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CORPORATION.

DEED OF. — A corporation cannot execute a deed otherwise than under its seal; nor can it make a deed unless the directors meet as a board and so determine. The only evidence of such meeting and action is the record kept by the secretary. In re St. Helen's Mill Co., Pac. Law Rep., Sept. 8, 1874.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 2.

CRIMINAL LAW.

SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS. - INSTRUCTIONS OF COURT. - The court instructed the jury as follows: "If you find that the defendants sold any of the intoxicating liquors named in the instrument, at the times and places named therein, notwithstanding they may have put into it roots and tinctures, unless it changed the nature or character of the liquors, so that it was no longer whiskey or brandy, or whatever it may have been originally, at the time of the sale, it was a violation of law. If its distinctive character as an intoxicating liquor was so destroyed that it could not be used as a beverage, and it became in fact a medicine to be used for diseases, and of such a character that it could not, in reason, be styled or used as an intoxicating drink, its sale was not a violation of law." Held, in the appellate court, to be a correct statement of the law. State v. Laffer, West. Jur., Sept. 1874.

See EVIDENCE, 4, 5; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3.

UNDER-VALUATION.

CUSTOMS.

FALSE INVOICE.

- Held, that it was error to refuse to admit the invoice of a previous shipment at a higher valuation as evidence that the claimant had guilty knowledge of the under-valuation in this case, and also in the instruction given to the jury that they could not return a verdict for the United States even if they found that the invoice value of the merchandise, as given in the invoice presented to the collector, did not conform to the value of such goods in the actual markets of the country of production, unless they should also find that such discrepancy was not the result of honest error on the part of the owner, consignee, or agent in respect to matters of law or fact, but that it was made knowingly and with design to evade the payment of the duty which he knew was legally chargeable on said merchandise. This instruction to the jury is directly opposed to the rule adopted by the unanimous decision of the supreme court. United States v. 146,650 Clapboards, Int. Rev. Rec., September 28, 1874.

DAMAGES.

The theory

WHERE LAND IS CONDEMNED FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE. of the statute of California is that the land-owner shall receive a fair, just compensation for the damage he suffers; and if that portion of his tract which is not taken will be enhanced in value, his damages will be diminished to the extent of the enhancement; and hence the statute contem

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plates that by deducting this benefit from the damages, the sum which remains will constitute a "just compensation "in the sense of the constitution. Cal. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, Cent. L. J., Sept. 10, 1874.

See EMINENT DOMAIN.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

See PERCENTAGES.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

WHERE PROPERTY IS CONDEMNED FOR RAILROAD PURPOSES AFTER THE TRACK HAS BEEN LAID, the track is not to be regarded as a part of the realty to be estimated in computing the damages. The law contemplates "just compensation," no less and no more. Cal. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, Cent. L. J., September 10, 1874.

EVIDENCE.

1. PURCHASE OF BUSINESS AND PROMISE TO PAY DEBTS. A purchased the business of B, assuming to pay his debts. C, a creditor of B, brought suit upon A's promise against A. Held, that it might be shown that at the time A made the purchase, B exhibited a list of his debts, on the strength of which the purchase and promise to pay B's debts were made, and that such list did not include C's debt. Torrent v. Campbell, Leg. Int., September 4, 1874.

tion.

2. WHERE A DEFENDANT CALLS A PLAINTIFF as a witness the examination may be conducted as if the witness was under cross-examinaBrubaker's Adm'rs v. Taylor, Leg. Int., September 25, 1874. 3. RECORDED DEED.· - BURNT RECORDS. EFFECT OF RECORD. An original deed, bearing certificate of having been duly recorded, is the highest class of evidence, and may be read whether the official record book be in existence or not.

Where a record of deeds is destroyed, the index book in which the deed is described, and its record in the proper book certified, is good evidence of the fact that a deed was recorded.

The notice which the due recording of a deed gives to all the world is not extinguished or lost by the destruction of the record book; nor can one who obtains adverse title be deemed an innocent purchaser. Alvis v. Morrison, Chicago, L. N., September 12, 1874.

