slung over their backs, and their heads half-turned towards their pursuers. "The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after volley, until tired of slaughtering; yet those stern implacable warriors preserved their habitual swaggering stride, and would not quicken it to a run, though death was at their heels."* Never had more personal courage been displayed by our officers and men. The greater part of the battle was a hand-to-hand fight. "The noble soldier Pennefather," as Sir Charles Napier called him, fell on the top of the bank, to appearance mortally wounded; and his place was instantly taken by Major Pool. Major Teesdale, animating his sepoys, rode desperately over the ridge into the midst of the Beloochees, and was instantly killed by shot and sabre. Major Jackson followed the heroic example of Teesdale, and met the same fate. Two brave havildars kept close to them in advance of their regiment, and, like their leaders, they were also killed, after they had slain several of the fiercest of the enemy. Lieutenant M'Murdogh, of the General's staff, rode like Teesdale and Jackson, into the very heart of the Beloochee mass; his horse was killed under him, yet he rose instantly, and meeting Jehan Mohabad, one of the most warlike of the chiefs, slew him in the midst of his clan. Then, while engaged with several in front, one came behind and struck at him, but a sergeant of the 22nd killed this enemy so instantly, that his blow fell harmless. M'Murdogh turned and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving the head of a Beloochee, who was aiming at his back. Captain Jacob and Lieutenant Fitzgerald performed similar exploits. Six European officers and sixty sergeants and privates were killed, and fourteen officers and about 200 men wounded. As the sepoy grenadiers had been but slightly engaged, this loss was nearly a sixth part of our fighting force. The loss of the Beloochees was enormous; a careful computation gave it as 6,000; 1,000 bodies were heaped in the ravine alone. The whole of the enemy's artillery, ammunition, standards and camp, with considerable stores, and some treasure, were taken. + • Major-General W. F. P. Napier. On the following morning, at the break of day, Sir Charles Napier sent to tell the Ameers that he would immediately storm Hyderabad, if they did not surrender. Six of these sovereign princes presently entered his camp on horseback, and offered themselves as prisoners. They yielded their fortresses, and laid their rich swords and other arms at the British general's feet. "Their misfortunes," said Sir Charles, were of their own creation, but, as they were great, I gave them back their swords." The Ameers were cowards, but the conqueror, both in his public despatches and in his private letters, gave full honour and praise to the brave Beloochees. 66 THE SIKH WAR.-MOODKEE. A. D. 1845. December 18. THE following table of the force on the frontier, as Sir H. Hardinge found it on his arrival in India, in July, 1844, and when the war broke out in December, 1845, is a complete refutation of the charge of want of preparation :— The force at the hill stations was the same at both periods, 1,800 men. Thus, in the first line from Umballa to the Sutledge, about 150 miles, there were, when Sir H. Hardinge landed in India, only 13,539 men and 48 guns. When the war broke out, there were 32,479 men and 68 guns. Increase, 18,940 men and 20 guns! The force at Meerut had also been augmented from 5,873 men and 18 guns, to 9,844 men and 26 guns; which force, being 250 miles to the rear, was not considered available to repel invasion, but as a support to that in advance of Umballa. The force in the first line also comprised seven regiments of European infantry out of the eleven at that time serving within the Bengal presidency. The battle of Ferozshuhr took place eight days after the Sikhs crossed the Sutledge; and if, out of the 32,479 at and north of Umballa, in December, 1845, 17,727 rank and file only could be brought into action after a junction with the Loodiana and Ferozpoor forces, what sort of an army could have been brought into the field had Sir H. Hardinge left the force on the frontier as he found it, consisting as it did of 13,538 men? On the 2nd of December, 1845, Sir Henry arrived at Umballa. From this point we may take up his own words, as contained in a despatch to the Secret Committee at the India-House : "I had moved with my camp on the 6th of December from Umballa towards Loodiana, peaceably making my progress by the route I had announced, with the intention of visiting the Sikh protected states, according to the usual custom of my predecessors. In common with the most experienced officers of the Indian government, I was not of opinion that the Sikh army would cross the Sutledge with its infantry and artillery. I considered it probable that some act of aggression would be committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling the British government to interfere, to which course the Sikh chiefs knew I was most averse; but I concurred with the Commander-in-Chief, and the chief secretary to the government, as well as my political agent, Major Broadfoot, that offensive operations, on a large scale, would not be resorted to. Exclusive of the political reasons which induced me to carry my forbearance as far as it was possible, I was confident, from the opinions given by the Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Sir John Littler, in command of the forces at Ferozpoor, that that post would resist any attack from the Sikh army as long as its provisions lasted; and that I could at any time relieve it, under the ordinary circumstances of an Asiatic army making an irruption into our territories, provided it had not the means of laying siege to the fort and the intrenched camp. Up to this period no act of aggression had been committed by the Sikh army. The Lahore government had as good a right to reinforce their bank of the river Sutledge, as we had to reinforce our posts on that river. The Sikh army had, in 1843 and 1844, moved down upon the river from Lahore, and after remaining there encamped a few weeks, had returned to the capital. These reasons, and, above all, my extreme anxiety to avoid hostilities, induced me not to make any hasty movement with our army, which, when the two armies came into each other's presence, might bring about a collision. The army had, however, been ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and on the 7th and 8th of December, when I heard from Lahore that preparations were making on a large scale for artillery, stores, and all the munitions of war, I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, directing his excellency, on the 11th to move up the force from Umballa, from Meerut, and some other stations in the rear. Up to this time no infantry or artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutledge. Nevertheless, I considered it prudent no longer to delay the forward movement of our troops, having given to the Lahore government the most ample time for a reply to our remonstrance. On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicholson, the assistant political agent at Ferozpoor, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the other hand, the information received by Major Broadfoot on that day from Lahore, was not of a character to make it probable that any Sikh movement on a large scale was meditated. On the 10th no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicholson's report, and the usual opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutledge. The troops, however, moved on the 10th, 11th, 12th, in pursuance of the orders given on the 7th and 8th; and the whole of the forces destined to move up to the Sutledge were in full march on the 12th. I did not consider the force moving up from Umballa to be sufficient to force its way to relieve Ferozpoor, if a large Sikh army, with a numerous and well-served park of artillery, should attempt to intercept it in its approach to Ferozpoor, as, in such case, it could with difficulty receive any aid from that garrison. Being some days' march in advance of the commander-in-chief, I rode over to Loodiana; and having inspected the fort, the cantonments, and the troops, it appeared to me most advisable that the whole of this force should be moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Loodiana to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the more infirm soldiers of the regiments at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very improbable contingency. The risk to be incurred of leaving the town and the cantonments liable to be plundered was maturely considered, and I had no hesitation in incur |