Higher up, in the gorge of the mountains, about a mile to the east of Oberglauh, is Lutzingen, bordered on the north and east, within musket-shot, by woods and ravines.

On the left of the Nebel the plain is uneven, and partly covered with brushwood. In the vicinity of Schwenenbach and Berghausen, the ground becomes more undulating. Near Weilheim, it rises into a gentle elevation, and consists of arable land as far as the village of Kremheim, which borders on the Danube.

In this great battle it is difficult to discover the respective numbers of the two armies, which in some degree arises from the uncertain mode of computation by battalions and squadrons.

The order of battle, which is preserved in the king's library, states the confederate army at 66 battalions and 166 squadrons; but of these, some are admitted to have been absent, and others unaccounted for.

Tallard computes the army of Marlborough at 49 battalions of 500 men each, and 88 squadrons of 160; and that of Eugene at 18 battalions and 78 squadrons; in all, 67 battalions and 166 squadrons, or 38,000 infantry and 26,560 cavalry-a total of 64,560 men. This exaggeration is evidently intended to extenuate his defeat.

Marlborough, in his letter to the States, computed the combined troops at 64 battalions and 166 squadrons, of which 1,500 horse were not present at the battle, making 32,000 infantry, and 18,420 cavalry, allowing 500 for each battalion, and 120 for each squadron; to which number we may add about 1,500 men, in consequence of the superior strength of the German squadrons. This statement justifies us in estimating the whole confederate force at 52,000 men. Of all arms, the enemy had about 56,000.

On the memorable 13th of August, at two in the morning, the allied generals, having detached their baggage to Rietlingen, broke up their camp, leaving the tents standing; and at three, the troops, amounting to 52,000 men, passed the Kessel in eight columns. The right wing was commanded by Eugene, the left by Marlborough, and the aggregate force amounted to 52,000 men, with 52 pieces of artillery, and a train of pontoons.

The army of Eugene, filing by the right, was divided.

into two columns of infantry, and two of cavalry, the artillery following the infantry, and the cavalry closing the march. The army of Marlborough, filing by the left, broke also into two columns of infantry and two of cavalry, the cavalry being on the left, and the artillery following the infantry.

On reaching the bank of the Reichen, they came into parallel order, and halted. Here the outposts joined their respective corps. The two brigades of Wilkes and Rowe, which on the preceding evening had been stationed in front of Dapfheim, were formed into a ninth column, and reinforced with eleven battalions from the first line, and fifteen squadrons of cavalry. This column was designed to cover the march of the English and Dutch artillery along the great road, and to attack the village of Blenheim, the possession of which would facilitate the passage of the main army over the Nebel, and open the right flank of the

enemy.

The troops of Marlborough were directed to form on the ground stretching from Weilheim to Kremheim, while those of Eugene, passing along the skirts of the hills in the rear of Wolperstetten, Berghausen, and Schwenenbach, were to prolong the line to the extremity of the valley, as far as Eichberg. From these general arrangements it appears that the allied commanders intended to make their first efforts against Blenheim and Lutzingen, which covered the flanks of the enemy. The subsequent changes arose from the locality of the ground, and the order adopted by their antagonists. After these preliminary dispositions, the troops resumed their march in silence. Meanwhile, Marlborough and Eugene, escorted by forty squadrons, rode forward to observe the situation of the enemy. They were accompanied by the Prussian general Natzmer, who had been made prisoner in the battle fought here between Stirum and Villars, in the preceding year, and was acquainted with the local peculiarities. About six they descried the advanced posts of the enemy falling back on their approach, and at seven, reaching the higher ground near Wolperstetten, they came in full view of the hostile camp. From hence they could trace the course of the Nebel, and learned that it might be traversed at the houses and water-mills, near the

right of the enemy; but that the islet and the banks towards Oberglauh were deemed too swampy to be passable. They observed, also, that the ground on the hither side, as far as Unterglauh, was sufficiently high to protect the passage of the rivulet, but that the plain beyond the farther bank, on which the troops must form for the attack, was commanded by the eminence occupied by the enemy. To these peculiarities they adapted their plan.

The morning being hitherto partially hazy, the GalloBavarians did not even suspect the approach of the enemy. Deceived by the intelligence which they had obtained from the prisoners taken on the preceding evening, they detached their cavalry to forage, and being persuaded that the allies were falling back on Nordlingen, they considered the guard which attended Marlborough and Eugene, as a body of cavlary pushed forward to cover this retrograde movement. But at seven, the fog dispersing, the heads of Eugene's columns were descried behind Berghausen, and the alarm was instantly given. Signal-guns were fired to recall the foragers, and the advanced corps, committing Berghausen, Schwenenbach, and Weilheim, to the flames, fell back to the main body. Confusion pervaded the lines, the artillery was hurried forward, and the troops were observed hastening to form at the head of the camp.