4. FLIGHT IN CRIMINAL CASE. Evidence of flight is not admissible as a badge of guilt; but it may be properly shown that there was a pursuit during which stolen property, not found upon the person of the accused when arrested, might have been thrown away. People v. Collins, Pac. Law Rep., September 1, 1874.

5. PARDON DEFINED. The record of the conviction and sentence of a witness having been introduced, he submitted a document signed by the governor purporting to have been executed in pursuance of law, by which the release of witness was ordered upon a particular day; and it was further ordered that upon the same day he be "restored to all the rights and privileges of citizenship to which he was entitled before the aforesaid con

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viction and imprisonment." Held, that the order did not amount to a pardon. Blane v. Rodgers, Pac. Law Rep., September 1, 1874.

6. DEPOSITION TO IMPEACH WITNESS, TAKEN UNDER COMMISSION AT THE EXECUTION OF WHICH WITNESS WAS NOT EXAMINED. - Where a witness denies a conversation with A, A's deposition may be received to impeach the witness although taken under a commission at the execution of which the witness was not examined. Pittsburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Andrews, Am. Law Reg., Sept. 1874.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. - ALIENATION BY HUSBAND WITHOUT CONSENT OF WIFE. - In the State of Tennessee it is now a rule of property, made permanent by the fundamental law, that every head of a family is deprived of the right to alienate the homestead, unless his wife joins in the conveyance. It follows that such conveyance is absolutely void, and communicates no title to the purchaser, so far as it abridges or interferes with the wife's homestead right, and the wife, by her next friend, has such an interest in the preservation of the homestead, as entitles her to invoke the protection of a court of chancery, by bill quia timet, to have the cloud upon her right removed, and her homestead rights declared. Williams v. Williams, Cent. L. J., Sept. 24, 1874.

2. CONSTRUCTION OF "LIVING APART FROM HUSBAND.' "Living apart from husband" means, in contemplation of law, a permanent abandonment or separation. Tobin v. Galvin, Pac. Law Rep., Sept. 1, 1874. 3. COERCIVE PRESENCE OF HUSBAND. A married woman cannot be convicted for selling liquor without license where the husband is coercively present that is, in and about the house where the selling was done. Commonwealth v. Lindsey, Leg. Chron., Sept. 12, 1874.

4. TORTS OF WIFE. The statute of Illinois known as the "Married Woman's Act," which gives the wife sole control of her separate estate and her own earnings for labor performed for any person other than her husband or minor children, with the right to use and possess the property and earnings, free from the control or interference of her husband, has the effect of discharging the husband from liability for the torts of the wife committed out of his presence and without his participation. Martin v. Robson, Am. Law Rep., Sept. 1874.

5. PARTNERSHIP OF WIFE. - EFFECT OF ASSISTANCE OF HUSBAND IN BUSINESS, ETC. — ATTACHMENT. — A married woman has not capacity to enter into a general mercantile partnership not connected with or relating to her separate property, and where she assumes to do so with the consent of her husband, and is by him assisted in managing and carrying on the business, the husband, and not the wife, is to be regarded in law as the partner.

A feme covert having obtained a "permit" to trade within the lines of the army, with the knowledge and consent of her husband entered into a partnership with other persons, for the purpose of buying and selling

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goods and merchandise under said "permit," and herself, with the assistance of her husband, managed and conducted the business. The firm was subsequently dissolved, and its property transferred by the other partners to her, she agreeing to pay all the partnership debts. She then sold the property to S., who had notice of all the facts, and who in like manner agreed to pay the partnership debts. This was all done with the knowledge and concurrence of the husband, who joined her in executing the bill of sale to S. In an action by a creditor of the firm against the husband and the other members of the firm, not including the wife: Held, that the goods in the hands of S., or the price agreed by him to be paid therefor, and not yet paid, are liable to attachment in the action. S. C. of Ohio, Swasey v. Antrain, Am. Law Reg., Sept. 1874.

INSURANCE.

