to redress their influence, or adapt them better to our taste and fentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly thofe of the finer arts, 'tis requifite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper fentiment; and a falfe relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter fpecies, and demands the affiftance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a fuitable influence on the human mind.

But though this question, concerning the general principles of morals, be extremely curious and important, 'tis needless for us, at prefent, to employ farther care in our researches concerning it. For if we can be fo happy, in the course of this inquiry, as to discover the true origin of morals, it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature. In order to attain this purpose, we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: We shall analyze that complication of mental qualities which forms what, in common life, we call PERSONAL MERIT: We shall confider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of efteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or fentiment or faculty, which, if afcribed to any person, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or fatire of his character and manners. The quick fenfibility on this head, which is fo univerfal among mankind, gives a philofopher fufficient affurance that he can never be confiderably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of mifplacing the objects of his contemplation: He need only

*See Appendix first.

enter

enter into his own breaft for a moment, and confider whether or not he would defire to have this or that quality afcribed to him, and whether fuch or fuch an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue poffeffes one fet of words which are taken in a good fenfe, and another in the oppofite, the leaft acquaintance with the idiom fuffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both fides which are common to thefe qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and from thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all cenfure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect fuccefs, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular inftances. The other scientifical method, where a general abftract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclufions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common fource of illufion and miftake in this as well as in other fubjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philofophy, and will hearken to no arguments but thofe derived from experience. 'Tis full time that they should attempt a like reformation in all moral difquifitions; and reject every fyftem of ethics, however VOL. H. fubtle

I i

fubtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and obfervation.

We shall begin our enquiry on this head by the confideration of the focial virtues, benevolence and juftice. The explication of them will probably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for.

SECTION

OF BENEVOLENCE.

II.

T

PART I

HERE is a principle, fuppofed to prevail among many,

which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral fentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved disposition; fo in its turn it tends ftill further to encou rage that depravity. This principle is, that all benevolence is mere hypocrify, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce, fidelity a fnare to procure truft and confidence; and that while all of us, at the bottom, pursue only our private intereft, we wear these fair disguises, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one must be poffeffed of who profeffes fuch principles, and who feels no internal fentiment that belies fo pernicious a theory, 'tis easy to imagine: And alfo, what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a fpecies, whom he reprefents under fuch odious colours, and fuppofes fo little susceptible of gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we will not afcribe thefe principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we must, at leaft, account for them from the most careless and precipitant examination. Superficial reafoners, indeed, obferving many Ii 2

falfe

falfe pretences among mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very ftrong restraint in their own difpofition, might draw a general and hafty conclufion, that all is equally corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed from all other species of existence, admit of no degrees of good or bad, in every inftance, the fame creatures, under different disguises and appearances.

but are,

There is another principle, fomewhat resembling the former; which has been much infifted on by philofophers, and has been the foundation of many a fyftem; that whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no paffion is, or can be difinterefted; that the moft generous friendship, however fincere, is a modification of felf-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we feek only our own gratification, while we appear the most deeply engaged in fchemes for the liberty and happinefs of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthusiasm of paffion, we seem to take part in the interefts of others, and imagine ourfelves divefted of all felfifh confiderations: But, at bottom, the most generous patriot and most nigardly miser, the braveft hero and most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own. happiness and welfare.

Whoever concludes, from the seeming tendency of this opinion, that thofe, who make profeffion of it, cannot poffibly feel the true fentiments of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himself, in practice, very much mistaken. Probity and honour were no firangers to EPICURUS and his fect, ATTICUS and HORACE feem to have. enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous

and