by thirteen years. Nothing came of the British act, since it would not "produce a due equality," although the Commissioner of Navigation contends we were always for, if not under, reciprocity. Our shipping policy was not then a party question. “A fair and adequate reciprocity," we have never had; and if we had it to-day, in the nature of the case, to-morrow it would fail to "produce a due equality" in navigation. MR. JEFFERSON

was wise to take no stock in it.

War with France was soon resumed by the British. We were neutral again, and our shipping unmolested, when in 1804, Congress added fifty cents a ton to the discriminating duty theretofore exacted, as additional protection, PRESIDENT JEFFERSON signing the bill. In the same year British impressment of American seamen began, and in 1807, '08 and '09 our embargo and non-intercourse acts inflicted much loss on our vesselFrench warfare on our commerce ceased in 1810, but the British continued their hinderance and aggressions right up to 1812, when we were obliged to declare war. In view of these facts, it cannot be fairly claimed for neutrality, that it was clearly protective in any year from 1804 to 1812. Certainly, from 1806 to 1815, not a particle of credit should be given to it; nevertheless, our tonnage in foreign trade increased to its first culmination in 1810-984,000 tons.

owners.

It may be noted here that Timothy Pitkin, quoted by the Commissioner, has erroneously credited "neutrality" with developing the East India trade. These are the words:

"The increase of the tonnage of the United States, as well as the spirit and enterprise of their citizens, led them also to engage in the more distant trade of the East Indies, and every other part of the world."

The facts are, that our India and China goods used to come from London. Our flag first appeared in a Chinese port in 1785, and then in consequence of State protection of navigation. In our first tariff act special encouragement was given to direct trade, by fixing the duties on teas and other goods, if brought by American vessels, at about half the rates, which were

chargeable if brought by foreign ships. This National protection soon built up the commerce started by a few of the States -a commerce such as our merchants, with their limited capital and inferior vessels-compared with the British-never could have won without it, from the rich corporations of London and the red flag of Britain. The building of vessels specially for East India and China trade, under the encouragement of the first tariff act, should be credited with giving to the world the American Clipper ship, with her superior model and rig, which, for a time in the forties and fifties, was a protection in itself to American commerce and navigation.

The Commissioner of Navigation, having no respect for history, in his first "Conclusion," page 11, makes this statement-A:

"First. United States."

Reciprocity has always been the policy of the

On page 8 he had made the conflicting statement following -B:

"From 1815, when reciprocity with Great Britain began [and it began with her first], to 1820, the American tonnage entering the United States steadily increased, as compared with the foreign."

If it is intended that statement A shall agree with the first member of B, a false impression is conveyed, to-wit: that we had "reciprocity" with all the world but Great Britain before 1815. The very first reciprocity was that begun then with Great Britain. While the last part of statement B is true, it is unfair and delusive to intimate that our increase in proportionate arrivals was due to reciprocity; first, because we had treaties with two countries only; second, because we had to pass a severely protective act against Great Britain in 1818, which more than offset her gain under the treaty. Here is a case where a little learning is a dangerous thing." The truth will be found in the following table:

Noticing British arrivals, we should have to go back twentythree years to find them equalling those in 1815. In 1816 they increased 3 per cent., in 1817 fell off more than one; and in the next three years sagged to the level before the war. What is the true explanation? The reciprocity treaty accounts for the gains to the British in 1815, '16 and '17-other foreign vessels, under no treaty, lost in 1816 and '17-while the British loss for 1818, '19 and '20 was occasioned by the protective enactment of April, 1818, which declared:

"That the ports of the United States shall be and remain closed against every vessel owned wholly, or in part, by a subject or subjects of His Brittanic Majesty, coming or arriving from any port or place that is, or shall be, by the ordinary laws of navigation or trade, closed against vessels owned by citizens of the United States."

