The first of them begins with this obfervation; That it is of great ufe to examine the cafe of doctrinal, or speculative points in Religion; how far they are of an indifferent nature, as to the belief of them; whether, as fuch, they be capable of being made terms of Salvation; and whether the doctrine of the Trinity be of this kind. To fuch a perfuafion it is owing, that a great number of Chriftians neglect the confideration of the effential doCtries of Christianity: For, being prepoffefs'd with an opinion that fuch matters do not at all concern them, in that they do not affect their future happiness, why fhould they spend their time upon subjects of no consequence, and perhaps as little entertaining to their tafte and humour? But if Unbelievers can be convinced, that the doctrine of the Trinity is not merely fpeculative; or that fpeculative doctrines may, if God pleafes, be required of us, as neceffary conditions of Salvation; they then must think themselves concern'd to enquire whether God has reveal'd them to us, and required us to believe them.

Another reason, the Author has given, why he thought an enquiry into the nature of doEtrinal, or fpeculative points fo feafonable, is, That the arguments, whereby the Innocency of Error in fuch points has been defended, fubvert all Religion, both natural and reveal'd.

Having thus obferv'd the importance of the fubject, he proceeds to ftate the question in difpute; where he takes particular care to fix the meaning of the terms, and to free them from that ambiguity in which they have been. ufed, either thro' ignorance, or defign. In the profe

profecution of this fubject he has a particular regard, as he himself fays, to a celebrated piece, intitled, The Innocency of Error, afferted and vindicated, written by Dr. Sykes; who has taken great pains to reduce the notion into a formed fcheme, whereas before it was only dropp'd occafionally, in loofe and naked propofitions. From this piece therefore our Author cites feveral paffages, where the doctrine is formally ftated. As thus; Error is an affent of the mind to a propofition as true, which is not fo. If error extends no farther than the mind, 'tis what I call SIMPLE ERROR: If a man proceeds upon this falfe bottom to regulate his practice, fuch error is then called a practical one. Again: If we guard against evil practices, if we take care that our actions are but right, and agreeable to the Laws of Chrift; I do not fee what harm can enfue. Again: If errors of the understanding are criminal, let all be fo, and punish philofophical ones, as well as theological. Then follow fome remarks upon the Doctor's inaccuracies and inconfiftencies; which we fhall pass over, having collected enough to fhew, that the affertors of the innocency of error mean, by fpeculative errors, fuch errors as relate to points that are only the objects of our understanding, without having any influence upon our actions; of which kind they fuppofe the doctrine of the Trinity, and other mysteries of Christianity to be.

The first argument that is brought in proof of this notion, is, That in the perceptions of the mind, men are perfectly paffive.

This argument, our Author obferves, will equally render all errors innocent, the mind be ing equally paffive in thofe perceptions upon

A 2

which

which we ground our judgment in practical truths, as in fpeculative ones. We act in confequence of our judgment; and our judgment is made in confequence of our perceptions: And therefore if in fpeculative truths, the agreement or difagreement of the terms of a propofition appears neceffarily to the mind, and the mind judges neceffarily according to the appearance of things; the progrefs of the mind is the fame in its judgment concerning practical truths, and confequently errors in fuch points are equally involuntary and unpunishable.

The fame confequence will alfo follow in respect to the belief of Chriftianity in general, as well as any particular doctrine of it: The mind being paffive in its perceptions, and judgments, it is not in any man's power to determine how the evidence for the truth of Christianity fhall appear, or whether he fhall judge according as things do appear; from whence it must follow, in this way of reafoning, that error in respect of the truth of Chriftianity, is as innocent as error in our notions of the Trinity: So that, as our Author takes notice, the advocates for the Innocency of error ufe the very fame way of arguing, in fupport of their favourite fcheme, which the late Mr. Collins and other Infidels have ufed against free will, in order to destroy Religion in general.

Their fecond argument is only the confequence of the former; That error cannot be punishable, because we cannot repent of error; i. e. can have no fting of Confcience, no remorse, no self-condemning notions for having been in an error, unlefs it has affected our actions; alledging this reafon for it, That 'tis a contradiction to be fully

per

perfuaded of any point, and to repent of it at the fame time. Upon which our Author obferves, ift, That men may be punished for what they cannot repent of, because their incapacity to repent may be owing to themselves. 2dly, That tho' 'tis a contradiction to be fully perfuaded of any point, and repent of it at the fame time; yet that perfuafion may be criminal, as arifing from the neglect of the proper means of conviction, or from vicious paffions, which may hinder thofe means from having their proper effect. But 3dly, That this argument, were there any force in it, would prove practical errors as innocent as fpeculative ones. For, if a man be fully perfuaded, tho' erroneously, of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any action, he cannot be fo fully perfuaded, and repent of that action at the fame time: And if he cannot fo repent of it, he cannot, in the opinion of these Gentlemen, be punished for it.

The third Argument is this; that the Evil lies not in them (fpeculative Errors) but in the frame and difpofition of mind, which tends to betray men into them. To which our Author anfwers, that this Argument proves directly, that Speculative Errors are punishable as well as practical ones, because they may, and often do arife from an evil frame and difpofition of mind; from pride, from felf-conceit, from obftinacy, or from worldly interest.

The last Argument that our Author mentions, he quotes from Mr. Chub, and it is this; That fpeculative Doctrines must be innocent, because they are not fo clearly revealed as to leave no room for Error; and it is abfurd to fuppofe that a wife and good Being Should create us capable of Error,

A 3

and

and punifb us for erring: To which he replies, That if we be capable of understanding and believing any truth, we may be punished for not doing it; or elfe there is an end of all Religion at once, because we are capable of finning, and confequently, according to this way of reafoning, we are not punishable for finning, tho' capable at the fame time of avoiding the fin. The general Remark which our Author makes upon all these arguments is, That either they prove nothing, too much, or fomething foreign to the purpofe; that no argument has been advanced concerning the innocency of fpeculations, or notions in particular, as diftinguifh'd from practical truths, but only fuch as prove all errors innocent, or all punishable.

Having therefore fhewn the weakness of their arguments, he proceeds to confider more particularly the tendency of the modern opinion concerning the Innocency of Error in fpeculative points, and fhews that it neceffarily leads to Deifm, tho' every advocate for it may not perhaps understand the Nature and confequence of his own doctrine. If fpeculation, as opposed to practice, cannot be the proper fubject of duty,, it is (according to them) because it has no inherent goodness or evil, fuch as we ascribe to moral actions; or, to use their own terms, because there is no moral fitness, or unfitness in matters of fpeculation. Which argument will equally prove, that all the pofitive duties, both of the Old and New Teftament, are of an indifferent nature, and that we can no more be obliged to obferve the Sacraments, than to believe the Mysteries of Chriftianity; because we cannot deduce our obligation to the obfervance of them from the eternal and immutable reafon of things, but only from

the