is an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of fome immediate impreffion *. No one can doubt but causation has the fame influence as the other two relations of refemblance and contiguity. Superftitious people are fond of the relicts of faints and holy men, for the fame reason, that they feek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and trong conception of thofe exemplary lives, which they defire to imitate. Now 'tis evident, that one of the best relicts, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a faint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be confidered in this light, 'tis because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him; in which respect they are to be confidered as imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of confequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his existence. Suppose, that the fon of a friend, who had been long dead or absent, were prefented to us; 'tis evident, that this object * "Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca "videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum effe verfatos, ma"gis moveamur, quam fiquando eorum ipforum aut facta audiamus aut fcriptum ali"quod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi PLATONIS in men"tem, quem accepimus primum hîc difputare folitum: Cujus etiam illi hortuli pro"pinqui non memoriam folum mihi afferunt, fed ipfum videntur in confpectu meo "hic ponere. Hic SPEUSIPPUs, hic XENOCRATES, hic ejus auditor POLEMO; "cujus ipfa illa feffio fuit, quam videamus. Equidem etiam curiam noftram, Hos "TILIAM dico, nón hanc novam, quæ mihi minor effe videtur poftquam est major, folebam intuens, SCIPIONEM, CATONEM, LELIUM, noftrum vero in primis avum "cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis eft in locis; ut non fine caufa ex his memoriæ "deducta fit difciplina." CICERO de Finibus, Lib. 5. VOL. II. K would would inftantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all paft intimacies and familiarities in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phænomenon, which feems to prove the principle above-mentioned.. We may obferve, that in thefe phænomena the belief of the correlative object is always pre-fuppofed; without which the relation could have no effect in enlivening the idea. The in-fluence of the picture fuppofes, that we believe our friend to have once exifted. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we believe that it really exifts.. Now I. affert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or fenfes, is of a fimilar nature, and arifes from fimilar causes, with the tranfition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire,. my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame.. This tranfition. of thought from: the cause to the effect proceeds not from reafon. It derives its origin altogether from cuftom and experience.. And as it firft. begins from an object, present to the fenfes, it renders the idea or conception of flame more ftrong and lively than any loose,. floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought moves inftantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impreffion prefent to the fenfes. When a fword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more frongly, than when a glass of wine is prefented to me, even though by accident this idea fhould occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present ob ject ject and a customary tranfition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind in all our conclufions concerning matter of fact and exiftence; and 'tis a fatisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The tranfition from a prefent object does in all cafes give ftrength and folidity to the related idea. Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the fucceffion of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the fame train with the other works of nature. Custom is that admirable principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; fo necessary to the fubfiftence of our fpecies, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumftance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of thofe objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowlege must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and fenses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Thofe, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes, have here ample fubject to employ their wonder and admiration. I fhall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like caufes, and vice verfa, is fo effential to the fubfiftence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trufted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which K 2 which is flow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at beft is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and miftake. 'Tis more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of na- ture to secure so neceffary an act of the mind, by some instinct, or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowlege of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; fo has fhe implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular courfe and fucceffion of objects totally depends. T HOUGH there be no fuch thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real caufe of a any event has the fame influence on the understanding, and begets a like: fpecies of belief or opinion.. There is certainly a probability, which arifes from a fuperi-ority of chances on any fide; and according as this superiority. encreases, and furpaffes the oppofite chances, the probability, receives a proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or affent to that fide, in which we discover the. fuperiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number, of spots on four fides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining fides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though if it. had a thousand fides marked in the fame manner, and only one. fide different, the probability would be much higher, and our. • Mr. Lockв divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that 'tis only probable all men must die, or that the fun will rife tomorrow. But to conform our language more to commen ufe, we should divide arguments into demonftrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning fuch arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or oppofition. belief |