SECTION I.

OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF

MORAL S.

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ISPUTES with perfons, pertinaciously obftinate in

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their principles, are, of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, thofe with perfons, intirely difingenuous, who really do not believe the opinion they defend, but engage in the controverfy, from affectation, from a spirit of opposition, or from a defire of showing wit and ingenuity, fuperior to the reft of mankind. The fame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the fame contempt of their antagonists; and the fame paffionate vehemence, in inforcing fophiftry and falfhood. And as reafoning is not the fource, whence either difputant derives his tenets; 'tis in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace founder principles.

Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the difingenuous difputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike intitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which Hh 2

nature

nature has placed between one man and another, is fo wide, and this difference is ftill fo much farther widened, by education, example, and habit, that where the oppofite extremes come at once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so fcrupulous, and fcarce any affurance fo determined, as abfolutely to deny all distinction between them. Let a man's infenfibility be ever fo great, he must often be touched with the images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever so obftinate, he muft obferve, that others are fufceptible of like impreffions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding that no body keeps up the controversy with him, 'tis probable he will, at laft, of himself, from mere wearinefs, come over to the fide of common sense and reason.

There has been a controverfy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they are derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowlege of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all found judgment of truth and falfehood, they fhould be the fame to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they are founded entirely on the particular fabric and conftitution of the human fpecies.

The antient philofophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reafon, yet, in general, feem to confider morals as deriving their existence from tafte

and

and fentiment. On the other hand, our modern inquirers, though they also talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured to account for thefe diftinctions by metaphyfical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abstract principles of human underftanding. Such confufion reigned in these subjects, that an oppofition of the greatest consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in the parts almost of each individual system; and yet no body, till very lately, was ever fenfible of it. The elegant Lord SHAFTSBURY, who first gave occafion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the antients, is not, himself, intirely free from the fame confufion.

It must be acknowleged, that both fides of the question are fufceptible of specious arguments. Moral diftinctions, it may be faid, are difcernible by pure reafon: Elfe, whence the many disputes that reign in common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this fubject: The long chain of proofs often produced on both fides; the examples cited, the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies detected, the inferences drawn, and the feveral conclufions adjusted to their proper principles. Truth is difputable; not tafte: What exifts in the nature of things is the ftandard of our judgment; what each man feels within himself is the standard of fentiment. Propofitions in geometry may be proved, systems in phyfics may be controverted; but the harmony of verse, the tenderness of paffion, the brilliancy of wit, muft give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but frequently concerning the juftice or injuftice of his actions.

In

In

every criminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to difprove the facts alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: The fecond to prove, that even if these actions were real, they ́ might be justified, as innocent and lawful. 'Tis confeffedly by deductions of the understanding, that the first point is ascertained: How can we fuppofe that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other?

On the other hand, thofe who would refolve all moral determinations into fentiment, may endeavour to show, that 'tis impoffible for reafon ever to draw conclufions of this nature. To virtue, fay they, it belongs to be amiable, and vice odious. This forms their very nature or effence. But can reafon or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any subjects, and pronounce before-hand, that this muft produce love, and that hatred? Or what other reafon can we ever affign for thefe affections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them?

The end of all moral fpeculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper reprefentations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correfpondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclufions of the understanding, which of themselves have no hold of the affections, nor fet in motion the active powers of men? They difcover truths: But where the truths which they difcover are indifferent, and beget no defire or averfion, they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes poffeffion of the heart, and animates us to embrace and

maintain

8

maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool affent of the understanding; and gratifying a fpeculative curiosity puts an end to our researches.

Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepoffeffions in favour of virtue, and all difguft or averfion against vice: Render men totally indifferent towards thefe diftinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.

These arguments on each fide (and many more might be produced) are fo plaufible, that I am apt to fufpect, they may, the one as well as the other, be folid and fatisfactory, and that reafon and fentiment concur in almoft all moral determinations and conclufions. The final fentence, 'tis probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which ftamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or cenfure; that which renders morality an active principle, and conftitutes virtue our happinefs, and vice our mifery: 'Tis probable, I fay, that this final sentence depends on fome internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole fpecies. For what elfe can have an influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for fuch a fentiment, and give a proper difcernment of its object, 'tis often neceffary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice diftinctions be made, juft conclufions drawn, diftant comparisons formed, complicated rela→ tions examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. Some fpecies of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their firft appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, 'tis impoffible for any reasoning

to