my part, it is not in my power to conceive a greater miracle than that is. The whole universe is affected by it; the earth, the sun, the moon, the stars. The most invariable laws of nature with which we are acquainted, even those which regulate the motions of the heavenly bodies, and dispense darkness and light to worlds, are violated. I appeal to the author himself, whether it could be called a greater, or even so great a miracle, that all the writers at that time, or even all mankind, had been seized with a new species of epidemical delirium, which had given rise to this strange illusion. But in this the author is remarkably unfortunate, that the principles by which he in fact regulates his judgment and belief, are often the reverse of those which he endeavours to establish in his theory.

SHALL I hazard a conjecture? It is, that the word miracle, as thus used by the author, is used in a vague and improper sense, as a synonymous term for improbable; and that believing the less, and rejecting the greater miracle, denotes simply believing what is least, and rejecting what is most improbable; or still more explicitly, believing what we think most worthy of belief, and rejecting what we think

least worthy. I am aware, on a second perusal of the author's words, that my talent in guessing may be justly questioned. He hath in effect told us himself what he means. "When any one," says he, " tells me, that " he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it "be more probable, that this person should "either deceive or be deceived, or that the "fact he relates should really have happened. "I weigh the one miracle against the other; "and according to the superiority which I "discover, I pronounce my decision, and al"ways reject the greater miracle. If the false"hood of his testimony would be more mi"raculous than the event which he relates; "then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.' At first,

indeed, one is ready to strange revolution is here!

exclaim, What a

The belief of mi

racles, then, even by Mr. Hume's account, is absolutely inevitable. Miracles themselves, too, so far from being impossible, or even extraordinary, are the commonest things in nature; so common, that when any miraculous fact is attested to us, we are equally under a necessity of believing a miracle, whether we

P. 182

believe the fact, or deny it. The whole difference between the essayist and us, is at length reduced to this single point, whether greater or smaller miracles are entitled to the preference, This mystery, however, vanishes on a nearer inspection. The style, we find, is figurative, and the author is all the while amusing both his readers and himself with an unusual application of a familiar term. What is called the weighing of probabilities in one sentence, is the weighing of miracles in the next. If it were asked, for what reason did not Mr Hume express his sentiment in ordinary and proper words? I could only answer, I know no reason but one, and that is, to give the appearance of novelty and depth to one of those very harmless propositions, which by philosophers are called identical, and which, to say the truth, need some disguise to make them pass upon the world with tolerable decency.

What then shall be said of the conclusion which he gives as the sum and quintessence of the first part of the essay? The best thing, for aught I know, that can be said, is, that it contains a most certain truth, though at the same time the least significant, that ever perhaps was ushered into the world with so much so

lemnity. In order, therefore, to make plainer English of his plain consequence, let us only change the word miraculous, as applied to the falsehood of human testimony, into improbable, which in this passage is entirely equivalent, and observe the effect produced by this elucidation. "The plain consequence is, and it is " a GENERAL MAXIM, worthy of our at"tention, THAT NO TESTIMONY IS SUFFICI(6 ENT TO ESTABLISH A MIRACLE, UNLESS 66 THE TESTIMONY BE OF SUCH A KIND, THAT 66 ITS FALSEHOOD WOULD BE MORE IMPRO"BABLE THAN THE FACT WHICH IT ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH.' If the reader thinks himself instructed by this discovery, I should be loth to envy him the pleasure he may derive from it.

* P. 182.

D 6

DISSERTATION

ON

MIRACLES.

PART II.

THE MIRACLES ON WHICH THE BELIEF OF CHRISTIANITY IS FOUNDED, ARE SUFFICIENTLY ATTESTED.

SECT. I.

There is no presumption arising from human nature, against the miracles said to have been wrought in proof of Christianity.

FROM what hath been evinced in the fourth and fifth sections of the former part, with regard to religion in general, two corollaries are clearly deducible in favour of Christianity. One is, That the presumption arising from the dignity of the end, to say the least of it, can in no religion be pleaded with greater advantage than in the Christian. The other is, that the presumption arising from the religious affection, instead of weakening, corroborates