As to the effect produced by this celebrated decision on the operation of the Statute of Frauds, and by St. 9, G. 4, c. 14, sec. 6, upon the class of cases of which this is the leading one, see the note to Chandelor v. Lopus, ante, vol. i. p. 79. It is shown in the same note from the cases of Foster v. Charles, 6 Bingh. 396; 7 Bingh. 108; Corbet v. Browne, 8 Bingh. 433; and Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 122, that, in order to prove such fraud as will sustain this action, it is only necessary to show that what the defendant asserted was false within his own knowledge, and occasioned damage to the plaintiff; a point which had been much mooted in Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 E. 92. The expression of opinion by the court in the principal case, that the novelty of the action is no objection, the injury being clearly shown to exist, is cited in the note to Ashby v. White, ante, vol. i. 131. In the late case of Langridge v.. Levy, 2 Mee & Welsb. 519, the Court of Exchequer carried the principle of Pasley v. Freeman somewhat further. It was an action for falsely and fraudulently warranting a gun to have been made by Nock, and to be a good, safe, and secure gun, and selling it as such to the plaintiff's father, for the use of himself and sons; one of whom (the plaintiff) confiding in the warranty, used the gun, whereupon it burst, and injured him. The action was held to be maintainable. "If,” says Parke, B., delivering judgment, "it (the gun) had been delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff for the purpose of being used by him, with an accompanying representation to him, that he might safely so use it; and the plaintiff had acted on the faith of its being true, and had received damage thereby; then there is no question but that an action would have lain on the principle of a numerous class of cases, of which the leading one is Pasley v. Freeman, which principle is, that a mere naked falsehood is not enough to give a right of action: but that it is so if it be a falsehood told with the intention that it should be acted on by the party injured, and that act must produce damage to him. If, instead of being delivered to the plaintiff immediately, the instrument had been placed in the hands of a third person, for the purpose of being delivered to, and then used by, the plaintiff, the like false representation being knowingly made to the intermediate person to be communicated to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had acted upon it, there can be no doubt but that the principle would equally apply, and the plaintiff would have had his remedy for the deceit, nor can it make any difference that the third person also was intended by the defendant to be deceived; nor does there seem to be any substantial distinction if the instrument be delivered in order to be so used by the plain tiff, though it does not appear that the defendant intended the false representation itself to be communicated to him. There is a false representation made by the defendant, with a view that the plaintiff should use the instrument in a dangerous way; and unless the representation had been made, the dangerous act would never have been done." This is a remarkable case; it affords an instance in which a party may bring an action for the consequences of a breach of contract, who was not the contractee, and could not have sued upon the contract. It has been approved and acted upon in Pilmore v. Hood, 5 Bingh. N. C. 97. A singular case has lately occurred in the Court of Exchequer, in which the majority of the judges decided that a contract made by an agent in behalf of his principal, and into which the contractee was induced to enter by a representation, which, though false within the knowledge of the principal, was not so within that of the agent, was not void on the ground of fraud; for it was argued, there is no fraud in the agent, since he thought he was telling the truth, nor any in the principal, since he did not make the representation. Lord Abinger, C. B., thought, upon the other hand, that the contract being procured by misrepresention must be tainted with legal if not moral fraud. The case was Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & W. 358. It is by no means universally admitted as law, and probably will be hereafter questioned. DOE d. RIGGE v. BELL. MICH.-34 G. 3. [REPORTED 5 T. R. 471.] If a landlord lease for seven years by parol, and agree that the tenant shall enter at Lady-day and quit at Candlemas, though the lease be void by the statute of frauds as to the duration of the term, the tenant holds under the terms of the lease in other respects; and therefore, the landlord can only put an end to the tenancy at Candlemas. THIS ejectment was on the demise of T. Rigge, guardian of H. and M. Rigge, infants. At the trial at the last assizes at York, before the Lord Chief Baron, it appeared, that in January 1790, Wilkinson, as agent for the lessor of the plaintiff, let the farm in question, called Hague's Farm, to the defendant for seven years, by parol. The defendant was to enter when the former tenant quitted, namely, on the land at old Lady-day, and the house on the 25th of May following; and he was to quit at Candlemas. The defendant entered accordingly, and paid rent. A notice to quit at Lady-day last was served on the 22d of September, 1792. It was also proved that both the daughters of the lessor of the plaintiff were above fourteen. The defendant's counsel objected, first, that the notice to quit was insufficient; the holding being from Candlemas, and the notice requiring the defendant to quit at Lady-day: 2dly, That the lessor of the plaintiff claimed as guardian in socage to his daughters, who were both above the age of fourteen. And the plaintiff was nonsuited. Chambre, on a former day, obtained a rule, calling on the defendant to show cause why this nonsuit should not be set aside. As to the first objection, he said, this was a holding from Lady-day, and that, therefore, the notice to quit was *regular; and as to the second, he produced an affidavit, in which it was stated, that one of the daughters of the lessor of the plaintiff was under fourteen years of age. Cockell, Sergeant, and Walton, were now to have shown cause against the rule; but Law, Chambre, and Barrow, were desired to answer the first objection; as to which they argued, that as that agreement for seven years was void by the Statute of Frauds, it being by parol, the defendant must be considered as tenant from year to year, that year commencing at Lady-day when he entered; and that consequently the notice to quit at Lady-day, served more than half a year before, was regular. Lord Kenyon, Ch. J.-Though the agreement be void by the Statute of Frauds as to the duration of the lease, it must regulate the terms on which the tenancy subsists in other respects, as to the rent, the time of the year when the tenant is to quit, &c. So where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term, without having entered into any new contract, he holds upon the former terms. Now, in this case, it was agreed that the defendant should quit at Candlemas; and though the agreement is void as to the number of years for which the defendant was to hold, if the lessor chose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven years, he can only put an end to it at Candlemas. Rule discharged. See Richardson v. Gifford, 1 Ad. & Ell. 52; Beale v. Sanders, 3 Bingh. N. C. 850; and the note to the next case. CLAYTON v. BLAKEY. MICH. 39 G. 3. [REPORTED 8 T. R. 3.] Though by the statute of Frauds it is enacted that all leases by parol, for more than three years, shall have the effect of estates at will only, such a lease may be made to enure as a tenancy from year to year. THIS was an action against a tenant for double rent, for holding over after the expiration of his term, and a regular notice to quit. The first count of the declaration stated a holding under a certain term, determinable on the 12th of May then past; and other counts stated a holding from year to year, determinable at the same period. It appeared in evidence, that the defendant had held the premises for two or three years, under a parol demise for twenty-one years from the day mentioned, to which the notice to quit referred; and the Statute of Frauds directing that any lease for more than three years, not reduced into writing, shall operate only as a tenancy at will, it was contended, at the trial of the last assizes for Northumberland, that the holding should have been stated according to the legal operation of it, as a tenancy at will; and as there was no count adapted to that statement, that the plaintiff ought to be nonsuited. Rooke, J., however, considering that it amounted to a tenancy from year to year, overruled the objection, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict. Wood now moved to set aside the verdict, on the ground of a misdirection, relying upon the positive words of the statute. |