trust which has been executed by the Bank of Vincennes, to secure a debt due to the United States, be legal? By which I suppose is meant, whether it be effectual to set apart this property exclusively to the use of the United States, and thus exempt it from execution for the debts of the bank. Neither the charter of the Bank of Vincennes nor the deed in question being before me, I feel some reluctance in answering the question. Upon the postulates, however, that the charter is according to the usual form, and that the deed is without seal, it is not, in my opinion, effectual to set apart the property to the use of the United States, nor to shield it from execution for other debts of the bank. The principle, that a corporation can grant only by its seal, is of universal application, and applies as well to the case of a grant to the United States as to an individual. The doctrine of priority, alluded to in the letter, does not operate to give validity to a deed made in behalf of the United States, which deed would be invalid with regard to an individual. That doctrine does not, in any manner, touch the efficacy of such deeds; it is a matter totally distinct, and leaves this question to stand by itself. Whether there be a priority in this case, in behalf of the United States, is a different question; which is not referred to me in this letter, and which, if it were, there are no facts to enable me to answer. It may not be amiss, however, to suggest, that according to the acts of Congress from which this priority is derived, expounded as they have been by the Supreme Court, this priority does not exist in every case in which there is an inability in the debtor to pay all his debts; there must be a known and legal insolvency to pay all his debts manifested by some open act, as taking the oath of insolvent debtors, under the laws of some of the States; there must be an assignment of all the debtor's effects for the use of his creditors, or there must be an attachment against the effects of an absent or absconding debtor. I remain, most respectfully, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. WM. WIRT. LIABILITY OF SURETIES. The estate of a surety for a receiver of public moneys for lands is liable after the death of such surety, for the faithful performance by the receiver of his duties until the end of his term. Sureties of a collector of taxes appointed by the President during a recess of the Senate and confirmed by the Senate at its next session, who signed the bond given by the collector when he entered upon his official duties, are liable for the faithful performance of the duties of the collector throughout the term-the appointment during the recess and the subsequent nomination to, and confirmation by the Senate, making but one and the same appointment. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, October 30, 1822. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, addressed to me direct, in the absence of the Secretary of the Treasury, and proceed to give you my opinion on the points stated. Patton, one of the sureties of Samuel Finlay, a receiver of public moneys for lands, &c., died in 1812. The principal, nevertheless, went on in the discharge of his duties as receiver, and, on the settlement of his accounts in 1818, was found indebted to the government in a sum exceeding $20,000. The administrators of Patton have pleaded that the estate of their intestate is not liable for any defalcation of Finlay after Patton's death. But there is no such limitation in the bond. The bond is Patton's contract. He binds himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, in the penal sum of $10,000, conditioned that Finlay shall well and truly execute the duties of his office of receiver; - not that he shall execute them faithfully during the life of Patton, but that he shall execute them faithfully throughout. The plea, therefore, seeks to annex to the contract a modification which is not to be found in the contract itself, and which it is not competent to either party to annex to it, without the consent of the other. I am of opinion, therefore, that there is no force in the objection. The other case is this: Charles R. Sherman, a collector of the direct tax and internal revenue, was appointed by the President, in the recess of the Senate, under the 2d section of the act of the 22d July, 1813, which gives him the power of making such appointment, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the next session of the Senate. During the next session of the Senate, Sherman was nominated to that body, and his appointment confirmed by them. Under his appointment by the President, however, and before his confirmation by the Senate, he gave the bond and surety required by the 18th section of the act of 1813; and his sureties in that bond contend that they are not liable beyond the end of the next session of the Senate after his appointmentthat being the term of his authority when they became his sureties. In my opinion, there is nothing in this objection more than in the former. There is nothing on the face of the bond, nor in the nature of the engagements, as explained by the law and constitution of the United States, which warrants the objection. The bond is required by the law to be in double the amount of the duties assessed on the district. The contract, therefore, looks to the collection of all those taxes. The condition of the bond is, that Sherman shall duly collect and pay all moneys assessed upon