of Shipping in Foreign Trade.

PERIOD OF RECIPROCITY-1829-1898.

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Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade

Imports Exports Per Cent. Per Ct.

If Great Britain had made no more progress than Madagascar it would not matter one whit. Besides, the comparison is unfair and the result necessarily misleading. The Commissioner does not compare American tonnage in foreign trade with the British in that trade. Not at all. British tonnage in foreign trade is not set down beforehand as so in use, as with us. They have a different registry system; the same papers answer for all voyages. Ours do not. We may have, by our books, any number of tons registered" (as foreign-going), but every ton may be idle all the year. On the other hand, the British have no tonnage registered, as specially for foreign trade, but make its amount up from arrivals and clearances foreign, each year, at its close. So a just comparison cannot be made in the manner attempted. One amount will be tonnage registered (American); the other, of arrivals and clearances (British).

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But undertaking to make a comparison, the Commissioner does not use our "Tonnage in foreign trade," but our "registered," which includes "whalers"! Then he lumps together sail and steam. Of steamers, Great Britain had in 1820 the same that we had, viz: none at all, but in 1860, hundreds more than we had. One ton of steam is supposed to equal four tons of sail. Then the British coasting trade has been unprotected since 1849, whilst ours has always been protected. Such odd comparisons can supply no truth, but delusion only. A row of houses cannot be compared with a brick-kiln. Here is another statement of no weight whatever:

"We increased our share of Great Britain's general carryingtrade, while her own share was reduced."

This is said to have been from 1840, not from '20, to '60. This was rather too good for wooden ships, was it not? What were “iron ships" doing from 1843 to '60? If true, the statement is of no significance, since the point is, not our increase of carrying in British trade, but our loss of carriage, in our own. There can be no mistake about that. What the British may have lost in their trade, they gained doubly from us in ours. The tables show that our great increase of carriage in the trade with

Britain was under protection in early days. In six years, 1790 to '96, we run her percentage in general trade down from 35.80 to 2.70 per cent. In 1810, her percentage of carriage in our general trade was 5.29; in 1815, after the adoption of reciprocity, it bounded up to 15.83; but by 1820, under the protective act of 1818, we had it down again to 5.38. By 1828, however, under reciprocity (from 1822) it had worked up to 9.70; by 1832 had reached 23.20; and at 1844, stood at 26.49; with a prospect of ascending. And this was in the time of wood and sail. It was not accomplished by "iron ships," but the working of "a free trade." In our particular trade with Britain, the Commissioner says, "we controlled the majority of the trade until the Civil War"; he prints a table to show this, page 10, but goes no further back than 1853. Why did he not go back to the beginning of our records? Was it to conceal the fact that protection gave us almost full control, but that reciprocity worked it away from us to to the extent of 35 per cent by the year 1853? He says, also, that " we controlled more than three-fifths of the direct carrying between the United States and Great Britain "-in the period of 1820-'60. As shown already, we had British carrying down to 5.38 per cent. in 1820, and it worked its way upward under reciprocity, and this at a good pace with wooden sailing ships,-before iron and steam came in.

But here is the most far-fetched statement:

"We equalled Great Britain in tonnage built."

To show this, page 10 has a table of four years, 1858-1861, inclusive, giving the tonnage built, not of sea-going vessels, as built by the British, but of all kinds that we build, seagoing, coasting, lake, river, canal-boats, barges, ferry-boats, tug-boats, fishing vessels and what-not! Even if the figures went back to 1820, such a comparison would be ridiculous. Besides, if true that we beat Britain at any time in building ocean shipping, the credit would be due, not to "a free trade" in shipbuilding, but to the wise registry law that has protected American builders against foreign competition since 1789-the same that the Commissioner wants repealed in the interest of call it the free

hearted, and princely philosophy of "cheap ships." If he wants us to believe the foregoing statement, why has he insisted that "iron ships" killed wooden before and since the time of his table?

Conclusion VII.

"We obtained for our vessels a large share of the carrying trade between different nations, and between foreign nations and their colonies, which was one of the main purposes of reciprocal navigation treaties, and is altogether overlooked by present advocates of discrimination."

The way in which our vessels in the foreign trade are documented and accounted for in our statistics, by regsistry as in that trade, prevents the juggle thus attempted. There is no chance for it among the well-informed. American registered ships, whalers excepted, are listed as in the foreign trade, and if they run a lifetime between foreign countries, or between them and their colonies, they are credited to our country in the same list with others who trade only from and to the United States. To count American registered ships as being in trade between countries abroad would be to count them twice.

On page

Besides, we should look at both sides of business. 11, the Commissioner cites the year 1840, and tries to make out that our ships did much freighting between Great Britain and all the world. What did it amount to? Entrances and clearances, both, only 829,052 tons. In 1840, arrivals in Great Britain were 4,657,795 tons. Reduce the 829,052 tons one half, to eliminate clearances, and we have 414,526 tons, a percentage of 8.9, for the extent that our ships were in British trade with the world. Now to what extent were British vessels in our trade with the world?. Arrivals in the United States, in 1840, were 2,289,309 tons, of this 582,424 tons were British, and the percentage was 25.41-almost three times as large as of our ships in British trade. And this is the way the Commissioner's statements all turn out.

The scanty business that reciprocity once gave us, between foreign nations and their colonies, is not worth consideration in

fixing upon a policy for the protection of our shipping in our own foreign trade. Whatever trifle of business ever came from reciprocity is all gone now. No reliance can be placed on foreign service. The only foreign carrying worth attention is that for nations and communities who have little, if any, shipping of their own. Of this we do a little still. The "present advocates of discrimination" overlook nothing of importance. It is absurd for us to have, or to shape a policy for international carrying, Great Britain is situated to do so, but we are not just now. Only the theoretical and visionary can see that any carrying beyond our own can be commanded.

We have come now to the final "conclusion" and the last futile argumentation of the Commissioner.

Conclusion VIII.

"Our present condition as a maritime power is due to failure to accept the progressive policies of other maritime nations, and to reliance upon old policies abandoned by other nations. To these it is now proposed to add another policy, un-American and obsolete. The decline is also due in a large degree to the damage actually done to our foreign trade by the Civil War, and the refusal to allow 800,000 tons of American-built vessels, sold foreign during the war, to return to the land of their builders and their original flag. The turning of capital and industry to internal development, especially to railroads since the first American locomotive was built by Peter Cooper, 1830, has involved a decline in shipping. To these should be added the change from wood, which we produced so cheaply, to iron and steel, which we have not yet produced so cheaply as Great Britain for any considerable period, though we appear soon to be able to overcome the difference in cost of construction and factors dependent on it."

In his former contentions we have had shade instead of light; in this one the Commissioner resorts to mystery. What were the "progressive policies of other maritime nations" that