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SECTION VIII.

OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

PART I.

T might reasonably be expected, in queftions, which have

I been canvaffed and difputed with great cagernels fince the

first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, fhould have been agreed upon among the difputants; and our enquiries, in the courfe of two thoufand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real fubject of the controverfy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere found of words, the object of future fcrutiny and examination? But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclufion. From that circumftance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided, we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguity in the expreffion, and that the difputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controverfy. For as the faculties of the foul are fuppofed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwife nothing could be more fruitless than to reafon or dispute together; it were impoffible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms, that they could fo long form different opinions of the fame fubject; especially when they communicate their

views,

views, and each party turn themselves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagonists. 'Tis true, if men attempt the difcuffion of queftions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the œconomy of the intellectual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could keep the difpute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions, which hold the antagonists ftill at a diftance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

This has been the cafe in the long difputed question concerning liberty and neceffity; and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we fhall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have been always of the fame opinion with regard to that subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controverfy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvaffed, on all hands, and has led Philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that 'tis no wonder if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the propofal of fuch a question, from which he can expect neither inftruction nor entertainment. But the ftate of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least some decifion of the controverfy, and will not much difturb his ease, by any intricate or obfcure reasoning.

I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrines both of neceffity and of liberty,

according

according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on thefe terms; and that the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doc trine of neceflity.'

'Tis univerfally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every natural effect is fo precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that nò other effect, in fuch particular circumftances, could poffibly have resulted from the operation of that cause. The degree and direction' of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with fuch exactness, that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies, as motion in any other degree or direction, than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just and precife idea of neceffity, we must confider, whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the ope ration of bodies.

It seems evident, that, if all the fcenes of nature were shifted continually in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any refemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of neceffity, or of a connection among thefe objects. We might fay, upon fuch a fuppofition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of caufe and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowlege of any real existence could poffibly have accefs to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arises entir dy VOL. II. Q from

!

from that uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature; where fimilar objects are conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuftom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumftancés form the whole of that neceffity, which we afcribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of fimilar objects, and the confequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of ceffity, or connection.

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If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed,. without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances · take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the opera--tions of the mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of neceflity, and that they have hitherto difputed, merely for not understanding each other.

As to the first circumftance, the conftant and regular con- junction of fimilar events; we may poffibly fatisfy ourselves by the following confiderations. It is univerfally acknowleged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the fame, in its principles and operations. The fame motives produce always the fame actions: The fame events follow from the fame causes. Ambition, avarice, felf-love, vanity, friendfhip, generofity, public-fpirit; these paffions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through fociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and ftill are, the fource of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the fentiments, inclinations, and courfe of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? Study well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and ENGLISH. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former

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most of the obfervations, which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are fo much the fame, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or ftrange in this particular. Its chief ufe is only to difcover the conftant and univerfal principles of human nature, by fhewing men in all varieties of circumftances and fituations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our obfervations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are fo many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his fcience; in the fame manner as the physician or natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by ARISTOTLE, and HIPPOCRATES, more like to thofe, which at present lie under our obfervation, than the men, defcribed by POLYBIUS and TA CITUS, are to those who now govern the world..

Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, entirely different from any, with whom we ever were acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generofity, and public fpirit; we fhould immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falfhood, and prove him a liar, with the fame certainty as if he had ftuffed his narration with ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make ufe of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions, ascribed to any perfon, are directly O 2 contrary

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