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is an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of fome immediate impression *.

No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are fond of the relicts of saints and holy men, for the same reason, that they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives, which they defire to imitate. Now 'tis evident, that one of the best reli&ts, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a faint ; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, 'tis because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his existence.

Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent, were presented to us ; 'tis evident, that this object

*“ Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca “ videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, ma“ gis moveamur, quam fiquando eorum ipsorum aut fa&a audiamus aut scriptum ali'" quod legamus ? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in men“ tem, quem accepimus primum hîc difputare folitum : Cujus etiam illi hortuli pro“ pinqui non memoriam folum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo .« hic ponere. Hic SPEUSIPPUS, hic Xenocrates, hic ejus auditor PolEMO ; “ cujus ipfa illa feflio fuit, quam videamus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hoo" TILIAM dico, non hanc novam, quæ mihi minor effe videtur postquam est major, “' solebam intuens, SCIPIONEM, CATONEM, Lælium, nostrum vero in primis avum 66 cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis eft in locis ; ut non ane causa ex his memoriæ 66 deducta fit disciplina." Cicero de Finibus, Lib. 5. VOL. II.

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would would instantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phænomenon, which seems to prove the principle: above-mentioned.

We may observe, that in these phænomena the belief of the. correlative object is always pre-supposed ; without which the relation could have no effect in enlivening the idea. The in-. fluence of the pi&ture supposes, that we believe our friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we believe that it really exists. Now I. assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or fenses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry. wood into a fire,. my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from: the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose,, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises im-mediately.. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. When a fword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appeará ance of the latter obje&? But what is there in this whole mate ter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present oba

ject

ject and a customary transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and 'tis a satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and folidity to the related idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. "Custom is that admirable principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowlege must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes, have here ample fubje&t to employ their wonder and admiration.

I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, K2

which

which is slow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. 'Tis more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct, or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowlege of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has fhe implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects ; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

SECTION VI.

OF PROBABILITY*..

THOUGH there be no such thing as Chance in the

1 world; our ignorance of the real cause of any evento has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like: fpecies of belief or opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superi-ority of chances on any side ; and according as this superiority encreases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability, receives a proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that fide, in which we discover the. superiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number, of spots on four fides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining fides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though if it. had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one. fide different, the probability would be much higher, and our.

• Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that 'tis only probable all men muft die, or that the sun will rise tomorrow. But to conform our language more to common ufe, we should divide arguments into demonftrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.

belief

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