signally ignorant of the importance of time in its combinations; and that the English in particular, inheriting too much of the character of their Saxon ancestors, were, like Athelstane the Unready, still unprepared to strike till the moment for decisive operations had passed.* from Lisbon, as already mentioned, in | all more than thirty thousand strong, the end of October, had broken, for was split into three divisions, severally the sake of procuring better roads for the artillery and waggon-train, into two columns; and while the main body, under Sir John in person, followed the direct road by Abrantes, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, a lesser division, but with the reserve and most of the guns, took the more circuitous route by Elvas, Badajos, Talavera, and Madrid. It was not, however, till the 8th November that this heavily encumbered corps reached the Spanish frontier, and on the 27th of the same month that it crossed the Guadarrama mountains, before which time the fate of all the Spanish armies on the Ebro was sealed. Meanwhile, on the 11th, Sir John Moore himself crossed the Spanish frontier, and on the 18th had collected the bulk of his forces at Salamanca; but Sir David Baird, who had landed at Corunna on the 13th October, had only, by great exertion, succeeded in reaching Astorga in Leon, four days' march from Sala manca, on the 20th November. 19. Napoleon, who was well aware of the importance of striking a decisive blow in the outset, and dispersing the Spanish armies in his front, 18. Thus the British army, not in before the warlike and disciplined re*These observations apply to those having into Spain. For this oblivion of the first the general direction of the allied campaign, rule of military movements, viz. to station and especially the English government, who, each portion of the army so that its different at this period, were far from being adequately arms may, in case of need, support and aid impressed with the vital importance of time each other, it is hardly possible to find any in war. Their instructions for the campaign excuse. It is difficult to conceive how the were dated so late as October 6. Both the direct road by Almeida could at that period gallant generals intrusted with the direction have been impassable for artillery and wagof the English army pressed forward with all gons, when it had so recently before been imaginable expedition after they received traversed by Junot with all his army, and them; and Sir John Moore in particular, as was ever after the great line of military comit will appear in the sequel, with mourn- munication which the Duke of Wellington ful resolution, began an important advance made use of from the capital to the frontier; under circumstances which, to all but a sol- and, at any rate, if the passage at that period dier of honour, were utterly desperate. It was impracticable for the guns, that might was impossible for him to commence opera- have been a good reason for sending the tions before the junction with Sir David whole army round by Elvas, but it could be Baird, which did not take place till the end none for separating it into two parts, severed of November. But still, in all concerned, by two hundred miles from each other, and there was at this period an evident want of exposing either to the chance of destruction, the vigour and expedition requisite for suc- when the other was not at hand to lend it cess in war. Napoleon would never have any support. Colonel Napier, much to his permitted the main English army to have credit, admits that this separation violated a lingered inactive at Lisbon from the end of great military principle, though he endeaAugust, when the Convention of Cintra was vours to defend it in that particular case as concluded, till the middle of October, when unattended with danger. It will appear in the march for Spain commenced, nor delayed the sequel, that the greatest commanders the British expedition under Sir David Baird sometimes unnecessarily fall into a similar till it reached the Spanish shores for the first forgetfulness; and that the cantoning the time on the 13th of that month. But these English infantry apart from the cavalry and were the faults of government. The great-artillery on the Flemish frontier, and within est error, in a military point of view, of Sir the reach of the enemy's attack, in 1815, had John Moore, was separating the artillery well-nigh induced a serious disaster at Quatrefrom the infantry and cavalry in the advance | Bras.-NAPIER, i. 334, and Infra. developed itself. Blake had engaged in this laborious and dangerous mountain-warfare without magazine stores or any base of operations, and with only seventy rounds of ammunition for each gun. His men, when the winter was approaching and the snow beginning to fall, were without greatcoats, and many without shoes; and the bulk of the enemy's forces being serve of the English troops could arrive at the scene of action, lost no time, after his arrival on the Bidassoa, in pressing forward the most active operations. Some inconsiderable actions had, before his arrival, taken place on the French right, where Blake had, since the 18th September, been engaged in an offensive movement, from which no material results had ensued. Prior to this, the French had evacuat-grouped around Burgos, exposed his ed Burgos and Tudela, and extended right flank to successful attack. themselves towards Bilbao, which they still held, much against the will of Napoleon, who strongly censured such a proceeding, as gaining nothing in strength of position, and losing much in moral influence.* Blake broke up from Reynosa on the 18th September with thirty thousand Galicians, and advanced to Santander. The effect of this movement was to make the French concentrate their forces in the basin of Vittoria; and Blake attacked Bilbao with fifteen thousand men, which fell the day after it was invested; while the French withdrew up the valley of Durango, and all the lateral valleys in its vicinity, to the higher parts of the mountains of Navarre. But though these operations were at first successful, yet the natural effects of the presumption and want of foresight of the Spanish government and generals soon "The line of the Ebro," says Napoleon, "was actually taken; it must be kept. To advance from that river without an object would create indecision; but why evacuate Burgos-why abandon Tudela ? Both were of importance, both politically and morally; the latter as commanding a stone bridge and the canal of Saragossa; the former as the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. If occupied in force, it would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, even Madrid itself. If the enemy occupies Burgos, Logrono, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful situation." It is remarkable how early the experienced eye of the French Emperor, at the distance of three hundred leagues from the scene of action, discerned the military importance of BURGOS-a town then unknown to military fame; but the value of which was afterwards so strongly felt by the Duke of Wellington, that he strained every nerve, and exposed himself to imminent risk in the close of the brilliant campaign of 1812, in the unsuccessful attempt to effect its reduction.-Note, Sur les Affaires d'Espagne, August 1808, taken at Vittoria; NAPIER, App. No. iv. p. 18. 20. A combined attack had been arranged between the Spanish generals, along the whole circumference which they occupied, upon the central mountain position of the French army. But such a complicated movement, difficult and hazardous even with the best disciplined troops, when acting along such an extensive and rugged line of country, was altogether hopeless with the disorderly and ill-appointed bands of the Peninsular patriots. An attack by Castanos, with the Andalusian army, upon the French posts on the Ebro around Logrono, though at the first attended with some success, at length terminated in disaster; and the Spanish division of Pignatelli was driven back with the loss of all its artillery, and immediately dispersed. Discouraged by this check, Castanos fell back to Calahorra; and dissensions, threatening very serious consequences, broke out between that general and Palafox, who retired with the Aragonese levies towards Saragossa. Meanwhile Blake, whose forces from the junction of the troops under Romana, which had come up from Corunna, and the Asturians, with whom he was in communication near Santander, were increased to nearly fifty thousand men, commenced a forward movement on the French left in the Biscayan provinces, and, stretching himself out by the sea-coast, and up the vallay of Durango, threatened to interpose between the advanced divisions of Lefebvre and Ney's corps, which lay most exposed, and their communication with the French frontier on the Bidassoa. 21. This offensive movement was well conceived, and, if conducted and |