glorious Paths, muft not be look'd upon as infignificant Labour, &c.

In the mean time, how far he has fucceeded in his Effay, he recommends to the faid Lord Bishop of Durham's Candor, and all true and equitable Judges to determine.

That his Specimen, which is the first of the Minor Prophets entire, fhall fpeak for it felf.

As to the Errors and Lapfes that may be excepted against the Attempt, the Author anfwers in a becoming modest way, in affuring us however, that he is sensible of none worth notice; and as for the Particles, light Variations, &c. as touch not the Senfe, nor affect the proper Dialect or Idiom of the Greek Tranflators, he is under no concern. Then concludes, that a Work of this Nature has never been attempted before by any one fo young in any Age or Country.

Now, with reference to the Plan it felf, 'tis propos'd, fays our Author, to go through all the minor Prophets; if the Effay he offers to the Publick be entertertain'd with a Reception a Work of fo much Usefulness and Difinterestedness may in reafon expect, and which will contain, in effect, all Editions in this, various Readings which have hitherto come abroad, by reprefenting them all at one view; with the Original Text, which is what has never been done before.

This may probably be an Incitement to other Men of Learning and Leifure, to fet about other Parts of the Bible, or to join in the fame Defign, which will deferve the highest Encouragement. To finish the whole Canon of Scripture with accuracy, is a Work of too great labour for any fingle Perfon to undertake, and can ne

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But this Point is very ingeniously and Philofophically handled by Plato in his Theatetus; where he demonftrates against Protagoras, that Science is not Senfe, but there is another Power in the Soul befides that of the Senfe or Paffion to which Science, Knowledge, and Intellection is to be referred.

And a further Proof that Senfe is not Knowledge or Intellection, because the Soul by Sense, doth not perceive the Things themselves, or the abfolute Natures of them, but only her own Paffions from them, as Sextus the Philofopher took notice of: The Senfes do not reach to the Objects that are placed without, but their Paffions alone. And this is that which Protagoras fo much infifted on: The Truth of which is fo evident in fome inftances, that none can poffibly gainfay it. For as the famous Monfieur le Clerc obferves alfo in his Logick, when the Body is either prick'd with a Needle, or wounded with a Sword, no Man can imagine that those Pains that refult from thence, were fuch real and abfolute Qualities exifting in the Needle or Sword before our Senfation, &c.

In fhort, the Soul by Senfe doth not perceive corporeal Objects, as they are truly, really, and abfolutely in themfelves, but under fome fantaftical Reprefentations and Difguifes; and therefore Senfe cannot be Knowledge, which comprehends a thing as it is.

Many Men befides Protagoras, conceive that the Nature of Senfe confifts in nothing else.but mere feeming or appearance, and there is no Object at all really exifting without the Soul. A known and approved Inftance whereof we have in those that, after they have their Arms and Legs cut off, have been fenfible when they were awake,

awake, of a strong and violent Pain in their Fingers and Toes, though really they had no fuch Members.

The Reafon of this is from hence, Becaufe by Senfe the Soul doth not fuffer immediately from the Objects themfelves, but only from its own Body, by reafon of that Natural and Vital Sympathy which it has with it; neither doth it fuffer from its own Body in every part of it, or from outward Organs of Senfe immediately, as from the Eye when we fee, the Tongue when we tafte, &c. but only from the Brain, or from. the Motions of the Spirits there.

The Phantafms and fenfible Ideas are really and materially the fame thing, both being Paffions or Sufferings in the Soul from the Body. Here our Author diftinguishes two Cafes in which a Phantafm doth not feem to be a Senfation.

First, when a Phantafm is raifed or excited purposely and voluntarily by the mere Command or Empire of our own Will. For inftance, it is in our Power to fancy what corporeal Thing or Perfon (formerly known to us) we please, tho' it be absent from us. Secondly, Every involuntary Phantafm, or fuch as the Soul is not confcious to it felf to have purpofely excited or raifed up within it felf, doth not feem to be a Senfation or Perception of a Thing as exifting without us; for there may be ftraggling Phantafms which come into the Mind we know not how. there are two kinds of involuntary Phantasms in the Soul; one, as it is intimated, that proceeds from fuch Motions of the Spirits as are caufed by the Nerves moved from the Objects without: Another, that proceeds from the Spirits of the Brain, otherwife moved than by the Nerves.

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The Exorbitancy of these Phantasms either proceed from fome Disease in the Body, or the fame thing may proceed originally from fome Diftemper in the Sout it felf.

Tho' our Author is not willing to give an account of thofe Phænomena of Wizards and Witches vulgarly talked of; but their feeming Tranfportations in the Air, Nocturnal Conventicles and Junkettings, and other fuch like things as feem plainly contradictory to Philofophy, and unreconcileable to good Senfe, may juftly be afcrib'd to either of the two Caufes juft now mention'd; or elfe let the Ignorance of the vulgar decide the Question.

After the Arguments our Author hitherto alledg'd to prove, that Senfe or Paffion from corporeal Things exiftent without the Soul is not Intellection or Knowledge, fo that Bodies themfelves are not known or understood by Senfe, infers, that Knowledge is an inward and active energy of the Mind it felf, and that's what Boetius expreffes too, Knowledge,fays he,does not arife from the force and activity of the Thing known from without, upon that which knows, but from the inward power, vigour, and activity of the Mind that knows actively, comprehending the Object within it felf.

Now further to prove that Senfe is not a mere Paffion, but a paffive Perception of the Soul, and a Cogitation, our Author argues thus: If Intellection and Knowledge were mere Paffion from without, or the bare reception of extraneous and adventitious Forms, then no Reason cou'd be given at all, why a Mirrour, for inftance, or Looking-glafs, fhou'd not understand? Whereas it cannot fo much as fenfibly perceive thofe Images which it receives and reflects to

us: And therefore Sense of it felf is not a mere Paffion, but a paffive Perception of the Soul, which has fomething of vital Energy in it, because it is a Cogitation; and really what Reafon cou'd be given, fays he, why brute Animals that have all the fame fenfes that Men have, and fome of them more acute, fhou'd not have Intellection alfo, and be as capable of Logick, Mathematicks and Metaphyficks, and have the fame Notions of Morality, of a Deity, and Religion, that Men have, were the Intellection and Knowledge, a mere paffive Perception of the Soul from without, and nothing but Sense.

Intellection therefore and Knowledge being not Paffion from without, but an active Exertion of the Mind from within it felf; hence it comes to pass that the Mind, which is a manner of all things, and a kind of notional or reprefentative World, as it were a Diaphanous and Crystalline Sphere, in which the Ideas and Images of all things exifting in the real Universe, may be reflected or reprefented: Hence it comes, fays he, that by knowing that which is exceedingly intelligible, the most Radiant and Illuftrious Truths is not debilitated thereby or overpowered, as Senfe is in perceiving that which is exceedingly fenfible, as the brightnefs of the Sun, but contrariwife the more invigorated thereby, and the better enabled to comprehend leffer and fmaller Truths; because tho' Senfe is Paffive and Organical, yet Knowledge is inorganical and active power and ftrength of the Mind, which the more it is exerted, is the more thereby invigorated and enlarged.

From hence likewife it is agreeable to Ariftotle's obfervation, That thofe Knowledges which are more abftract and remote from Matter, are

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