admitted that fortune also was against him. The elements were his opponents; and those most deeply conversant in warlike operations, will be the first to acknowledge how easily the wisest calculations may be overthrown by the occurrence of contingencies which human prudence could neither foresee nor avert. During his retreat, Sir John Moore lost no trophy in fight. He led his army to their ships. He declined to sacrifice the honour of his country by proposing a convention. He closed a life of honourable and distinguished service on the field of battle; and his reward was the shout of victory which met his dying ear. "From the moment he entered Spain, Sir John Moore was surrounded by difficulties. He saw at once that the British Government were deceived with regard to the state of the peninsula. He was directed to co-operate with armies which seemed to melt at a breath, and retain nothing of material existence. He was thwarted in his schemes by those on whose opinions he had injudiciously been made dependent. He received no support from the authorities from the country. He felt it to be impossible to realize the expectations of the British Government and nation. His spirit, almost morbidly sensitive, shrunk from the breath of censure, which even blameless failure, for a time, might draw on his fair fame. Unfortunately, such feelings-the feelings of a generous and proud soul-gathered force as the prospect darkened around him, and disposed his mind to despondency. Something perhaps he wanted of fitting confidence in his own great powers; something, too, of that elastic buoyancy of spirit, which danger and difficulty tend rather to stimulute than depress. "But enough. Such as Moore was, England is proud of him; and the moral perceptions of her people must, indeed, be blunted, when they shall cease to regard his memory with love and honour."* * Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns, by the author of "Cyril Thornton" (the late Captain Hamilton.) WELLINGTON CAMPAIGNS. A. D. 1809. By our two victories, at Roliça and at Vimeiro, and by the convention entered into with Junot, Portugal was entirely cleared of the French, in the autumn of 1808. But Napoleon Bonaparte did not swerve from his resolution of subduing the whole of the peninsula. Marshal Soult, after the battle of Coruna, had obtained easy possession of Ferrol, Bilbao, and all the most important places on the northern coast of Spain. Then he had proceeded towards Portugal, and having entered that country by Braga, he had taken possession of Oporto, on the 29th of March, after a spiritless resistance of only two days. Upon the rapid advance of Soult, Sir J. Craddock, who now commanded our little army, concentrated his forces for the defence of Lisbon. There were other discouraging circumstances: the French had reduced many towns on the east of the Ebro. Zaragoza had been obliged to surrender at discretion, on the 14th of February; and, that which was gloomiest of all, the Spaniards of Madrid, and in many other large cities, seemed to be quietly resigning themselves to the dominion of the intrusive King, Joseph Bonaparte. Still, however, there were some brighter glimpses, for no sooner had Soult evacuated Galicia, than the people rose in arms, and several places in the Asturias, and in the Biscayan provinces, had been recaptured by the patriots. Moreover, in Portugal, a body of Portuguese regulars had been admirably disciplined in the English manner, by General Beresford, to whom the Prince Regent of Portugal had wisely confided the chief command of all his troops. The British government, undismayed by the unfortunate, but not inglorious or discouraging result of Sir John Moore's campaign, and undeterred by the orators and writers who represented the attempt as the height of madness, resolved to persevere in sending assistance to the Peninsula, and to enter upon that war on a larger and a bolder scale. In a memorandum, dated on the 7th of March, Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had well examined the country during his short stay in it, delivered his decided opinion that Portugal could be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain; and that in the meantime the measure adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French. His notion was, -that the Portuguese military establishments might, by means of English assistance, be raised to 40,000 militia, and 30,000 regular troops; that the British troops in the country should be raised to 20,000 infantry, and 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry; that the rifle corps should be increased; that other choice infantry should be sent out, together with an additional corps of artillery, and more ordnance; that, even if Spain should be conquered, the French would not be able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men; and that, so long as the contest should continue in Spain, the united British and Portuguese force, if it could be put in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually decide the contest. In this remarkable document, short as it is, nearly every thing is foreseen and provided for. Sir Arthur knew how the Spanish juntas had misapplied the money which Great Britain had sent; and, therefore, he recommends that the English Ambassador