BATTLE OF FEROZSHUHR. A. D. 1845. December 21, 22. On the 19th of December, two heavy guns reached Moodkee, escorted by Her Majesty's 29th, the 1st European Light Infantry, and two regiments of native infantry. Every possible care had been taken of these troops in their rapid advance by the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief. Elephants were despatched to Churruk, seven-and-twenty miles from Moodkee, to carry those who might be unable to walk. When near Moodkee, and almost overcome by fatigue and the terrible desert thirst, water was distributed to them, which had been brought out on elephants from head-quarters, Moodkee, where the Governor-General's band welcomed them with a joyous burst of music. This reinforcement did not reach camp till nine or ten o'clock at night, and it was determined, in order to give them rest, that the army should halt on the 20th. During this halt of two days, the wounded and sick were cared for, and secured in the mud fort at Moodkee. It was now that Sir H. Hardinge magnanimously offered his services to Sir Hugh Gough. He was appointed second in command of the army, and all officers were directed to obey any orders emanating from him, which they were not bound to do so long as he (although the head of the government) exercised only a civil authority. Expresses were sent to Sir John Littler at Ferozpoor, apprising him of the victory at Moodkee, and directing him on the 21st to march with as large a force as he could, and effect a junction with the army under the Commander-in Chief. Arrangements were also made for leaving the wounded and the baggage at Moodkee when the army marched; a regiment and a half being told off to protect them. This decision was a wise one. Had the British The 11th and 41st. army on the night of the 21st been embarrassed with a column of baggage, great would have been the suffering of our own camp-followers and wouuded. Whereas, the fort at Moodkee, defended by a regiment and a half, was safe for a time against the enemy's cavalry and loose plunderers, which alone could penetrate the rear of our army. Early on the morning of the 21st, Sir John Littler, leaving 5,000 men to hold his position and watch Tej Singh, moved off quietly by his right, with 5,500 men and twenty-one guns, to join the Commander-in-Chief. The force from Moodkee marched at three o'clock in the morning, in two open columns of companies, left in front; the army had therefore only to wheel into line to be in position. The march for the head-quarter column was a distressing one, on account of the heat and dust and the scarcity of water, but was of no great length, certainly not more than twelve miles; and the columns arrived opposite the Sikh camp at half-past eleven, A.M. The junction with the force from Ferozpoor, was effected at a few minutes before one, near the village of Misriwala. Skirmishers were then thrown forward, and some considerable time elapsed before the attack was made. The whole country is a dead flat, and studded with trees and jungle, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages. What with dust and trees, the movements of troops became very difficult to direct. The British now concentrated comprised 5,674 Europeans and 12,053 natives, making a total of 17,727 rank and file, and sixty-five guns. According to the Sikhs' account, their force at Ferozshuhr consisted of 25,000 regular troops and eighty-eight guns, exclusive of the Yazedarees and irregular soldiers, making their force in camp upwards of 35,000. Besides this force, Tej Singh, with 23,000 regulars and sixty-seven guns, was only ten miles distant. Had it been possible for the Commander-in-Chief to have delayed the attack on the Sikh camp till the next day, which it was not, the British force would not have been augmented by one man, whilst Tej Singh, who was opposite Ferozpoor, only ten miles distant, would have been able to bring at least 20,000 additional regular troops and sixty guns to the assistance of the enemy. The Sikh intrenchment was in the form of a parallelogram of about a mile in length and half-a-mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozshuhr; the shorter sides looking towards the Sutledge and Moodkee, and the long one towards Ferozpoor and the open country. But the Sikhs were fully prepared to place their guns in position, on whatever side the attack should be made. They were thoroughly acquainted with the country; and knowing by what roads their enemy could advance, they readily prepared for their reception. Thus it mattered not much whether our approach was made on the longer or shorter side, though the preparations on the side fronting Ferozpoor, showed that it was considered by the Sikhs as the proper front of their position. "The ground in front, like that at Moodkee, was jungly; the three divisions of the British, under the command of Major-General Gilbert, Sir John Littler, and Brigadier Wallace, were placed in line, with the whole of their artillery, in their centre, except three troops of horseartillery, one on either flank, and one in support. The reserve was under Sir Harry Smith, and with the cavalry formed the second line." The artillery were ordered to the front, and after a reasonable time had been allowed for the mortar practice, which it was speedily seen would never silence Lal Singh's guns, our artillery opened their fire to ascertain the position of the batteries, and