The provisions of this act were considerably extended by those of the supplementary one of May, 1820. The treaty of reciprocity with Great Britain applied to direct trade across the Atlantic; securing advantages in that, she sought to shut her other ports against our traffic. The above legislation, in knocking her out of the indirect or "triangular" trades, was protective in a high degree, and accounts fully for our gains in the percentage of carriage, and her losses shown in the table. Except for the year 1815 "other foreign" tonnage, not under reciprocity, did about an even business-only Great Britain fell off greatly, showing that the protective act of 1818 was much better

to us than reciprocity to her from 1815 to '17. With the acts of 1818 and '20 in force, as to all nations, and the ante-war protection by discrimination in force as to all but the British in direct trade-with one or two other small powers-it is easily seen how our foreign traffic could pick up in proportionate carrying, though it added little in tonnage on account of "hard times," after the war of 1812; why its carrying percentage was sustained until after 1825-'26, and why it then culminated on the removal of hindrances to foreign navigation; and afterward, when "reciprocity" enough had been injected into our laws and treaties, why it declined and decayed in the course of time.

It is thus that we may perceive that no ordinary trick can be relied on to show that "reciprocity" has ever been of benefit to American shipping as to foreign; since the best contrived may may fail. Not satisfied with the one just exposed, the Commissioner, page 7, tries again, as follows:

"When we began reciprocity with England, in 1815, [still carrying the idea that it might have begun with other countries long before], three-fourths of the vessels entering the United States from foreign ports were American, and sixteen years later the same proportion held good."

This is cunningly phrased to make the false impression that from 1815 to '31 we ran along about on the line of 75 per cent of proportionate carriage. While the text is true, the inference suggested is elusive, unfair, and in fact highly deceptive. In 1815, our shipping had not recovered from the effects of the war. In 1810, our percentage of arrivals was 90. We reached that figure again in 1820, under the protection of the act of 1818 already quoted, and held above it for eight years. This is kept back by the Commissioner. In 1830, the percentage figure was 88. Why did it fall to that level? and why did it fall to 79 in 1831?, and to 70 in 1832? Chiefly and manifestly, becanse Great Britain got another instalment of reciprocity" by act of Congress, 1830, in consideration of which she opened her West India trade to our vessels. As it resulted, this was a mere bait to her barbed hook. Our arrivals from abroad actually fell off in 1831

and '32 from the level of 1830, while the British increased from 100,298 to 239,502 tons in 1831, and to 311,569 in 1832, and to 402,730 in 1833-quadrupling in three years, while our arrivals gained less than 15 per cent. The Commissioner has witheld the these facts, forgetful that concealment invalidates an argument.

As the main contention of the Commissioner has for its predicate, that legislative protection did virtually nothing for our early marine, it may be well to offer here the testimony of statesmen of the time familiar with the subject, and who debated the question in 1828, the occasion being the passage of the tariff bill in the House of Representatives. (Debates in Congress, part II. of vol. IV. April 1 and 2). MR. SPRAGUE, of Maine, holding low tariff views, severely attacked the bill on the ground that it increased the cost of vessels. By the statistics which he offered this would amount to 2 per cent. MR. BUCHANAN thought this advance could well be afforded by a protected interest. The effort of MR. SPRAGUE was to show that shipping had not been, and was not then very much protected, and therefore could not well afford a higher tariff on iron, copper, hemp, duck, paints, &c. After showing the extent of the "new burdens to be imposed," and the importance of the industry affected, he launched out as follows:

Mr. Sprague's Speech.

"We have been told that our navigation is the Child of Protection; that it has grown up under a fostering and paternal system of preferences. This has been reiterated by almost every gentleman who has addressed this Committee. If it be so, that of itself is a powerful argument against imposing burdens to take away that protection. Is it not true, has it not been on all hands conceded, that when Government has, by its legislation or encouragement, invited the investment of capital, changed the habits of its people, and called into being and activity any branch of manufacturers, that it is morally bound not to destroy it ? * * * * If navigation be indeed the child of our legislation, let us not, like the crocodile, feed upon and consume our own off-spring. But as great strength is laid on this topic, and this supposed past partiality to our navigation is the constant