tective, and only a policy of protection could counteract it. Retaliation would have looked to punishment and been beneath Statesmanship under the circumstances.

The origination of the reciprocity policy now in vogue between the maritine nations is claimed for the British Government before the framing of the Constitution. The Commissioner, on page 2, quotes from Henry Clay and Albert Gallatin, our treaty Commissioners in 1815, that "a proposition to abolish discriminating duties first came from Great Britain, and a provision to that effect was inserted in the unratified treaty of 1806." I have shown elsewhere, on the authority of a British work, "McGregor's Commercial Statistics," Vol. III., that "Minister Pitt, in March, 1783, brought in a bill for the regulation of intercourse with the United States, then independent, upon the principle of perfect reciprocity." The British shipping interest opposed this bill and it was laid aside. It is apparent, however, that Pitts' object was to head off ship protection by the American States, the British marine having advantages that might serve it better under reciprocity than would its old-time protection under a system of countervailing measures. Besides, it was important to control the formulation of American Navigation law, by tying our hands in the beginning.

But the British Government did not rest, or desist from efforts to prevent the attainment of sea-power and commercial independence by the United States through ship protection, and they never will. McGregor, who was a Secretary of the Board of Trade, prints as follows:

"The acts passed by the first Congress imposing the discriminating tonnage and other duties did not escape the particular notice of British statesmen. Their injurious effects were at once perceived. They saw that American commerce was no longer at the mercy of thirteen distinct legislative bodies; nor subject to the control of the King and Council. As early as Sept. 30, 1789, the acts imposing those duties were referred to the lords of the Committee of the Board of Trade-to consider and report, what were the proposals of a commercial nature it would be proper to be made by their government to the United States-[to maintain British command of American trade.]

"In January, 1791, this Committee reported, not only upon the duties, but upon the general subject of the relations between the two countries. The report was drawn up by Lord Liverpool. In reference to navigation it stated, there is but one proposition which it would be advisable for the ministers of Great Britain to make the government of the United States, in a negotiation for a commercial treaty, viz.: that British ships trading to the ports of the United States should be there treated with respect to the duties on tonnage and imports in like manner, as the ships of the United States shall be treated in the ports of Great Britain.1 The Committee added, however-if Congress should propose (as they certainly will) that this principle of equality should be extended to the ports of our Colonies and Islands, and that the ships of the United States should be there treated as British ships, it should be answered that this demand cannot be admitted, even as a subject of negotiation."

Thus it appears, after we had achieved ship protection and was content therewith, Great Britain, in her own interest, cast about for inducements for its removal as to herself. In 1785, before the Union was effected under the Constitution, under the stress of poverty, we had asked Great Britain to take her ship protection off and let us live-we would then have accepted Pitt's plan-but she was too comfortable to comply, and we suffered until we could help ourselves. After 1785 we had not asked for reciprocity, since under the Constitution we had the power, which was lacking under the Confederation, to institute a National protection that was better. Lord Liverpool's proposition did not include Colonial trade, but mean as it was, it was practically the same which the British renewed, and we foolishly accepted, in 1815. Falling far short of the "perfect reciprocity" attempted by Pitt thirty-two years before, the treaty of July, 1815, failed decidedly to square fully with the act of March authorizing a change of policy as to Great Britain. Practically, the Representatives of the people never consented to this treaty, in the form that it finally assumed. But Great Britain had set her heart upon it as it stsads, and of course was gratified.

1-By this course Parliment would control Congress.

If "reciprocity has always been the policy of the United States," as falsely affirmed by the Commisioner of Navigation, what policy was it, that was first applied in a partial manner in pursuance of the treaty of July 3, 1815, with Great Britain? And what policy was it, that was finally swept away in 1828, that the present policy, which is reciprocity, should prevail? Manifestly the contention of the Commissioner is fanciful and absurd.

Conclusion II.

“The increase in our shipping from 1789 to the war of 1812 was due to foreign wars and our position as a neutral nation.”