1. CANCELLATION OF POLICY. - SECRETARY OF COMPANY. Upon the non-payment of certain assessments the secretary of an insurance company wrote the insured a letter which contained the following: "If you have paid the agent you are all right. If not, the company will renew the policy when it is paid," and other similar statements. Held, that the letter was to be regarded as a cancellation of the policy. And that the secretary of the company was the proper organ of communication between the company and its policy holders. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Masonheimer, Leg. Int., Sept. 11, 1874; Pittsb. L. J., Sept. 22, 1874; Leg. Chron., Sept. 26, 1874.

2. RETROACTIVE CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE are as valid as those having relation to the future only, if the intent of the parties is clear, and the insured and insurer were both ignorant of the loss at the time of making the contract. Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Folsom, Leg. Gazette, Sept. 4, 1874. 3. CONCEALMENT. The non-disclosure of a void tax title is immaterial. So is the failure to disclose that the title of the property insured is in litigation. Cheek v. Columbia Fire Ins. Co., Cent. L. J., Sept. 17,

1874.

4. WHERE THE COMPANY'S AGENT FILLS OUT THE POLICY any failure to state facts disclosed to him is a failure by the company which does not affect the policy. Ib.

JURISDICTION.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER is a "suit of a civil nature," within the meaning of the act of 1789, of which a United States court has jurisdiction. Wheeler v. Bates, Chicago L. N., Sept. 19, 1874.

See ADMIRALTY, 6; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 3.

LAND GRANT.

CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD GRANT. MEXICAN GRANT. RESERVED LANDS. — CONFIRMATION. PATENTEE AS TRUSTEE. The grant of alternate sections of land to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, under section 3 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat. 492), is a present grant of the number of sections designated, which became specific and attached to every alternate section subject to grant,

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lying within the prescribed limits, as soon as the line of the road became "definitely fixed."

The grant having attached to the alternate sections the moment the line of the road became "definitely fixed," could only be defeated by a failure of the grantee to perform the conditions subsequent of building the road within the time, and in the mode prescribed.

The fact that some of the alternate sections within the prescribed limits of the grant, at the time the line became "definitely fixed," were situate within the exterior limits of land claimed under an invalid Mexican grant, does not constitute such land "reserved" lands within the meaning of that term, as used in said section three of said act. Lands lying within the exterior boundaries of land claimed under an invalid Mexican grant were a part of the domain of the United States on July 1, 1862, and were not, by reason of such claim only, within any of the exceptions mentioned in the act of Congress of that date, or of any of the acts supplementary thereto, granting lands to aid in the construction of the Pacific railroads, and the alternate sections of such lands, lying within the prescribed limits, to which no other right had attached at the time the line of the road became "definitely fixed," were within the terms of the grant to the railway company, and the title thereto became irrevocably vested in said company upon the performance of all the conditions prescribed by said several acts.

A decree rejecting a claim to lands under a Mexican grant, in proceedings had for a confirmation under the act of 1851, to settle land titles in California, is an adjudication between the claimant and the United States that the claimant had no title, legal or equitable; and that, as to said claim, the land was always a part of the public domain of the United States, from the date of its cession by Mexico.

When the title to lands vested in the Central Pacific Railroad Company and its assignees, under the act of Congress of 1862, to provide for the construction of the Pacific railroads, and a patent to the same has been subsequently wrongfully issued to another party, a court of equity will convert the patentee in such patent into a trustee for the party in whom the title vested under the act, and compel him to convey such title as he acquired by the patent. Sanger v. Sargent, Pac. Law Rep., Sept. 22, 1874.

NEGLIGENCE.

A PASSENGER ON A RAILROAD PERMITTING HIS ARM TO PROJECT OUT OF THE CAR WINDOW is guilty of such negligence that if injured by an obstacle too near the track he cannot recover. Pittsburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Andrews, Am. Law Reg., Sept. 1874.

See ADMIRALTY, 8.

PACIFIC RAILROAD.

See LAND GRANT.

PARDON.

See EVIDENCE, 5.