the district. The appointment made by the President in the recess, and the subsequent confirmation by the Senate, make but one and the same appointment. It has been so ever considered in filling vacancies in the recess under the constitution. The parties to this contract could not look at the law under which they were about to enter into this engagement, without seeing clearly and distinctly that they were entering into an engagement for the collection of all the moneys assessed upon the district. The whole act is full of this information. The 27th section expressly makes the collector chargeable with the whole amount of taxes receipted by him. The fol lowing section subjects both the collector and his sureties to the warrant of the comptroller for any part of such sum not accounted for by the collector; and, by the same section, the amount of the sums committed to any collector for collection is declared to be a lien on the lands and real estate of such collector, until the same shall be discharged according to law. The act of the 2d August, 1813, imposing the direct tax, as well as those laying the internal duties, all declare that they shall be collected by the officers appointed under the act of July, 1813, and in the manner therein provided. These acts are all "in pari materiá:" they constitute an entire system; and looking at them all together, it is impossible to suppose that the sureties of the collectors could suppose they were engaged only till the end of the next session of the Senate. They must have known they were engaged for an officer whose permanency depended only on the confirmation of the Senate, and that their obligation was co-extensive with the duties prescribed to that officer by the laws under which he was appointed; and I am of opinion that the penalty of their bond will become absolute on them (unless they show that their principal has discharged all those duties) the whole time that he held the office of collector, under the President's appointment, confirmed by the Senate. I have the honor to remain, sir, &c., &c., WM. WIRT. To the AGENT OF THE TREASURY. DUTIES OF ATTORNEY GENERAL. The Attorney General will decline giving official opinions concerning infringements of the rights of patentees by dealers in the patented articles of manufacture, it not being the duty of the officers in charge of the Patent Office to decide upon the legal effect of patents issued in conformity to the laws, nor to inform patentees of their rights. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of the 2d instant, covering a letter from Dr. Thornton, of the Patent Office, with its accompaniment, (a letter from Mr. J. R. Nourse,) requesting my opinion on the following question: Mr. Nourse represents himself as part proprietor of Powles's patent bedstead, for the State of New York; and that he has authorized cabinet makers to manufacture and sell them in that State. The question which he asks is, whether bedsteads thus sold can be legally carried and resold in any other State or section of the United States, without infringing the right of the patentee? If it is any part of your duty, or that of the officer who is charged with the patent business attached to your department, to answer questions like these, then it becomes my duty to meet the reference which is made of it to me; for my duty, as prescribed by law, is to give my advice and opinion upon questions of law, when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their depart. ments-that is to say, touching the discharge of any duty which is imposed by law on their departments. Now, on turning to the patent laws, I do not discover that it is anywhere made the duty, either of the Secretary of State, or the Patent Office, to answer questions touching the legal effects of patents which they have issued in conformity to the laws; nor to inform patentees, or the assignees of these patents. Their duty is confined to issuing patents in the cases and with the forms prescribed by law; having done this, their duty is at an end. The rights which those patents confer, and what will amount to a violation of those rights, are questions with which they have nothing to do. They are questions of law, which are to be settled by courts and juries, and on which individuals may, if they choose, consult counsel for their own guidance; but the law gives them no authority to bring such questions to the Department of State, nor to the Patent Office attached to that department. If there is any act to be done by the patent officer, which demands the previous setflement of this legal question, then, indeed, it becomes a question touch ing the duties of the department, and I shall be ready to answer; but since it comes to me in the mere form of an abstract question of law, having nothing to do with any duty which is to be performed by the Patent Office, and not touching any matter that concerns the department, I must, for the present, decline answering it, being very certain that you will hold me excused from creating any unnecessary augmentation either of your duties or my own. I have the honor to be, &c., To the SECRETARY OF STATE. WM. WIRT. SALVAGE. A recapture from pirates gives a fair claim for salvage by the general maritime law; and by the act of March 3, 1800, national ships are entitled to salvage from the ships of friendly powers rescued from their enemies; which act, in spirit, applies to rescues from pirates. