their short life of fire and flame upon the river-bank without injury to any one. After this it is hardly necessary to say that the land attack on Kemmendine failed completely.

If the fire-rafts could have reached the harbour of Rangoon, which was now crowded with transports and country vessels of all kinds, the effect might have been very tragical; but the English sailors said that none should pass Kemmendine Point, and not one did pass. Kemmendine, where the river makes a sudden angle, was the only point from which the rafts could have been launched with effect. Fully aware of this, Bandoola ordered attack upon attack to be made, and for seven days no rest by night or by day was allowed to our troops or to our seamen there. But every effort of the enemy failed, nor were they more successful in any other part of their line of circumvallation. On the 5th of December, when the matériel and warlike stores of the Burmese left wing were brought forward from the jungle to their foremost intrenchment in front of Rangoon, and were fairly within our reach, Sir Archibald Campbell ordered a decisive attack to be made upon their army. Major Sale, with one column 800 strong, and a troop of British dragoons, who had only been landed the preceding day, was directed to fall upon their centre; and Major Walker, with 500 men, was sent to make a vigorous attack on their left wing. The operations of these two columns of troops were greatly facilitated by Captain Chads of the navy, who proceeded up the Creek to within gun-shot of the rear of the enemy's line, with the man-of-war boats and a part of the flotilla, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which distracted the attention of the Burmese, and prevented their reinforcing in front. Our two columns broke through the intrenchments, and completely routed both the centre and the left with vigorous bayonet charges; but Major Walker and a good many of his gallant comrades fell. The loss of the Burmese was appalling; they were driven from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the ground behind them covered with dead and wounded, with all their guns, intrenching tools, and a great number of small arms. On the 6th of December Bandoola was employed in rallying his defeated troops. On the 7th the Burmese made their last and grand attack on the great pagoda. Here they were beaten, driven back to their

intrenchments, then driven into them, and forced back into the jungle by the British bayonet. Our troops at that post, worn out by seven days and nights of incessant fighting or watching, could not pursue the flying enemy, who left in the trenches a great number of dead-nearly all stout, tall, athletic fellows, who might almost have measured with English grenadiers, and who had evidently belonged to the élite of Bandoola's army. During these seven busy and fiery days the Burmese, in addition to a prodigious loss of lives, had lost every gun they had, and the entire matériel of their army. The survivors were flying towards Donoopew; but they were stopped in their flight by some great and terrible chiefs, who had been sent down with numerous reinforcements, and they rallied at Kokeen, about four miles beyond the Great Pagoda. It is said that when Bandoola counted his forces, he found them reduced, from more than 60,000 fighting men, to less than 25,000. This favourite of the Golden Foot was allowed to retain the chief command; he immediately began to intrench and stockade himself at Kokeen, and employed incendiaries to burn the invaders out of Rangoon, and destroy all their stores, powder magazines, etc. The latter attempt-which very nearly succeeded*-brought down a rapid attack upon his new position, and disgrace and ruin upon himself. On the 15th of December-three days after the midnight fire at Rangoon-1,500 British troops and sepoys, unaided by artillery, under the command of Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, drove Bandoola and his mighty host from all their intrenchments and stockades at Kokeen, and strewed the position with dead and dying. Here ended the operations in front of Rangoon; the British troops returned in the evening to their cantonments, and the remnant of the Burmese army retreated upon Donoopew.

* On the night of the 12th of December, the cry of fire resounded through the town of Rangoon, and nearly the whole of that filthy, wood and bamboo-built place seemed to be immediately in a blaze. The incendiaries had placed their matches in various parts of the town, and had set fire to them at the same moment. One-half of the town was burned; but the flames were prevented from reaching our depot of stores and ammunition.

WAR IN SCINDE.-MEEANEE.

A. D. 1843. February 17.

THE forces of the Hyderabad Ameers made a ferocious attack on the British residency, outside their city. On moving away from the bank of the Indus, Sir Charles Napier found that a great force of the enemy was gathering in his rear, while the rest kept their post at Meeanee, in his front. But he had read the Duke of Wellington's observations on Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat before the Mahrattas, and he had drawn from it this conclusion-never to give way before barbarians. He said, "Let there be sixty or a hundred thousand I will fight." He therefore rapidly advanced; and on the 17th of February was fought the great battle of Meeanee. Our army was now reduced to 2,600 of all arms, including officers fit for duty in the field.

The enemy's positions were formidable; they had a natural ravine in their front; they had more than 30,000 infantry, with fifteen guns, supported by 5,000 cavalry. Their wings rested on large woods or hunting grounds, which extended on each side of the plain in front for a considerable way, so as to flank the British lines on both sides when it should advance. These woods were very dense, yet Sir Charles Napier and his little force fell impetuously upon the enemy by the front. The fighting was terrible, and as hard as fighting could be. The dead level of the plain was swept by the Beloochee cannon and matchlocks; and when our troops got close up, after the ravine was crossed, our men had to ascend a high sloping bank.

"The Beloochees, having their matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, waited until the assailants were within fifteen yards ere their volley was discharged; the rapid pace of the British, and the steepness of the slope, deceived their aim, and the result was not considerable; the