and friendly difpofitions as any disciple of the aufterer schools. And among the moderns, HOBBES and LOCKE, who maintained the selfish fyftem of morals, lived moft irreproachable lives; though the former lay not under any restraint of reli gion, which might supply the defects of his philosophy. An EPICUREAN or a HOBBIST readily allows, that there is fuch a thing as friendship in the world, without hypocrify or disguise; though he may attempt, by a philofophical chymistry, to resolve the elements of this paffion; if I may fo fpeak, into those of another, and explain every affection to be felf-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the fame turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the fame direction to the original paffion; this is fufficient, even according to the selfish fyftem, to make the wideft difference in human characters, and denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. I efteem the man, whofe felf-love, by whatever means, is so directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him ferviceable. to fo-ciety: As I hate or defpife him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain. would' yoù suggest, that these characters, though seemingly oppofité, are, at bottom, the fame, and that a very incon-fiderable turn of. thought forms the whole difference between them. Each character, notwithstanding these inconfiderable. differences, appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and, untranfmutable. And I, find not in this, more than in other fubjects, that the natural fentiments, arifing from the general appearances of things, are easily deftroyed by fubtile reflections. concerning the minute origin of these appearances.. Does not the the lively, chearful colour of a countenance inspire me with complacency and pleafure; even though I learn from philosophy, that all difference of complexion arises from the most minute differences of thickness, in the most minute parts of the fkin; by means of which a fuperficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colours of light, and absorb the others? But though the queftion, concerning the univerfal or partial selfishness of man, be not fo material, as is usually imagined, to morality and practice, it is certainly of confequence in the speculative science of human nature, and is a proper object of curiofity and inquiry. It may not, therefore, be improper, in this place, to bestow a few reflections upon it *. The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothefis, is, that as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions; there is required the highest stretch of philofophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless obferver, there appear to be fuch difpofitions as benevolence and generofity; fuch affections as love, friendship, compaffion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and ob * Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the general and particular. The firft is, where we have no friendship or connexion or esteem for the perfon, but feel only a general sympathy with him or a compaffion for his pains, and a congratulation with his pleafures. The other fpecies of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue, on fervices done us, or on fome particular connexions. Both thefe fentiments must be allowed real in human nature; but whether they will refolve into fome nice confiderations of felf-love, is a queftion more curious than important. The former fentiment, viz. that of general genevolence, or humanity, or fympathy, we shall have occafion frequently to treat of in the course of this inquiry; and I affume it as real, from general experience, without any other proof. A fervation, and plainly diftinguished from thofe of the selfish paffions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted; till fome hypothefis be discovered, which, by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and feem to have proceeded intirely from that love of fimplicity, which has been the fource of much false reasoning in philofophy. I fhall not here enter into any detail on the present sub-ject. Many able philosophers have shown the infufficiency of thefe fyftems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the finalleft reflection will make evident to every impartial inquirer. But the nature of the fubject furnishes the ftrongest prefumption, that no better fyftem will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect fimplicity. The cafe is not the fame in this fpecies of philofophy as in phyfics. Many an hypothesis in nature, contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more accurate fcrutiny, folid and fatisfactory. Inftances of this kind are fo frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty philofopher *, has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way, in which any phænomenon may be produced, that there is a general prefumption for its arifing from the causes which are the least obvious and familiar. But the prefumption always lies on the other fide, in all inquiries con-cerning the origin of our paffions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The fimpleft and most obvious. caufe, which can there be affigned for any phenomenon, is pro- Monf. FONTENELLE.. bably bably the true one. When a philofopher, in the explication of his fyftem, is obliged to have recourse to fome very intricate and refined reflections, and to suppose them effential to the production of any paffion or emotion, we have reason to be extremely on our guard against fo fallacious an hypothefis. The affections are not fufceptible of any impreffion from the refinements of reafon or imagination; and 'tis always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, neceffarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind, from vanity or felf-conceit, is defirous of fuppofing more prevalent; But there is no instance, that a concealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abftrufeness and intricacy of the motive. A man, who has loft a friend and patron, may flatter himself, that all his grief arises from generous fentiments, without any mixture of narrow or interefted confiderations; But a man, that grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and protection; how can we fuppofe, that his paffionate tenderness arifes from fome metaphyfical regards to a self-intereft, which has no foundation or reality? We may as well imagine, that minute wheels and fprings, like those of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the origin of paffion from fuch abstruse reflections. Animals are found fufceptible of kindness, both to their own species and to ours; nor is there, in this cafe, the least suspicion of disguise or artifice. Shall we account for all their fentiments too, from refined deductions of felf-intereft? Or if we admit a difinterested benevolence in the inferior species, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the fuperior? Love Love between the fexes begets a complacency and good-will, very diftinct from the gratification of an appetite. Tenderness to their offspring, in all fenfible beings, is commonly able alone to counterbalance the strongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependance on that affection. What intereft can a fond mother have in view, who lofes her health by affiduous attendance on her fick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the flavery of that attendance? Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely without any meaning or reality? Have we no fatisfaction in one man's company above another's, and no defire of the welfare of our friend, even though absence or death should prevent us from all participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and prefent, but our affection and regard to him? These and a thousand other inftances are marks of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real intereft binds us to the object. And how an imaginary intereft, known and avowed for fuch, can be the origin of any paffion or emotion, seems difficult to explain. No fatisfactory hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability, that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable fuccefs. But farther, if we confider rightly of the matter, we shall find, that the hypothefis, which allows of a difinterested benevolence, diftinct from felf-love, has really more fimplicity in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to refolve all friendship and humanity into this VOL. II. Kk latter |