at Lisbon shall be empowered to give or withhold such sums as he may think necessary for the support of the Portuguese military establishments only. The Spanish juntas, partly through their own ignorance of business, partly through their own corruption, and partly through the difficulty of raising any taxes, even in the districts where the French were not, had made a terrible jumble of the revenue. Sir Arthur recommended that the English Ambassador at Lisbon should see that the revenues of Portugal, whatever they might be, were in the first instance applied to the military establishments of the country, and that our ambassadors should have a complete control over the measures of the Portuguese government. As indispensable parts of his plan, Sir Arthur laid it down that the U whole of the army in Portugal, Portuguese as well as British, should be placed under the command of British officers; that the staff of the army, the commissariat in particular, must be British; and that these two departments must be increased in proportion to the strength of the whole army about to act in Portugal, to the number of detached posts it would be necessary to occupy, and with a view to the great difficulties of providing and distributing supplies in that country. But for the care taken by Sir Arthur Wellesley of the commissariat, which other commanders-inchief had been accustomed wofully to neglect, or to leave to their inferiors,-thinking barrels of salt pork, and bags of biscuits, unworthy the attention of well-bred gentlemen and gallant soldiers-but for the reforms he gradually introduced into our un-systemised commissariat department, there would have been no such glorious victories as Salamanca, Vittoria, and Toulouse; but the British army would have been wasted away by famine, and driven from the Peninsula with disgrace.* In a happy hour the command of the army in Portugal was given to him who had framed the bold plan of defence, and our greatest soldier took his departure. "England's bright genius, mov'd with Europe's tears, With insulary thunder to prevent The tow'ring giant of the continent." Sir Arthur landed at Lisbon on the 22nd of April. As soon as he was there he said he thought that Marshal Soult would not remain long in Portugal. He took the field with an army of about 25,000 men, including the Portuguese, trained by Beresford. His first business was to dislodge Soult from Oporto, the second city in the kingdom. This was done in the most brilliant style on the 12th of May, and with an amazingly small loss. Soult commenced an orderly and scientific retreat into Galicia, from which, only four months before, he had expelled Sir John Moore; but being pressed on all sides, by hourly increasing difficulties, he sacrificed his artillery, his baggage, and even his military chest, and For the rest of this memorandum on the defence of Portugal, see Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Despatches. escaped across the mountains by paths impracticable for a regular army. Before Soult could get over the Spanish frontier, in the direction of Orense, his army was nothing better than a rabble and a hungry mob. Thus, in ten days, was Portugal again cleared of the French by Sir Arthur. His army now leisurely retraced its steps to the south. By the 26th of May, the greater part of the British troops had crossed the Mondego, and Sir Arthur's arrangements were completed for an advance into Spain in that direction, where he intended to co-operate with, or at least to receive some aid from, old General Cuesta, who commanded the army of Estremadura, and who was said to have collected on the Guadiana from 40,000 to 50,000 men. The advanced guard of the British entered Spain by Zarzala-Mayor on the 2nd of July; and on the 8th Sir Arthur's head quarters were at Placentia. Cuesta crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Almaraz, and effected his junction with Wellesley at Oropesa on the 20th of July; but the Spanish general was now found to have no more than 30,000 men, and these were, for the most part, discouraged by repeated defeats, and lank, lean, hungry, and badly disciplined. When Wellesley first began his march, to enter the country, and give the hand to Cuesta, the French forces were thus disposed:-Marshal Victor, the nearest to the allied army, was in Estremadura, close to the borders of Portugal, with the first corps, numbering in the muster-rolls 35,000 men; General Sebastiani commanded the fourth corps, which was in La Mancha, and which counted about 20,000 men under arms; General Dessolles, with a division of reserve, and some of Joseph's guards (in all, 15,000 men), was at Madrid, taking care of the intrusive king; Kellerman and Bonnet were stationed in old Castile, and on the borders of Leon and the Asturias, with two divisions that formed togegether 10,000 men: (all these corps and troops, forming a numerical total of 80,000 men, were considered as being immediately under the command of Joseph, who knew not how to command a troop of horse or a company of foot, but who was aided and assisted by Marshal Jourdan). Soult had collected the second corps in the northern provinces, hoping to be able retrace his steps into Portugal with 20,000 men; and immediately dependent upon Soult were Marshal Mortier with |