the Sikhs then responded. Our artillery then made a nearer advance, protected by the whole of our infantry. When several hundred yards nearer, our guns were unlimbered, and several rounds of shot fired; this was repeated until they approached within three hundred yards of the batteries. Then, seeing that these Sikh guns could not be silenced, the infantry advanced amidst a murderous shower of shot and grape, and captured them with matchless gallantry.t In the advance, General Littler's division, marching direct on the village, edged away to the left, and caused an opening in the line between its right and Brigadier Wallace's division. Littler's division, led with the greatest valour by its general, when close up to the enemy's batteries, which fired volleys of grape, was compelled to retire; the *The Commander-in-Chief's Despatch. + Ibid. Ibid. left brigade of the reserve, under Sir Harry Smith, was ordered forward to fill up the opening, and advanced on the village with great energy. Wallace's and Gilbert's divisions forming the right and centre, were completely successful, but when all the batteries of the Sikhs seemed to be within our grasp, the night set in (and there is no twilight in India), the dry forage in the camp was on fire, the loose powder exploded in all directions, and it was impossible, under these circumstances, to retain the occupation of the enemy's batteries, which had been so gallantly won. All military order and discipline must have been lost, and the troops were directed to form about 150 yards from the enemy's camp, lying down in contiguous columns at quarterdistance. Sir Harry Smith's division pushed on to the vil lage and maintained itself there till about 10 o'clock at night, when, not knowing the position of the troops on his right, he retired. Sir John Littler's division, having advanced against the strongest part of the work, suffered severely, especially her Majesty's 62nd Regiment, having seventeen officers killed or wounded, out of twenty-three. Having done everything that men could do, they were obliged to retire. Just before dark, the gallant 3rd Dragoons, who were on the extreme right, were ordered to charge; never for a moment considering the propriety of such an order, which was given by a staff-officer, now no more, they dashed headlong into the Sikh camp, carrying terror into the Sikh ranks, but at the same time losing ten officers and 120 valuable men out of about 400. About twelve o'clock at night, the Sikhs, finding that Sir Harry Smith had been forced to retire from the village, and that their batteries were not occupied, brought some guns to bear upon our column, the fire from which was very destructive. The Governor-General mounted his horse and called to the 80th Regiment, which was at the head of the column, "My lads, we shall have no sleep until we have those guns." The regiment deployed immediately, advanced, supported by the 1st Bengal Europeans, and drove a large body of Sikhs from three guns, which they spiked. The regiment then retired and took up its position again at the head of the column as steadily as if on a parade, much to the admiration of the Governor-General and Commander-inChief, the former of whom exclaimed, as they passed him, "Plucky dogs! plucky dogs! -we cannot fail to win with such men as these." For the rest of the night our column was left comparatively unmolested, but it cannot be denied, that its position was one of danger-great danger. Darkness had covered our ranks, while the scarcely thinned foe, driven from his foremost intrenchments, had still a formidable artillery remaining intact. Both Sir John Littler and Sir Harry Smith had been compelled to retire; and in the darkness the direction was not known to the Governor-General or Commander-in-chief. They were left, with not more than 8,000 men, within 150 yards of an enemy's camp, whose strength they had no means of ascertaining. It could not be known whether Tej Singh had, during the action or during the night, marched up to reinforce Lal Singh. The noisy tramping of men, the fire of musketry and artillery, was continued by the Sikhs during the night, and in the morning the expectation most probable was, that the British army would have to encounter the whole concentrated force of the enemy. In this state of things, the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General determined to hold their ground, to wait patiently till the morning dawned, then to attack the enemy's batteries, if they still held them, by taking them in reverse, to make one united effort by a simultaneous attack, to beat them, or to die honourably in the field. The gallant Commander-in-Chief, kind-hearted, heroically brave, quite agreed with the Governor-General. If ever confidence was inspired to troops by the conduct of their leaders, it was by Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough on that occasion. They knew that the struggle would be severe, but cheered all around them with the certainty of success. The whole of Sir Henry Hardinge's personal staff having been put hors de combat except his son, Captain A. Hardinge, who, however, had had his horse killed under him, Captain West, of the Commander-in-Chief's staff, officiated as his aide-decamp. By daylight the British troops had deployed into line, and all arrangements for renewing the attack being made, the Commander-in-Chief put himself in front of the right of |