ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT (1822-1885)

General Grant also was not a literary man in the usual sense of the term. His dispatches during the war attracted the attention of the country by their terse, dynamic power, and when his Personal Memoirs appeared in 1885-6, written at the suggestion of Mark Twain and published by him with great success, they were recognized generally as being not only first-hand documents from the pen of a chief actor in the drama which they recorded, but as having the same soldier-like directness of style and the same artless power that had characterized his dispatches in the field. Matthew Arnold's dictum that the Memoirs lack literary distinction may serve as food for thought, but it cannot do away with the undoubted fact that they have a unique quality, one not to be found in the more polished efforts of the professional stylists. The fact that Grant wrote the book while struggling with the last stages of the disease to which finally he succumbed lends to it a melancholy interest that cannot be forgotten.

THE MEXICAN WAR1

tle and third complete victory, the Whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the Presidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country. It was no doubt supposed that Scott's_ambition would lead him to slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize.

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not 10 seem to have been denied by President Polk, or Marcy, his Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig and the administration was democratic. General Scott was also known to have political aspirations, and 15 nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. It would not do therefore to give him command of the army of conquest.' The plans submitted by Scott for a campaign 20 in Mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success 25 could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May, 1846. Four days later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico. General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to 30 sary to destroy his chances promptly. The take the field. Colonel Zachary Taylora brigadier-general by brevet was therefore left in command. He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but 35 after the fall of Monterey, his third bat1 Copyright by the Century Co.

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. It was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the Presidency. It was neces

problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the administration of Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such des

sonal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate.

Buena

General Taylor's victory at Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, 5 with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a foregone con10 clusion. He was nominated and elected in 1848. I believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the United States.

peration that he would disgrace himself.
General Scott had opposed conquest by
the way of the Rio Grande, Matamoras
and Saltillo from the first. Now that he
was in command of all the forces in Mex-
ico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his
regular troops and left him only enough
volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line
then in possession of the invading army.
Indeed Scott did not deem it important to
hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and
authorized Taylor to fall back to that line
if he chose. General Taylor protested
against the depletion of his army, and his
subsequent movement upon Buena Vista 15
would indicate that he did not share the
views of his chief in regard to the unim-
portance of conquest beyond the Rio
Grande.

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in the division of General David Twiggs in Taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William Worth, in which I served to the close of the war. The troops withdrawn from Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. I found General Worth a different man from any I had before served directly under. He was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. General Worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing

Scott had estimated the men and ma- 20 terial that would be required to capture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only 25 the confidence of the President, but his sincere good wishes. The promises were all broken. Only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and Scott 30 had scarcely started for Mexico before the President undertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H. Benton as lieutenant-general. This being refused by Congress, the President 35 asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Con- 4° ess failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve un der him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. 45 General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth of the Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to 50 their food, ordered tents struck and made

meet him. Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. He had started on this march before he was aware of

the march that night which had been intended for the next day. Some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them with

General Scott being in the country. Un- 55 out fatigue, while others can wear them

der these circumstances Scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from Tay without the per

out in a few days without accomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class. He enjoyed, however, a

fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him.

The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. The men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow 5 water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, animunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation one shot took off the head of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops were landed and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of the city to the Gulf again on the north,

ing of stores was continued until every... thing was got ashore.

The army lay in camp upon the sandbeach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. The transports were all sailing vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many of 10 the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of Vera Cruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. 15 The transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. The transports with troops were as- 20 was soon and easily effected. The landsembled in the harbor of Anton Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from 25 the North. With the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat - the first vessel of the kind I had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. At 30 that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were side-wheelers. This little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted 35 a great deal of attention. I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, Why, 40 the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances.'

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a 45 population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defense, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing 50 from vessels lying in the open sea.

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so 55 that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North.

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled city. The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. There were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the invading army had established their camps out of range of the hs from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. These batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been made at any time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops

away..

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who was Governor of both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence with General Scott looking to the surrender of the town. forts and garrison. On the

sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things 10 are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been passed with contempt; its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of countering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field.