realm of second causes was expanded to him, leaves his mind as dissatisfied as ever with the next one, and fixes it on the ultimate. And as to the piety of the inquiring mind, it will be found that those who have been most concerned in seeking out the causes of things on their own account, are those who are for that reason the least disposed to rest in the causes they have obtained. They may be atheistic, but this is not what makes them so. This would rather make them look higher: and, indeed, it does, for though the improvers of other men's discoveries have very often, as might be expected, been worshippers of second causes to the exclusion of a first, the discoverers of original laws, whatever their aberrations on other points may have been, have generally been very firm believers in a first cause. But as this impatience of resting in a cause already found, is only as common as either a causative or truly pious mind-both which things are uncommon; and as it is much more common to rest in the cause next to hand, the more knowledge progresses, inasmuch as it reveals, in the same degree, the reign of second causes, in the same degree, in most minds, is the recognition of the first cause (if not speculatively, at least practically) liable to suffer, and, therefore, either atheism or secularism, i.e. practical atheism, likely to prevail. Let us now test the effects of the same connexion of things on

2nd.-The Belief in Miracles.

And it may be shown that to it they are just as unfavourable (even though for argument's sake we should suppose them to be ever so well proved), though in an opposite way. I mean by the assumption of their inconsistency with an intermediate cause, the effect of which in connection with the progress of knowledge is to render the notion of a miracle less probable. For as the proof of intermediate causes in so many instances proves the principle to many minds by analogy to apply to all, i.e. that everything has one, so by the same analogy it is

concluded that any notions which are inconsistent with any but an immediate cause are in fact impossible. And this is a mode of reasoning which is due to the same infirmity. For if it be asked whence comes the assumption upon which it rests, nothing can be more certain than that it does not come from anything that can be adduced on the authority of revealed religion. There is not a passage in the Bible which makes the essence of a miracle to consist in the non-intervention of intermediate causes; on the contrary, there are several which suppose, or assert, their agency. Proximate causes, personal or impersonal, are continually introduced in this connection, the agency of intelligent beings (such are the angels) or the workings of particular elements. Sometimes there seems, as it were, an ostentatious display of intermediate means which would be positively nugatory were it not that all intermediate means are so as distinct from a final.* This supposition, then, has not been fetched from the Bible. But if not from thence, from whence? There is no other source left but the human mind. But to what feeling of that mind is this view due? I reply, the same feeling that makes the same mind when less informed refer everything wonderful to the direct action of God-makes it when better informed, still require His direct action for the notion of a miracle (i.e. as a notion) even though it rejects the notion as one capable of realization in fact. The same reason that makes the untutored person ascribe an earthquake DIRECTLY to God, makes the educated (even though sceptical) one, ascribe a miracle, i.e. the miracle

* For example, the circumstances accompanying the cure of Naaman, the man born blind (John ix.), or Hezekiah (Isa. xxxviii.). Perhaps it may be said these are so manifestly inadequate they cannot be considered in the light of causes at all. Perhaps so-but the same may be said of any intermediate cause which has yet been discovered. When you have travelled up to a certain point there is no necessary connexion between the last cause and its successor; if you seek an account of its potency you must fall back on some unknown predecessor, which for its adequacy must depend again on your final cause, whatever it may beGod, if you are a believer-chance, or the sum total of things, if you deny His existence or personality.

