William Gomm, an accomplished man, who had been Governor of the Mauritius, and under his mild sway there was no further friction. Much was done for the conciliation of the sepoys, with more or less of wisdom. That the alarm created by past occurrences had not wholly died away, is shown by the efforts made by the Governor-General to call the attention of the authorities in London to the weakness of the European portion of the Indian army. In 1854, the Crimean war broke out in Europe, and Dalhousie lost no time in entering his protest against the propriety of withdrawing British troops from India. In spite of his remonstrances, two regiments were ordered to embark for Europe before the end of that year, and the ratio of one or two which has been since considered proper, had sunk till there were at least five sepoys to every British soldier.*

On the eve of laying down his powers, Dalhousie transmitted to the Court of Directors a series of Minutes on this subject; they were entirely neglected, and the neglect was before long to be expiated by the abolition of that distinguished but effete body. The retiring Governor-General pointed out the loss of military reputation that the Empire had incurred by the Crimean war; the failure to make the Indian armies keep pace with the great increase of territory; the possibility of trouble from external enemies: and he proposed remedies which ought at least to have been considered. It has been asserted that these proposals had not even been noticed at the India House until they were called for in the House of Commons after the Mutiny. Whether or no they would have completely prevented that disaster, whether or no that disaster

The figures given by Mr. Holmes, citing the authority of the Duke of Argyll, are-Native troops, 232,224; Europeans, 45,522. But the roll of sepoys did not include the large local levies, such as the Contingents of Sindhia, the Nizám, etc., and the Punjab force mentioned in the text. It has been affirmed that, in Bengal, there was but one British soldier to twenty-one native sepoys. ["Indian Mutiny," p. 62].

was "a disguised blessing," are irrelevant questions in comparison with the slur that the whole case throws on the failure to take them into consideration.

Dalhousie's proposed reforms would have, at least, restored the proper proportion of British troops in the dominions of the Indian Government. There does not, it is true, seem to be any indication that Dalhousie or any one else perceived the true sources of the coming peril, or that he took any notice of the great likelihood of the contingents of the Native States feeling and displaying sympathy with the discontents and aspirations of the Company's sepoys, often men of their own kindred. He did not advert to the great extent of the Native element in the Indian artillery, always the strong point with the Indian soldiers; neither did he notice the faulty arrangement by which the regiments of the Bengal regular army had been rendered homogeneous in composition. With a large nucleus of Audh men, irritated by the annexation of their country, each corps had a few Sikhs and Patháns, not in sufficient numbers to hold their own, and a spirit of professional brotherhood had so far overcome dissidences of creed, and of nationality or class, that what was felt by each one of such corps, was sure to be communicated to all the others, like the shock of earthquake passing through kindred strata.*

If Dalhousie's preventive measures were thus, for various reasons, ineffectual to reform the army, it cannot be fairly claimed that the rest of his military administration was completely wise or beneficial. Among the evils that affected the Native troops, some were within his power of correction, and some actually of his own causing. The European officers

* A remarkable confirmation of this view was soon to be afforded. The regiments which proved the most completely indifferent or hostile to the mutinous movement in the Bengal army were each throughout of one class; the 66th (Gurkhas) and the 31st (all high-caste Brahmins) who bit the cartridges and used them freely against the mutineers.

were characterised by a distinguished soldier as "the refuse," on the ground that all who could possibly get away from regimental duty were away in staff-employ, while their less fortunate comrades were without interest in their work, and regarded it as penal.* The Native officers, mostly old men who had risen by long service, were charged with almost all the duties of discipline, aided by European sergeants. The men had reason to be dissatisfied with a number of reductions and petty grievances, while their heads were turned by flattery and relaxed discipline. The powers of Commandants and Courts-martial were sapped by the facility of appeals to Headquarters; and the pension rules had become so strict that a soldier could not retire until he was quite worn out, and unable to enjoy his retirement.

None of these things was in itself a sufficient cause of the Mutiny, and of the partial popular revolts which followed. The 31st and 66th, who remained faithful, had the same grievances, most of which were shared by the Bombay army, which proved mainly loyal, and the "Coast" or Madras army, in which there was no disaffection at all. Nevertheless, it must be confessed, that when, on the 29th of February, 1856, Lord Dalhousie retired from the post that he had so long and honourably filled, he left British India in a somewhat volcanic condition.

He was advanced to the dignity of a Marquess for his services, and lived, a hopelessly broken man, about four years longer, dying after the catastrophe of Fifty-seven and unable to defend himself against charges arising out of that event which were not all very just, and-many of them at least--wholly ungenerous.

*To be sent back to regimental duty was an ordinary punishment for short-comings and offences on the part of officers holding administrative posts. Under the present system, on the contrary, employment with a Native regiment is itself a staff-appointment, requiring positive proofs of capacity.

[See works cited under previous sections; also "History of the Indian Mutiny," by T. R. E. Holmes, 4th edition, London, 1891 this work is based on laborious research, most carefully and impartially utilised. The epithet of "refuse" was applied to the officers of the Bengal Army by Lord Melville who as General Dundas, had served with them at the siege of Multan, and the battle of Gujarát. Lord Dalhousie's papers are withheld from publication under a special clause in his will, and will not be available to the historian till the year 1910, when their interest (it may be feared) will have grown somewhat cold. In the meantime, much has been done for the vindication of his policy. See "India, etc.," by the Duke of Argyll, London, 1865; "A Vindication, etc.," by Sir C. Jackson, same date. Sir W. W. Hunter's able monograph, already cited, contains original matter, and has had the advantage of aid from Dalhousie's family and friends.]

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CHAPTER XX.

THE FALL OF THE COMPANY.

Section 1: The Revolt of Fifty-seven-Section 2: The restoration of order-Section 3: The first Viceroyalty.

SECTION I.-When Lord Dalhousie's health broke down under work and weariness, the Ministry of the Queen named as his successor the son of the famous Statesman who had been similarly designated nearly thirty years before. Lord Canning had inherited his peerage from his mother, had served under various Governments, and had declined an offer of the Private Secretaryship to the Governor-General when Ellenborough went out in 1842. The Directors accepted the ministerial nomination; and on August 1st, 1855, Canning attended the customary banquet where he made a speech in which he showed forecast, and a dignified sense of the seriousness of his position. "We must not forget," he said, "that India was a country in which anything might happen, however quiet things might seem." There were still discontented races there, and the temper of subsidiary States might render it impossible to forbearance itself to command peace. If, in spite of all efforts a blow should have to be struck, why it should be so struck that "the struggle would be short, and the issue not doubtful." He went to the country by the Overland Route, which was now regularly established; and he landed in the end of February 1856. A man of calm and reflective character, he seemed, with massive marble manners, and the novelty of the con