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After telling us that "reciprocity was the life of our shipping policy, this statement is so sweeping as to cast doubt upon itself. To multiply causes is to divide effects. However, it may be granted that some advantage did attend our neutrality in the wars referred to; but it is not a fact that they prevailed all the time mentioned; nor true that we were a neutral power all along ; or that our navigation had much benefit from onr position at any time. The Commissioner states that a "period of incessant European warfare" began in 1789, and calls upon Messrs Seybert and Pitkin, neither of them historians, to furnish color for his affirmation, but the quotations made, fall considerably short of warranting his statement, though the views expressed do not lack in expansion. Pitkin says:

"The war between England and France, which began in 1793, (soon after the establishment of the National government), and between England and Spain in 1796, and which continued, with but a short interval, until it involved all the nations of Europe, threw into the hands of the American merchant no small portion of the trade of the world."

Accepting this loose statement, we had four years of rivalry before war came. In that time our tonnage in foreign trade increased from 123,893, to 367,734 tons, a gain of 197 per cent.; and our proportion of carriage in our own commerce rose from 28 to 79 per cent. In 1792, before the English and French war broke out, the Pirates of Algiers began siezing our vessels in

consequence of which war resulted in 1793. Not to neutrality, therefore, but to protection under early policy, and especially so for East India trade, must be ascribed the gains of this original period. Afterward two nations only warred three years and then drew in a third. By this time, 1796, our tonnage in foreign trade had increased from 367,734 (1793) to 576,733 tons, a gain of 57 per cent.; and our proportion of carriage had increased from 79 (in 1793) to 92 per cent. (This percentage of carriage agrees perfectly with the percentage of tonnage which was American entering our ports in 1796, by the table of the Commissioner on page 6 of his monograph). In these three years we had some advantage from our neutrality, but withal, comparing with the proceeding period, our gains fell considerably short -perhaps on account of our difficulty with the Algerines. However, in the seven years we had won the battle. All the neutrality that we had afterward seems to have been, for the most part, offset by the hostility of the belligerents. Before the term had closed, the French began their spoliation of our commerce, and war with France followed. Spain became a belligerent of Great Britain, but our flag was not neutral again for three years and a half. After the peace in 1800, we found our tonnage had gained a little-rising from 576,733 (in 1796) to 657,107 tons, but our proportion of carriage had fallen from 92, to 89 per cent. Our shipping had no picnic in this period, while in the next two years we had a war with the Barbary States. Our tonnage fell off a little, but our carriage held its own. In this short period was the interval of peace in Europe following the treaty of Amiens. Concerning the views of PRESIDENT JEFFERSON and the outlook in 1801 and 1802, when we had the Barbary war, the following extracts from his messages will be of interest:

Message of 1801.

"Agriculture, manufactures, commerce and navigation, the four pillars of our prosperity, are then most thriving when left most free to individual enterprise. Protection from casual embarrassments, however, may sometimes be seasonably interposed. If

in the course of your observations or inquiries, they should appear to need any aid, within the limits of our constitutional powers, your sense of their importance is a sufficient assurance they will occupy your attention. We cannot, indeed, but all feel an anxious solicitude for the difficulties under which our carrying-trade will soon be placed. How far it can be relieved, otherwise than by time, is a subject of important consideration."

Message of 1802.

"On the restoration of peace in Europe, that portion of the general carrying-trade which had fallen to our share during the war was abridged by the returning competition of the belligerent powers. This was to be expected, and was just. But in addition, we find in some parts of Europe, monopolizing discriminations, which, in the form of duties tend effectually to prohibit the carrying thither our own produce in our own vessels From existing amities and a spirit of justice, it is hoped that friendly discussion will produce a fair and adequate reciprocity. But should false calculations of interest defeat our hope, it rests with the legislature to decide whether they will meet inequalities abroad with countervailing inequalities at home, or provide for the evil in any other way.

"It is with satisfaction I lay before you an act of the British Parliment, anticipating this subject so far as to authorize a mutual abolition of the duties and countervailing duties permitted under the treaty of 1794. It shows, on their part, a spirit of justice and friendly accommodation, which it is our duty and our interest to cultivate with all nations. Whether this would produce a due equality in the navigation between the two countries, is a subject for your consideration."

While these extracts show that "reciprocity" as a policy was unknown to our statutes, it proves that protection inhered, and was not then begrudged to our shipping; in fact, it was depended on, and it was Great Britain, not the United States, that wanted reciprocity, having passed an act for it that MR. JEFFERSON was doubtful of, and which anticipated our first statute