The Gallo-Bavarian army consisted of 56,000 men, and was drawn up in front of the tents, according to the order of encampment.

The united troops of the Elector and Marsin formed on the left with the cavalry on their right, the army of Tallard on the right with the cavalry on the left, so that the centre consisted of horse and the wings of foot. This order was adopted on the supposition that the Nebel was impassable from Oberglauh to the mills. The lines extended from the commencement of the acclivity behind Blenheim, along the crest of the eminence to the rear of Oberglauh, and from thence, crossing a branch of the Nebel, to the woods above Lutzingen.

As every moment afforded fresh indications of the approaching contest, Tallard proceeded to make ulterior arrangements. Hastening to Blenheim, he ordered a brigade of dragoons under the Count de Hautefeuille to dismount, and

form between the village and the Danube, behind a barricade of waggons. He then directed all the infantry of the first line, and part of the second, to enter the village, and placed the three brigades of Navarre, Artois, and Gueder, with their right joining the left of the dismounted dragoons, behind the palisades which enclosed the gardens. The openings between the houses and gardens were closed with boards, carts, and gates. Behind the hedges to the left of the village, he posted the brigade of Zurlauben; in the centre, among the houses, that of Languedoc, to the right; in the rear, the royal brigade; and behind the Meulweyer, that of Montroux, to act as a reserve. Two hundred men were also thrown into the castle and churchyard, and small bridges formed across the Meulweyer to facilitate the communications. The mills on the Nebel, and adjacent houses which were likely to favour the approach of an enemy, were set on fire. A battalion of artillery was distributed on different points, and Lieutenant-General De Clerambault was enjoined to maintain the village to the last extremity.

Eight squadrons of gens-d'armes drew up to the left of Blenheim, and from thence the line, including the right wing of the electoral army, amounting to about fifty squadrons, was prolonged to near Oberglauh. Behind this village was the infantry of Marsin, consisting of the brigades of Champagne and Boubonnois, and the Irish brigade, in all about thirty battalions. Beyond were more battalions extending to the left, and covering the flank of the cavalry, who were drawn up in front of Lutzingen. Strong pickets of infantry occupied Oberglanh, and eighteen French and Bavarian battalions, who had at first been posted in Lutzingen, were drawn out to form an oblique flank among the woods, on the extreme left of the cavalry. The second line of the united troops under the Elector and Marsin, was formed in the same order as the first; but in that of Tallard, were stationed three brigades of infantry in the centre of the cavalry. Behind was a reserve of horse, which could not find a place in the lines. Tallard, observing the increasing mass of the allies in the centre, sent an aide-de-camp to his colleague, requesting that his reserve might likewise be posted behind the centre, to resist the attack which he foresaw was meditated on that point; but this proposal was

declined by Marsin, from an apprehension that his whole force would be required to withstand the attack of Eugene. The artillery was distributed with judgment. Four twenty-four pounders were planted on the high ground above Blenheim, to sweep the plain of Schweningen. Four eight-pounders were also pointed against the columns of Marlborough, as soon as they appeared about the high road leading towards Unterglauh. Before the gens-d'armes was another battery of twenty-four pounders, and the other pieces were disposed along the front of the different brigades. Zurlauben, who commanded the right wing of Tallard's cavalry, was directed to charge the allies whenever a certain number should have crossed the Nebel. Tallard rode along his lines to the left, and communicated his arrangements to the Elector and Marsin. The three generals then visited the other points of their position, to mature the preparations against the attack of Eugene, whose columns continued to stretch along the elevated ground behind Berghausen.

About seven the troops of Marlborough reached their respective points of formation, and began to deploy. Officers were detached to sound the Nebel, and indicate the spots which were most passable, and the different generals assembled round the commanders to receive their orders.

Two defects in the position of the enemy did not escape the vigilant eyes of the confederate generals. Blenheim and Oberglauh were too distant from each other to sweep the intervening space with a cross-fire, and the lines of cavalry on the elevated ground were too remote from the rivulet to obstruct the passage. Of these defects they prepared to take advantage. While Eugene bore on the front and left flank of the troops under the Elector and Marsin, Marlborough was to push his cavalry across the Nebel, under the protection of his foot, and to charge the hostile cavalry at the same time that the effort was made to carry Blenheim. With this view he ordered General Churchill to draw up the infantry in two lines-the first of seventeen, and the second of eleven batalions-in the direction of Weilheim; and between them an interval was left for the two lines of cavalry, the first of thirty-six, and the second of thirty-five squadrons. Novel as this disposition may appear, it was skilfully adapted to the ground; for the first line of infantry, by traversing the