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out farther into Arguments (ad Hominem) in making a Digression, but a very solid one, in order to shew the different Natures of Sense and Intellection or Knowledge, and to assert the ime mutable Natures or Essences of Things; confequently to expose this Philofopher's Fantaftacism. We shall relate in few words his Affertions.

1. That Sense is not Knowledge, but Passion in the Body of the Sentient, which bodily Passion is nothing else but local Motion impress’d upon the Nerves from the Objects without, and thence propagated and communicated to the Brain, where all Sensation is made. For there is no other Action of one Body upon another, nor other change or mutation of Bodies conceivable or intelligible, besides local Motion; which Motion in that Body which moves another is called Action, in that which is moved by another Pasion.

2. Sense being not mere local Motion impress'd from one Body upon another, or a Body's bare Reaction or Refistance to that Motion of another Body; but a Cogitation, Recognition, or Vital Perception and Consciousness of these Motions or Pallions of the Body: 'Therefore, says our Author, there must of Necessity be another kind of Passion also in the Soul or Principle of Life, which is vitally united to the Body to make up Sensation. Which Paffion, notwithstanding, is of a different kind or Species from the former ; for the Soul that is a cogitative Being, is supposed to be such a thing as can penetrate a Body; and for this Reason, cannot be


conceived to be locally moved by the local Motion of the Body.

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3. But this Pasion of the Soul in Sensation, is not a mere naked Passion or Suffering, because it is a Cogitation or Perception, which has fomething of active Vigour in it. For, according to the Atomical Philosophy, those Ideas of Heat, Light and Colours, being not Qualities really existing in the Body without us, and not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without, like a Signature upon a piece of Wax; must needs arise partly from some inward vital Energy of the Soul it felf, being Fantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it.

4. Sense is a Passion in the Soul also, viz. such a Passion, as a vital and cogitative Being is capable of, because we find by Experience, that it is not elicited from the Soul it felf, but obtruded upon it from without ; so that the Soul cannot chuse but have such Sensations, Cogitations or Affections in it, when such or fuch external Objects are presented to the outward Senses.

5. Thuse Sensitive Cogitations differ from those pure Cogitations that are the Actions of the Soul it felf, there being a vast difference between the Senses of Hunger and Thirst, and mere volitions in the Soul to eat and drink, &c.

6. Hence our Author concludes, that Sensa. tions formally considered, are certain Paffions or Affections in the Soul, fatally connected with some local Motions in the Body, whereby the


Soul perceiveth something else, besides those immediate corporeal Motions in the Nerves, Spirits, or Brain.

These Positions our Author finishes with explaining very ingeniously the various Kinds of Sensations. But he goeth further in this Subject ; and thinks,

That Sense is a kind of dull, confused, and Atupid Perception obtruded upon the Soul from without, whereby it perceives the Alterations and Motions within its own Body, and takes Cognizance of individual Bodies existing round about it, but doth not clearly comprehend what they are, nor penetrate into the Nature of them; but Knowledge or Judgment is the active Energy of an unpassionate Soul, which is vitally united to the Body. If these when compound or Animal are so cloudy and confounded, it arises from their very mixture and confusion, as it were blended together.

That consequently there is a great difference betwixt Sensitive and Intellectual Cogitation; which is evident, says our Author, by Experience, not only in the Senses of Hunger and Thirst, Pain and corporeal Titillation, but also in all those other Perceptions of Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Sounds, Odours, and Sapours ; neither is this true in Experience only, but the most acute Philosophers had the fame Sentiment of it.

To give Advertisement of corporeal Things existing without us, and their Motions for the use and concernment of the body, and such general Intimations of the Modes of them, as may give the Understanding sufficient Hints by its own Sagacity to find out their Natures, and invent intelligible Hypotheses to solve a great man" appearances by, are the Uses of the Sensitive BRUARY 1731.



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and Intelle&tual Cogitation, that Nature had designed it to.


Letters, giving an Account of several Con

versations upon important and entertaining Subje&ts. Written originally in French by M. de Saint Hyacinthe, F.R.S. Printed by J. Bettenham, and fold by F. Hooke at the Flower-de-Luce overagainf St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet, J. Stagg in Westminster-Hall, and W. Darres at the Crown in Panton-street, near LeicesterSquare. 1731.


O give our Reader, in this second Ex

tract, an Abridgment of this valuable Book, wou'd be the setting of it in a very improper Light; for as it is in truth a Dramatick Piece, there is no part of it can be diminish'd without disfiguring the whole.

The Character of every Person introduc'd is kept up with so much nicety and justice, that the least variation would alter the Lineament and Features, if I may be permitted to express my self so, of each one that appears throughout the whole Piece.

In another Respect, an Abridgment of this Work wou'd do it a Prejudice, because by taking it all together, the Reader sees how Conversation may be improv'd and reviv’d; and how much it deferves the attention of those that are capable of such Advantages, to make so right a use of their Time.

Here if you have not a solid and useful Reflection, you are sure to be entertain’d with something that is lively and polite, and suitable to the State and Condition of the Person that speaks. Things of this Nature are not to be abridg'd.

The Author has made an excellent use of the first Principles of Knowledge, according to Des Cartes's Method, and shews that as he has read the best Books, he has made a suitable and proper use of them.

Some Characters he has brought in to form an agreeable Contrast to that of others, upon which the main part is founded.

The Counsellor, the Lady, and the Abbé, make an entertaining Episode in the Drama, in that the Author has said enough to give a sufficient Impression of them, without wearying the Reader by too minute a detail of their way of Conversation.

We may apply to this part what an Author says of a Picture, Ubi magis intelligitur, quam pingitur.

I must not omit what he says of the Lady's Niece, which I will take leave to transcribe:

“ The Niece is a young Creature who, as

yet, knows not how to give an Answer; her " Aunt, according to the Cuftom of old Coquets,

puts an Air of Severity to her. This Niece " the Count thinks pretty ; for this Reason, he

o thinks

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