1858, of our war-scare subsidy act of 1845, which was given effect in 1847, '48 and '50, Great Britain lightened up considerably on her payments, being able to do this without damage to her lines, since much of the support withdrawn by Congress from our own. to their ruin, was turned over to the British. By the beginning of the Civil War we were paying 30 per cent. of the cost of our ocean mail service to foreign shipping. Until 1858, we had paid nothing of the kind. Third, that after the war, when Congress had again undertaken to support an American Ocean Mail Service, great Britain for the second time enlarged her subsidies until a party in Congress appeared to oppose a ship protective policy, when she ventured a second time to reduce her appropriations, and on the second repeal of law for aiding steam navigation, she further reduced them-(1874 to '78). As it was after 1858, so after '78, a large part of the support withdrawn from our owǹ lines, crippling or ruining them, was forthwith turned over to the aid of foreign. Our treasury has contributed over $12,000,000 for the support of rival steam lines, and but little more than twice as much for our own. These are facts about " 'changes in policy always ignored and never noted by the foreign writers apparently depended on "by some" for the fabrication of steamship history.

From 1868 to '77 we paid only 27.8 per cent. of cost of our own ocean mail service to foreign ships, but for the later period of 1878 to '91 the contributions of our treasury averaged 80.9 per cent. For the period of 1858-'91-thirty-four years-in which we have spent our treasure to support foreign steam lines in place of American, the proportion of money so misapplied has been an average of 56.8 per cent. The highest British mail. payment was made in 1870-$6,107,761—and the highest American, to all lines, in 1855-$1,936,715. Such has been the difference in policies.

In the forty-eight years of the table referred to, we see Great Britain expending eight dollars where we have paid out one upon the maintenance of a steam marine in foreign trade. Where we have expended $2.70 on our own steam lines, we have furnished

one dollar to aid foreign, principally those of Great Britain. Now we are told that acts of Parliament and Congress have cut no figure in steam navigation, but all progress has been due to mechanical invention!

Second. Concerning the "substitution of iron for wood as shipbuilding material, that, too, was the work of protection, since it was done by the British for protection and by protection. The facts are worth knowing. Wooden vessels, for the want of native timber, had come to be constructed largely of imported stock, both for the marine and the navy. This dependency imperiled the national welfare and security. There must be produced at home a British ship. Accordingly, in 1854, the British Lloyds Register Association, the champion and protector of British shipping, organized in 1834, raised the insurance rating of iron-built vessels to double its previous figure, and to equality with wooden,—namely, from six to twelve years A 1,-if built by the rules then laid down. On the strength of this "change," wholly arbitrary, British underwriters instituted a policy of discrimination in premium rates favoring iron hulls and their cargoes at the expense, in fact, of wooden vessels and their cargoes. This policy effected the "substitution," not the merits of materials. Either the merits could not be trusted, or their operation might be too slow. It was desirable to mine the materials, manufacture them and build at home a truly British vessel and proclaim her superiority. It was also to be of great advantage to condemn the shipbuilding of rival nations and prejudice it in the minds of British and other underwriters. England was then the “iron country"; the United States the country for wooden ships, of which we built the best in the world. It would never do for Great Britain, the ruler of one-fourth of the land and nearly all the sea, to give up shipbuilding and turn it over to the “ States." Shipbuilding is a military art. The nation that would rank and rule the world, must build her own ships, of her own materials, at whatever cost. Britain's true policy, it can be seen, was to encourage, protect and perfect metal shipbuilding and condemn wooden, trusting that wood-building nations would sleep while

she worked. And soundly our rulers slept principle being, the Government cannot help who go down to the sea in ships.

through it all, their those of the people

Iron shipbuilding for ocean navigation, began in 1838. The first sea-going iron bark, if extant in 1854, was sixteen years old. Only a few vessels had run twelve years when Lloyds' Association without full experience, raised the rating to that figure. Now, a term of years is not assigned by them, since metal vessels have an uncertain life. The substitution of metal for wood, in British shipbuilding, was, at the time, a State necessity, rather than a mechanical preference. And it was plainly a stroke of State policy for the British underwriters to discriminate against wooden shipping, that metal might survive while wooden perished. Legislative protection could not have accomplished more, and might conflict with treaties. No enactment was necessary, for Lloyds' rules are boasted of in England as having "all the force of a law of Parliament." But the Government took an active part. Parliament provided for an iron navy, to be built mostly by contract with private builders. This supplied their yards with the plant required. The government also looked to it that only iron steamers received subsidies. Thus was the "substitution" business settled. The Lloyds' policy, protective in high degree, effectively aided the British Atlantic steamers in running off our "packets" and other ships.

