The focial virtues muft, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the esteem of uninftructed mankind, and engages their affections. And as the public utility of these virtues is the chief circumftance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take hold of fome natural affection. It must please, either from confiderations of felf-intereft, or from more generous motives and regards.

It has often been afferted, that, as every man has a strong connexion with fociety, and perceives the impoffibility of his folitary fubfiftence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all those habits or principles, which promote order in society, and insure to him the quiet poffeffion of fo ineftimable a blesfing. As much as we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we value the practice of justice and humanity, by which alone the focial confederacy can be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and affiftance.

This deduction of morals from felf-love, or a regard to private intereft, is a very obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the wanton fallies and sportive affaults of the fceptics. To mention no others, POLYBIUS, one of the graveft and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of antiquity, has affigned this selfish origin to all our fentiments of virtue *. But

Undutifulness to parents is difapproved of by mankind, googwμeres to perλov, xj συλλογιζόμενες οτι το παραπλήσουν εκάσοις αυτών συγκυρήσει. Ingratitude for a like reafon (though he feems there to mix a more generous regard) συναγανακτείας μεν τω πελας, αναφερόλας δ' επ' αυτές το παραπλησιον εξ ων υπογεγνείαι τις εννοια παρεκάτω τα καθηκος, δυνατ

μέως

But though the folid, practical fenfe of that author, and his averfion to all vain fubtilties, render his authority on the prefent fubject very confiderable; yet this is not an affair to be decided by authority; and the voice of nature and experience feems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.

in

We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed

very diftant ages and remote countries; where the utmost fubtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of felf-intereft, or find any connexion of present happiness and fecurity with events fo widely separated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adverfary, commands our approbation; while in its confequences: may be acknowleged prejudicial to our particular interest.

it

Where private advantage concurs with general affection for: virtue, we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these. distinct fentiments, which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous, humane action contributes to our: particular intereft: But the topics of praise which we infift on are very wide of this circumftance. And we may attempt to bring over others to our fentiments, without endeavouring to: convince them, that they reap any advantage from the actions, which we recommend to their approbation and applause,

Frame the model of a praife-worthy character, confisting of all the most amiable moral virtues: Give instances, in which thefe difplay themfelves after an eminent and extraordinary

μews xj déwpras.. Lib. 6. cap. 4. Perhaps the historian only meant, that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened, by our confidering the fimilarity of our cafe, with that of the perfons fuffering; which is a just sentiment.

manner ::

manner: You readily engage the esteem and approbation of all your audience, who never fo much as enquire in what age and country the perfon lived, who poffeffed these noble qualities: A circumftance, however, of all others, the most material to self-love, or a concern for our own individual happiness.

Once on a time, a ftatefman, in the fhock and contest of parties, prevailed fo far as to procure, by his eloquence, the banishment of an able adversary; whom he secretly followed, offering him money for his fupport during his exile, and foothing him with topics of confolation in his misfortunes. Alas! cries the banished statesman, with what regret muft I leave my friends in this city, where even enemies are fo generous! Virtue, though in an enemy, here pleased him: And we also give it the just tribute of praise and approbation; these sentiments, when we hear, that the action past at ATHENS, about two thousand years ago, and that the perfons names were ESCHINES and DEMOSTHENES.

nor do we retract

What is that to me? There are few occafions, when this queftion is not pertinent: And had it that univerfal, infallible influence fuppofed, it would turn into ridicule every compofition, and almost every conversation, which contain any praise or cenfure of men and manners.

'Tis but a weak fubterfuge, when pressed by these facts and arguments, to fay, that we transport ourselves, by the force of imagination, into diftant ages and countries, and confider the advantage, which we should have reaped from these characters, had we been contemporaries, and had any commerce with the VOL. II. perfons.

Q ૧

perfons. 'Tis not conceivable, how a real fentiment or paffion can ever arife from a known imaginary intereft; especially when our real intereft is fill kept in view, and is often acknowleged to be entirely diftinct from the imaginary, and even fometimes oppofite to it.

A man, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the fentiment of imaginary danger actuates him, in oppofition to the opinion and belief of real fafety. But the imagination is here affifted by the prefence of a ftriking object; and yet prevails not, except it be alfo aided by novelty, and the unusual appearance of the object. Cuftom foon reconciles us to heights and precipices, and wears off thefe falfe and delufive terrors. The reverfe is obfervable in the efimates which we form of characters and manners; and the more we habituate ourselves to an accurate fcrutiny of the moral fpecies, the more delicate feeling do we acquire of the most minute diftinctions between vice and virtue. Such frequent occafion, indeed, have we, in commonlife, to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object of this kind can be new or unufual to us; nor could any falfe views or prepoffeffions maintain their ground against an experience, fo common and familiar. Experience being chiefly what forms the affociations of ideas, tis impoffible, that any affociation could establish and support itself, in direct oppofition to that principle.

Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, ufeful? For what? For fome body's intereft, furely. Whofe intereft then? Not our own only: For our approbation fre

quently 9

quently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of thofe, who are ferved by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we fhall discover one great fource of moral distinctions.

PART II.

Self-love is a principle in human nature of fuch extensive energy, and the intereft of each individual is, in general, fo closely connected with that of the community, that those philofophers were excufable, who fancied, that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for our own happiness and prefervation. They faw, every moment, inftances of approbation or blame, fatisfaction or displeasure towards characters and actions; they denominated the objects of these fentiments, virtues or vices; they obferved, that the former had a tendency to encrease the happiness, and the latter the mifery of society; they asked, whether it were poffible that we could have any general concern for fociety, or any disinterested refentment of the welfare or injury of others; they found it fimpler to confider all these sentiments as modifications of selflove; and they discovered a pretence, at least, for this unity of principle, in that clofe union of intereft, which is fo obfervable between the public and each individual.

But notwithstanding this frequent confufion of interefts, 'tis easy to attain what natural philofophers, after my Lord BACON, have affected to call the experimentum crucis, or that experiment, which points out the right way in doubt or ambiguity. We have found inftances, in which private in

any