THE

PRESENT STATE

OF THE

Republick of Letters.

For MAY 1731.

ARTICLE XXXIII.

A Treatife concerning ETERNAL and IMMUTABLE MORALITY, by Ralph Cudworth, D. D. Formerly Mafter of Chrift's College in Cambridge; with a Preface by the Right Reverend Father in God Edward Lord Bishop of Durham. Printed for James and John Knapton at the Crown in St. Paul's Church-yard. 1731.

BY

Y what we have already faid of this excellent Divine and great Metaphyfician, in our three preceding Journals, it may be easily judged how valuable this Book is. However, MAY 1731. X

we

Art. 33. we cannot omit affuring our Reader, that almoft every Page fhews the Penetration of the Author's Understanding, the Fertility and Nicety, as well as Solidity of his Judgment and Invention, and the whole accompany'd with profound Learning. The IVth and Vth Chapters of the fecond Book deferve indeed to be tranfcrib'd word for word, but we shall content our felves with barely specifying the Subjects they contain, and fhall enlarge a little more upon the Articles of the fifth.

I.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV.

INdividu

Ndividual material Things cannot be the immediate Objects of Intellection and Knowledge; befides which, there must be fome other kind of Beings or Entities as the immediate Objects, fuch things as do not flow, but remain immutably the fame. 2. Of thefe immutable Entities, what they are, from whence, and where they exist. 3. That there is an Eternal Mind, from which all created Understandings are conftantly furnish'd with Ideas. 4. Conclufion, that Wisdom, Knowledge, and Understanding, are eternal and Self-fubfiftent Things, fuperior to Matter and all fenfible Things.

BOOK II. CHAP. V.

1. Ntelligible Notions of Things, though exifting only in Mind, are not Figments of the Mind, but have an Immutable Nature; they are an Adamantine thing in the World," becaufe, "fays the Author, Intelligible Effences of Things cc are like Unities indivifible; fo that if the leaft "be added to them, or detracted from them, "they are not the fame but fomething elfe;

and

" and this Truth being rightly understood by any one particular Mind whatfoever, and where"foever it be, is a Catholick and Univerfal one.

2. The Criterion of Truth, with reference to this, "We must not, fays Dr. Cudworth, go "about to look for it without our felves, by "confulting individual Senfibles, as the Exam

plars of our Ideas, and measuring our Con"ceptions by them. And how is it poffible to "know by measuring of fenfible Squares, that "the Diameter of every Square is incommenfu"rable with the Sides? In other terms, fays he,

The Criterion of true Knowledge is not to be "look'd for any where abroad, neither in the "Heighth above, nor in the Depth beneath, "but only in our Knowledge and Conceptions "themselves: The Entity of all Theoretical "Truth, being nothing elfe but clear Intel"ligibility, and whatever is clearly conceiv'd " is an Entity and a Truth; but that which is "falfe, Divine Power it felf cannot make it to "be clearly and distinctly understood; falfhood, ic as he obferv'd before, being Non-Entity, and cc a clear conception being an Entity; Omnipo"tence it felf cannot make a Non-Entity to be . an Entity.

Wherefore he concludes, "No Man ever was "or can be deceiv'd in taking that for an Epi❝ftemonical Truth which he clearly and di66 ftinctly apprehends, but only in affenting to (6 things not clearly apprehended by him, which is the only true Original of all Error.

3. The Opinion that nothing can be demonftrated to be true abfolutely, but only bypothetically, refuted: For, fays our Author, if we cannot

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other

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66 otherwife poffibly be certain of the Truth of any Thing, but only ex Hypothefi, that our "Faculties are rightly made, of which none

can have any certain affurance, but only he "that made them, then all created Minds what"foever muft of neceffity be condemned to an "Eternal Scepticism. Neither ought they ever

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to affent to any thing as certainly true, fince "all their Truth and Knowledge as fuch, is but "Relative to their Faculties arbitrarily made, "that may poffibly be falfe,and their cleareft con"ftant Apprehenfions nothing but perpetual De"lufions: Wherefore,according to this Doctrine, we having no abfolute Certainty of the firft Principles of all our Knowledge, as that, Quod cogitat ef. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia; omnis numerus eft vel par vel impar ; CC we can neither be fure of any Mathematical nor Metaphyfical Truth, nor of the Existence "of God, nor of our felves. For whereas fome "wou'd endeavour to prove the Truth of their "Intellectual Faculties from hence, because "there is a God whofe Nature alfo is fuch as

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that he cannot deceive: It is plain that this is nothing but a Circle, and makes no progrefs at all, forafmuch as all the certainty which they have of the Existence of God and "of his Nature, depends wholly upon the ar'cc bitrary Make of their Faculties, which, for "ought they know, may be falfe. Nay, ac"cording to this Doctrine, no Man can certainly know that there is any abfolute Truth in the World at all. Wherefore the Author infers, that upon this fuppofition all created Knowledge, as fuch, is a mere fantastical Thing.

4. What