Says the Commissioner of Navigation: "From the time when iron became the chief material of marine construction up to the present it is useless to seek for any other cause than that for the decline of our shipbuilding." This is confounding cause and effect. Iron shipbuilding in England was, in itself, an effect. It need not have hurt us at all, since we could have protected against such result. But those who will not wear shoes must stub their toes; those who have to wade in water at work should wear rubbers. It is foolish to complain that the roads are rough, and the water cold.

As an art, iron shipbuilding did not even compete with wooden when patriotic sentiment, the governmental patronage,

and the underwriting power of Great Britain supplied the breath of life to it, and thus became efficient causes of what resulted from their united forces. The end to be accomplished was the seeming elevation of shipbuilding, and the real advantage of running preferential, if not superior ships. To say that iron construction accomplished these purposes is to indulge in metaphor, perhaps to dress up the naked facts. Here is an example of the warfare waged to force the decline of Ameriean shipbuilding, showing, not the merits of iron ships, but the adverse power of the British Lloyds :

In 1865, when the war closed, our percentage of export carriage was down to 26.1; in 1866 it bounded up to 37.7, and for the period of 1866, '70 held an average of 37.2 per cent. The year 1865 had an import carriage of 29.9; this fell to 25.1 in 1866, but in following years recovered, and the period of 1866,'70 average 30.1 per cent. Apparently, we were recovering lost ground, and by the favor of Congress, possibly, we were destined to see our marine restored, and for future time protected.

There had been a great increase of commerce-about 31 per cent.-over the period of the war. The greater part of the gain was in exports, and British shipowners thought too many cargoes were carried by our wooden ships. From 1854 to '70 these had been admitted to classification, with a disparaged rating, in British Lloyds Register. They were subject to discriminative insurance rates, both on hulls and cargoes, and were therefore obliged to carry freights at the lowest rates, or lay up ide, but our competition was moderately successful. In 1870, however, the Lloyds made a rule refusing classification and registration to "foreign ships," (few of which were metal), except for a single year at a time, on special survey. This new discrimination, intended to stop the British purchasing and chartering of wooden ships, was aimed especially at American shipping then, as ever since, asking Congress in vain for the protection of its life. For the six years following 1870 our vessels were shut out, practically, from the British Lloyds Register-sometimes called the book of life-depreciated, disparaged, degraded, and decried, for

British, or even American employment. In 1864 our average proportion of carriage in the foreign trade had fallen to 27.5; in 1870 it had risen to 35.6, a gain of more than 8 per cent. in seven years. The object of Lloyds' action, dictated by British owners in their Committee, was to interrupt this little thrift, to hinder future growth, to stamp out our hope of better times, and force our people to "give up the ship and quit the sea." British merchants, having got hold of our business during the war, were not to freight our ships except at their own rates. British Underwriters were not to insure their cargoes except at costly rates. It was part of the scheme, by the activity of agents in the United States, to prevent the revival of our shipbuilding through the passage of a "free ship" bill, then, as ever since, pending or threatened in the House or Senate. In short, the object was to drive American shipping out of the trans-Atlantic grain, cotton, and provision trades, unless built in Britain and partly owned by Britishers under our flag. The following facts show how well the Lloyds, not iron ships, attacked:

In three years our export carriage fell off 12, and in five years 14 per cent. Import carriage fell off 4 per cent in five years, while commerce increased 20. Necessarily, shipbuilding fell off largely.

What was done, on our part, to counteract the aggressive conduct of our active rival? Nothing at all! Congress paid some attention to the subject but disappointed the country by inaction. Our shipping interest was outrageously treated; National rights were violated—our dignity, even, affronted; but not a finger of government moved in defence. One would think that a Commissioner of Navigation should be too astute to state or acknowledge, let alone to argue or defend, the British pretence that it was iron material for shipbuilding, or the passive ship herself, that caused the loss of our transportion, since it is not difficult to see that protection could have built iron shipping in the United States, as well as in Great Britain. It is hard, however, to get our statesmen to feel that what can be seen so clearly is still their duty to their country.