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pride; and it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourself with complacency and satisfaction.

Now as the causes of these passions are very numerous and various, though their object be uniform and simple ; it may be a subject of curiosity to consider, what that circumstance is, in which all these various causes agree; or, in other words, what is the real, efficient cause of the passion. We shall begin with pride and humility.

3. In order to explain the causes of these passions, we must reflect on certain principles, which though they have a mighty influence on every operation, both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. The first of these is the asociation of ideas, or that principle, by which we make an easy transition from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They usually pass with regularity, from one object, to what resembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it*. When one idea is present to the imagination; any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility, by means of that introduction.

The second property, which I shall observe in the human mind, is a like association of impressions or emotions. All resembling impressions are connected together; and no sooner one arises, than the rest naturally follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper, when

.See Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. III.

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elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, courage, pride, and other resembling affections.

In the third place, it is observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much affist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made, where they both concur in the same object. Thus, a man, who by any injury

received from another, is very much discomposed and ruffled · in his temper, is apt to find an hundred subjects of hatred,

discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy paffions; especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, who was the object of his first emotion. Those principles which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both, uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. ..

Upon this occasion, I may cite a passage from an elegant writer, who expresses himself in the following manner *. “ As the fancy delights in every thing, that is great, strange, “ or beautiful, and is ftill the more pleased the more it finds “ of these perfections in the same object, so it is capable of re“ ceiving new fatisfaction by the assistance of another sense. “ Thus, any continual found, as the music of birds, or a fals “ of waters, awakens every moment the mind of the behol“ der, and makes him more attentive to the several beauties " of the place, that lie before him. Thus, if there arises a “ fragrancy of smells or perfumes, they heighten the pleasure “ of the imagination, and make even the colours and verdure “ of the landscape appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both “ senses recommend each other, and are pleasanter together

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" than where they enter the mind separately: As the different e colours of a piểure, when they are well disposed, set off « one another, and receive an additional beauty from the “ advantage of the situation.” In these phænomena, we may remark the association both of impressions and ideas; as well as the mutual assistance these associations lend to each other.

• 4. It seems to me, that both these species of relation have

place in producing Pride or Humility, and are the real, efficient causes of the passion.

With regard to the first relation, that of ideas, there can be no question. Whatever we are proud of, must, in some manner, belong to us. It is always our knowlege, our sense, beauty, possessions, family, on which we value ourselves. Self, which is the object of the passion, must still be related to that quality or circumstance, which causes the passion. There must be a connexion between them ; an easy transition of the imagination; or a facility of the conception in passing from one to the other. Where this connexion is wanting, 'no object can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the connexion, the more you weaken the passion.

5. The only subject of enquiry is, whether there be a like relation of impressions or sentiments, wherever pride or humility is felt; whether the circumstance, which causes the passion, produces antecedently a sentiment fimilar to the pasfion; and whether there be an easy transfusion of the one into the other. i

The feeling or sentiment of pride is agreeable; of humility, painful. An agreeable sensation is, therefore, related to the

former;

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former ; a painful, to the latter. And if we find, after examination, that every object, which produces pride, produces also a separate pleasure ; and every object, that causes humility, excites in like manner a separate uneafiness; we must allow in that case, that the present theory is fully proved and ascertained. The double relation of ideas and sentiments will be acknowleged incontestible.

6. To begin with personal merit and demerit, the most obvious causes of these passions; it would be entirely foreign ta our present purpose to examine the foundation of moral distinctions. It is fufficient to observe, that the foregoing theory concerning the origin of the passions may be defended on any hypothesis. The most probable system, which has been advanced to explain the difference between vice and virtue, is, that either from a primary constitution of nature, or from a sense of public or private interest, certain characters, upon the very view and contemplation, produce uneasiness; and others, in like manner, excite pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction, produced in the spectator, are essential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character, is to feel a delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it, is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and pleasure therefore, being, in a manner, the primary source of blame or praise, must also be the causes of all their effects; and consequently, the causes of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction. ..

. . But fupposing this theory of morals should not be received ;, it is still evident that pain and pleasure, if not the fources of moral distinctions, are at least inseparable from them. A genes, , D d 2

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rous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight is. On the other hand, cruelty and treachery displeafe from their very nature ; nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these qualities, either in ourfelves or others.. Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleasure distinct from the pride or self-satisfaction which attends it : Vice, an uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse.

But a high or low. conceit of ourselves arises not from those i qualities alone of the mind, which, according to common

systems of ethics, have been defined parts of moral duty; but from any other, which have a connexion with pleasure or uneasiness. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more fenfible mortification; than a disappointment in any attempt of that kind. No one has ever been able to tell precisely, what wit is, and to thew why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such another rejected. It is by taste alone we can decide concerning it; nor are we possel of any other standard, by which we can form a judgment of this nature. Now what is this taste, from which true and false wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no thought can have a title to either of these denominations ? It is plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure from true wit, and of disgust from false, without our being able to tell the reasons of that fatisfaction or uneasiness. The power of exciting these opposite sensations is, therefore, the very essence of true or false wit; and consequently, the cause of that vanity or mortification, which arises from one or the other.

7. Beauty

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