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: In reply to your communication of the 29th instant, relative to the salvage voluntarily paid by the French brig Theodore, on her recapture from pirates by the United States sloop-of-war Hornet, I would remark, in the first place, that a recapture from pirates gives a fair claim for salvage by the general maritime law-(See Wheaton on Captures, page 237, note m, and the authorities there cited; see, also, the case of Talbot vs. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1.) That national ships are entitled to salvage from the ships of friendly powers rescued from their enemies, see the 3d section of the act of 3d March, 1800, providing for salvage in cases of recapture. It is true, that this section does not in terms apply to cases of property rescued from pirates; but, in its reason and spirit, the appli cation is manifest-more especially when taken in connexion with the principle that a recapture from pirates gives at least as strong a claim to salvage as a recapture from enemies carrying on a regular war. The distribution of the salvage-money is regulated by the 4th section of the act just referred to, (that of 3d March, 1800,) which takes the rule adopted by law for the distribution of prize money; and this last is regulated by the act of April 23, 1800, for the better government of the navy of the United States. I have the honor, &c., &c., WM. WIRT. To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. BREVETS IN THE MARINE CORPS. Captain Wainwright, of the marine corps, having served ten years in the grade of captain, and having applied for brevet promotion under the act of 16th April, 1814, the question is presented whether, since the act of 3d March, 1817, fixing the peace establishment of the marine corps, and abolishing the office of major in the same, the President can confer the brevet of major at all? and if so, whether it should not be the brevet of major in the army?— HELD, that the only brevet rank of major which the President can confer is that of brevet major in the army of the United States. If it shall be deemed expedient to confer upon a captain of marines the brevet rank of major in the army, then he is entitled, if entitled at all to promotion, to the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel in the marine corps. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEral, SIR: The question submitted for my opinion on the 22d April, 1820, was, whether the President was authorized to confer the brevet rank of major in the marine corps? The case which produced the question was stated to be this: Under the 3d section of the act of 16th April, 1814, in relation to the marine corps, the President had conferred the rank of brevet major on several captains of that corps, while the rank of major belonged to the organization of that corps. But one captain, equally meritorious with the rest, and equally entitled, had been accidentally pretermitted. On this posture of things came the act of the 3d March, 1817, to fix the peace establishment of the marine corps, which abolished the grade of major in that corps: the single question, therefore, was, whether the President could now confer this grade in that corps by brevet, to relate back to the time when it should have been conferred? and my answer, on the 22d April, 1820, was, that as the rank of major no longer existed in the corps, the President could not confer it by brevet. Captain Wainwright (the same gentleman, I presume, whose case is above stated) has renewed his application for brevet promotion, under the act of 16th April, 1814, on the ground that he has served ten years in the grade of captain; and the case is again submitted for my opinion on the questions 1. Whether Captain Wainwright is entitled to brevet promotion; 2. If he be so entitled, whether it is to the rank of lieutenant colonel, or that of major. On the first question, I think there can be no doubt. The act of 16th April, 1814, is still in force; and, in the 3d section, it expressly authorizes the President to confer brevet rank on such officers of the marine corps as shall have served ten years in any one grade. Captain Wainwright has served ten years in his present grade; and, therefore, the brevet rank which the President is authorized to confer there can be no propriety in withholding; especially towards an officer so meritorious as, from the documents with which you have accompanied your letter, Captain Wainwright appears to be. The second question is one of more difficulty, and is, I humbly think, rather a military than a legal question. Laws on military subjects, as you know, sir, seldom fall within the sphere of a lawyer's practice or consideration; and he is consequently without that key of experience in the subject-matter which is so essential to their just construction. The origin and nature of brevet rank-for example, the cases in which it is conferred, and the effects which it produces-are purely questions of mili tary experience, with regard to which we have no written laws; and all questions in relation to that rank must be, of necessity, beyond the province of the mere jurist; but the question which you have submitted to me demands all this military knowledge; and although I shall proceed, according to my sense of duty, to give it the best answer in my power, yet I submit it, whether the President would not be much more safe in resting on the opinion of military men, in this case, than on mine. I had always supposed that (in our service at least) brevet rank was the |