which he disbelieves, hypothetically to Him in the same way, i.e. as the only way in which this particular notion, if possible, could be possible. And this unwillingness to press a conclusion legitimately obtained to all its consequences, is also shallowness, though working in another way. And though while knowledge is suspended, it is not adverse but favourable to the reception of a miracle, however false, yet in proportion as knowledge advances, it is, as has been shown, from the nature of the case, hostile to the reception of a miracle, however true. But it is not the only infirmity of our nature which makes the progress of knowledge (in which in itself there is nothing inconsistent with this faith) unfavourable to it. Perhaps as many would be disposed to reason in this way, "Whereas it has been found by experience that the most wonderful of other things are not only brought about by intermediate causes, but by ones which are observed to recur (i.e. forasmuch as it has been observed that they are under fixed laws), and as miracles do not recur, therefore they cannot be." And this is a way of thinking which, I imagine, will be found to be due to another infirmity of the human mind which is distinct from shallowness, and which I must call "narrowness," for if it be asked why, the only answer which can be given is, because they do not happen now: i.e. within the limits of our life, or at most a great part of the lifetime of the world. But to make this a reason for their not recurring at all is from a very limited point of time to draw a conclusion to all eternity—before and after—for which the premises are clearly insufficient; and this, I think, is, properly speaking, narrowness as distinct from shallowness. Shallowness has right premises but refuses to sink to the bottom of them, but narrowness has only partial premises, and insists on drawing an universal conclusion from them. It takes a greater width of mind for a man to acknowledge that though what we call a miracle is a very sufficient proof of a Divine revelation, yet that, though rare to us, it may, within the limits of God's

reign, which is eternity, be a thing of comparatively not unfrequent occurrence. As it takes a greater depth of mind for him to acknowledge that, though it had a thousand intermediate causes, there is nothing to prevent its being as proper an act of God as if He did it without any intervention. But as knowledge of second causes is likely to increase far more rapidly than the depth and width of mind which are necessary for their contemplation, the natural effect of its progress must be to diminish the belief in miracles (even though hypothetically true), and not because of its own fault, but because of the infirmities it encounters and no less because of

2.-The Improvements it Produces.

Knowledge, as applied to the past experience of the human race, or, as it is called, historical criticism, must, as it progresses, discover many tricks which have been played on the credulity of mankind-as in other things, so in miraculous stories. This, according to the common experience of any individual who has been deceived, leads mankind generally to a more reserved reception of anything miraculous. And though no doubt a distinction ought to be drawn between sufficiently and insufficiently supported accounts of the same kind, yet the unreflecting mind is naturally more disposed to lump things, and less to draw distinctions. And as this is its infirmity under any circumstances, it is increasingly so when the natural reaction in consequence of having been previously cheated makes it even less inclined to consider such distinctions. Objection (1): But the operation of these causes is such as from its nature can only affect those who reason to that extent on the subject rightly or wrongly, and therefore must at best be very limited, for nine-tenths of mankind have neither leisure nor inclination to reason in this way on the subject at all. Answer: Nine-tenths of mankind reason a great deal more than they are conscious of reasoning, and even if it were not so, the unreasoning many take the opinions of the reason

ing few. Objection (2): On the contrary, does not experience rather point the other way; does it not show that however it may be in other things, in matters of religion, at all events, opinion commences with the many and thence goes up. Have not all the beliefs that have taken an extensive hold of the world (Christianity itself not excepted) come up from the masses instead of going down to them? Answer: Yes. Beliefs go up, but unbelief goes down. The truths of the ancient philosophers never reached the masses, but their unbelief in the popular religion did; and as it is with disbelief in a false religion, so in a true. Whether, therefore, we regard the improvements it makes, or the infirmities it encounters, we conclude that the progress of knowledge is unfavourable to existing faiths, i.e. so far as the reasonings of the mind are answerable for the formation of our opinions. There are doubtless other causes beside these which shape them. I mean

(II.)

THE FEELINGS OF THE HEART.

But the effect of knowledge upon them likewise will be found, I think, to diminish the belief of the average man in Divine things, and this because of the impulse it gives to two feelings of the heart, neither originally wrong, but the tendency of both which, I think, is as I have said, and which, for distinctness' sake, I will call respectively (1) Independence, and (2) Earthliness.

1.-Independence.

I believe there can be little question that the increase of this feeling, whether it be for good or bad, is in some measure due to knowledge. The more educated people are, the better they understand their own rights, and the more likely in consequence they are to insist on them, though by no means in the same proportion to concede those of others. And this, though it may be good, so far as removing many great grievances, and