their possible effect in defeating her claim to the whole watershed, is thus referred to in the British Case (p. 163):

"Further to the south the Imataka Mountains and the range of hills constituting the water-shed between the tributaries of the Orinoco and those of the Cuyuni and Massaruni form the boundary of the river basin to which Great Britain is primâ facie entitled. But if it be considered that Venezuela is entitled to the region about the Yuruari, in which the Mission stations were situate, the Schomburgk line offers a boundary with every advantage of physical features, etc.”

We have already seen the state of the Essequibo colony in 1648. It was not until 1658 that the Dutch attempted to occupy the Pomeroon. The plan was a large one, but the failure was even larger; for, in 1665, it was destroyed by the English.

In 1679 the Commandeur in Essequibo writes:

"The river Pomeroon also promises some profit; for, in order to make trial of it, I sent thither in August last one of my soldiers to barter for annatto dye. But there lately came tidings of the approach of a strong fleet of Caribs from the Corentyn with intent to visit this river and Pomeroon, having perhaps a secret understanding with the Caribs here to make a common attack upon us. (This danger, thank Providence, we have escaped; for I now learn from Berbice that they long ago passed this river on their way back from Barima, and, seizing in Berbice an Indian boat, have gone back to their homes again.) On receiving the aforesaid ill tidings I called in to the fort the above-mentioned outlier in Pomeroon, both to save him from being surprised, along with the Company's goods, by these savages and to strengthen ourselves in case of attack. Accordingly he came to the fort on the 8th inst. with all the goods, bringing with him a barrel of annatto dye which he had there bought up. The scare being now over, I shall send him back there within four or five weeks (the dye season not fairly beginning there before that date); and, if the trade prospers, it would not be a bad idea to build there a hut for two or three men, so that they may dwell permanently among the Indians and occupy that river." (V. C., vol. ii, pp. 37-38.)

In 1689 the Commandeur in Essequibo wrote:

"In Pomeroon the Company has nothing to lose but a small bread and yam garden, with five or six decrepit negroes, and the whole force there consists of only nine or ten men." (V. C., vol. ii, pp. 59-60.)

In the same year the post was practically abandoned, as appears by this resolution of the West India Company:

"It was further resolved that from the colony of Pomeroon shall be removed whatever has been brought thither on behalf of the company, both the employees and the slaves and other commodities, there being left there only three men with a flag for the maintenance of the company's possession at the aforesaid place, and that the aforesaid employees and commodities be transported to Essequibo in order there to be employed for the service of the Company." (V. C., vol. ii, p. 62.)

The condition of things in 1790 is told with particularity in the report of Commissioners Sirtema van Grovestins and Boey:

"The river of Essequibo is cultivated on the eastern side from Bourassiri to Bonnasigue, and on the western side from the Toeloekaboeka to the Supinaam Creek, being a distance of nine thousand six hundred rods. However, many more lands here could be brought under cultivation if the vicinity of the river Orinoco did not prevent it, for the Spaniards there sometimes come with armed boats, called lances [lanchas], as far as Moruca and by force carry away the Indians who dwell there, enslaving them, while on the other hand our negro slaves, when they run away, betake themselves to Orinoco, where they are proclaimed free.

The colonies of Demerara and Essequibo therefore form a stretch of twenty-four [Dutch] miles along the coast of Guiana; and, if means could be found to facilitate the inland communication by appropriate canals issuing into the rivers, both for the transportation of products and for the drainage of the lands, this would increase incalculably the land fit for cultivation. (V. C., vol. ii, p. 243.)

The noticeable things here are, that the Spaniards on the Orinoco were asserting by armed expeditions the ownership of Pomeroon; that by reason of this the Dutch could not extend their settlements to that region, and that Demerara and Essequibo combined only occupied "twenty-four Dutch miles along the coast of Guiana."

Now, long before this time the Spaniards had established many missions in the watershed of the Cuyuni, and had asserted and maintained a military control throughout that region.

Spanish military occupation and surveillance of the lower Cuyuni resulted, in 1772, in the final abandonment of the last Dutch post in that river, three days' journey from the Dutch fort. We conclude this discussion with the remark that Great Britain is not only asserting here a doctrine, as to river mouth settlements, the reverse of that maintained by her in the Oregon case, but is in the case now at bar denying to Venezuela the benefit of the alleged rule, while claiming it in her own behalf. Spain held the Orinoco, not constructively but actually. In the language of the British Counter-Case (p. 28): "The Spaniards entered, explored, settled and effectively defended the Orinoco." The occupation of the Orinoco and of the Essequibo present two very different cases. The former was "entered, explored, settled and effectively defended" by Spain. Of Essequibo and the Dutch these things cannot be said. If the Orinoco was Spain's--if she owned both its banks, from mouth to source, as she did--then a very mild and reasonable application of the watershed theory would give her the tributary streams-the Waini, the Barima and the Amacura. Her acknowledged dominion over the main stream could not be maintained without these. In the case of the Essequibo, Great Britain seeks to appropriate the main stream and all its tributaries by mere construction, and that apparently before any Dutchman had passed above the tide limit. And yet, admitting Spain's actual, effective dominion of the Orinoco, she denies. to Spain two of its tributaries and seeks to appropriate by the seizure of Barima Point the command of the Orinoco itself.

CHAPTER XX.

MIDDLE DISTANCE AND NATURAL BOUNDARIES.

While no definite use has been made here, so far as we recall, by Great Britain of what is called the rule of the middle distance, it will not be amiss to briefly to state the reason and limits of the rule. It is not a mere rule of compromise--the splitting of the difference-and can have no application to any case where there is a line of right. This great Tribunal is organized to find the line of right, and is required to establish it when found. It cannot omit to do either of these things. It cannot, without finding the line of right, fix upon a middle line; nor, after finding the true boundary, give to one nation that which it has found belonged to another. Before the rule of the middle distance can be used, it must be found that there is no line of right; that neither party has a superior right to the whole or any determinate part of the disputed territory. In that case the middle distance is not the splitting of a difference, but the nearest possible ascertainment of the line of right. It proceeds upon the theory that there is no better right to any part of the territory in dispute. Neither party admits, or even suggests that we have such a case here. In the discussion between Spain and the United States, as to the western boundary of Louisiana, the former rested the suggestion of the middle distance upon the theory that two nations had made discoveries and settlements at some distance from each other, and that neither had a superior claim to the territory in controversy. In the case at bar Spain only has the discoverer's title, while that of the Dutch rests upon conquest, treaty, prescription, or an alleged abandonment of the discoverer's title. But if, in any case of a disputed boundary, the middle distance is to be applied as a basis of compromise, it