conceive the heights of friendship and generofity. 'Tis readily allowed, that other beings may poffefs many fenfes, of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, viz. by the actual feeling and fenfation.

There is, however, one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not abfolutely impoffible for ideas to go before their correspondent impreffions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the feveral diftinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eyes, or those of found, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other; though, at the fame time, refembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no lefs fo, of the different fhades of the fame colour; and each fhade produces a diftin&t idea, independent of the reft. For if this should be denied, 'tis poffible, by the continual gradation of fhades, to run a colour infenfibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without abfurdity, deny the extremes to be the fame. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his fight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for inftance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different fhades of that colour, except that fingle one, be placed before him, defcending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be fenfible, that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis poffible for him, from his own imagination, to fupply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea

2

of

of that particular fhade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his fenfes? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may ferve as a proof, that the fimple ideas are not always, in every inftance, derived from the correspondent impreffions; though this inftance is fo fingular, that 'tis fcarce worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone, we should alter our general maxim.

Here, therefore, is a propofition, which not only feems, in itself, fimple and intelligible; but if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has fo long taken poffeffion of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn fuch difgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obfcure: The mind has but a slender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine that it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impreffions, that is, all fenfations, either outward or inward, are ftrong and fenfible: The limits between them are more exactly determined; nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain therefore any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, from what impression is that fuppofed idea derived? And if it be impoffible to affign any, this will serve to confirm our fufpicion. By bringing ideas into fo clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all difpute, which may arife, concerning their nature and reality *.

'Tis probable, that no more was meant by thofe, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impreffions; though it must be confeffed, that the

terms

terms which they employed were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind muft be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in oppofition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, cotemporary to our birth, the difpute feems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, even by Mr. LOCKE himself, as fstanding for any of our perceptions, our fenfations and paffions, as well as thoughts. Now in this fenfe, I should defire to know, what can be meant by afferting, that felf-love, or refentment of injuries, or the paffion between the fexes is not innate.

By admitting these terms, impreffions and ideas, in the fense above explained, and understanding by innate what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we affert, that all our impreffions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I muft own it to Be my opinion, that Mr. LOCKE was betrayed Into this question by the schoolmen, who making ufe of undefined terms, draw out their difputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in queftion. A like ambiguity and circumlocution feem to run through all that philofopher's reafon Ings on this fubject.

SECTION III.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

"T"

IS evident, that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more ferious thinking or discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon this regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was ftill a connection upheld among the different ideas, which fucceeded each other. Were the loosest and freeft converfation to be tranfcribed, there would immediately be observed fomething, which connected it in all its tranfitions. Or where this is wanting, the perfon, who broke the thread of discourse, might ftill inform you, that there had fecretly revolved in his mind a fucceffion of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of converfation. Among the languages of different nations, even where we cannot fufpect the leaft connection or communication, 'tis found, that the words,

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words, expreffive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: A certain proof, that the fimple idea, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by fome universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find, that any philofopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of affociation; a fubject, however, that seems very worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, viz. Refemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Caufe or Effect.

All

That these principles ferve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original: The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or difcourfe concerning the others † And if we think of a wound, we can scarce forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it ‡. But that this enumeration is compleat, and that there are no other principles of affociation, except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own fatisfaction. we can do, in fuch cafes, is to run over several inftances, and examine carefully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as poffible. The more inftances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more affurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire. Inftead of entering into a detail of + Contiguity.

Refemblance.

Cause and Effe&t.