The paffions of fear and hope may arise, when the chances are equal on both fides, and no fuperiority can be discovered in one above the other. Nay, in this fituation the paffions are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon, and is toft with the greatest uncertainty. Throw in a fuperior degree of probability to the fide of grief, you immediately see that paffion diffuse itself over the compofition, and tincture it into fear. Encrease the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails ftill more and more, 'till at last it runs infenfibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief. After you have brought it to this fituation, diminish the grief, by a contrary operation to that, which encreased it, to wit, by diminishing the probability on the melancholy fide; and you will fee the paffion clear every moment, 'till it changes insensibly into hope; which again runs, by flow degrees, into joy, as you increase that part of the compofition, by the increase of the probability. Are not these as plain proofs, that the paffions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a coloured ray of the fun, paffing through a prism, is a compofition of two others, when as you diminish or increase the quantity of either, you find it prevail proportionably, more or lefs, in the composition?

5. Probability is of two kinds; either when the object is itself uncertain, and to be determined by chance; or when, though the object be already certain, yet it is uncertain to our judgment, which finds a number of proofs or prefumptions on each fide of the queftion. Both these kinds of probability cause fear and hope; which must proceed from that property, in which they agree; to wit, the uncertainty and fluctuation Cc 2 which

which they beftow on the paffion, by that contrariety of views, which is common to both..

6. It is a probable good or evil, which commonly caufės: hope or fear; because probability, producing an inconftant and wavering furvey of an object, occafions naturally a like mix-ture and uncertainty of paffion. But we may observe, that,, wherever, from other caufes, this mixture can be produced,. the paffions of fear and hope will arife, even though there be: no probability..

An evil, conceived as barely poffible, fometimes produces fear; efpecially if the evil be very great.. A man cannot think of exceffive pain and torture without trembling, if he runs the least risque of suffering them. The fmallness of the probability is compenfated by the greatnefs of the evil..

But even impossible evils caufe fear; as when we tremble on the brink of a precipice, though we know ourselves to be in: perfect fecurity, and have it in our choice, whether we will advance a step farther. The immediate prefence of the evil influences the imagination, and produces a species of belief; but being oppofed by the reflection on our fecurity, that belief is immediately retracted, and causes the fame kind of paffion, as when, from a contrariety of chances, contrary paffions are produced.

Evils, which are certain, have fometimes the fame effect as the poffible or impoffible. A man, in a strong prison, without the leaft means of efcape, trembles at the thoughts of the rack, to which he is fentenced. The evil is here fixed in itfelf; but the mind has not courage to fix upon it; and this

fluctuation

fluctuation gives rife to a paffion of a fimilar appearance

with fear.

7. But it is not only where good or evil is uncertain as to its existence, but also as to its kind, that fear or hope arises. If any one were told that one of his fons is fuddenly killed; the paffion, occafioned by this event, would not fettle into grief, 'till he got certain information which of his fons he had loft. Though each side of the question produces here the fame paffion; that paffion cannot fettle, but receives from the imagination, which is unfixed, a tremulous unfteady motion, refembling the mixture and contention of grief and joy.

8. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a strong connexion with fear, even though they do not caufe any oppofition of paffions, by the oppofite views, which they prefent to us. Should I leave a friend in any malady, I fhould feel more anxiety upon his account, than if he were prefent; though perhaps I am not only incapable of giving him affiftance, but likewife of judging concerning the event of his sickness. There are a thousand little circumftances of his fituation and condition, which I defire to know; and the knowlege of them would prevent that fluctuation and uncertainty, so nearly allied to fear. HORACE has remarked this phenomena.

Ut affidens implumibus pullus avis.
Serpentum allapfus timet,

Magis relictis; non, ut adfit, auxili
Latura plus præfentibus.

A virgin on her bridal-night goes to bed full of fears and apprehenfions, though fhe expects nothing but pleasure. The confusion of wishes and joys, the newness and greatness of the

unknown

unknown event, fo embarrass the mind, that it knows not in what image or paffion to fix itself.

9. Concerning the mixture of affections, we may remark, in general, that when contrary paffions arife from objects nowife connected together, they take place alternately. Thus when a man is afflicted for the lofs of a law-fuit, and joyful for the birth of a fon, the mind, running from the agreeable to the calamitous object; with whatever celerity it may perform this motion, can scarcely temper the one affection with the other, and remain between them in a state of indifference.

It more easily attains that calm fituation, when the fame event is of a mixed nature, and contains fomething adverse and something profperous in its different circumftances. For in that cafe, both the paffions, mingling with each other by means of the relation, often become mutually deftructive, and leave the mind in perfect tranquillity.

But suppose that the object is not a compound of good and evil, but is confidered as probable or improbable in any degree; in that cafe the contrary paffions will both of them be prefent at once in the foul, and inftead of balancing and tempering each other, will fubfift together, and by their union, produce a third impreffion or affection, fuch as hope or fear.

The influence of the relations of ideas (which we shall afterwards explain more fully) is plainly feen in this affair. In contrary paffions, if the objects be totally different, the paffions. are like two oppofite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the paffions are like an alcali and an acid, which, being mingled,

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mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and confifts in the contradictory views of the fame object, the paffions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate..

The effect of a mixture of paffions, when one of them is predominant, and fwallows up the other, fhall be explained afterwards..

SECT. II.

I. BESIDES thofe paffions above-mentioned, which arife from a direct purfuit of good and averfion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or confideration. Thus Pride is a certain fatisfaction in ourselves, on account of fome accomplishment or poffeffion, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is a diffatisfaction with ourselves, on account of fome defect or infirmity.

Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or fervices: Hatred, the contrary.

2. In these two sets of paffions, there is an obvious distinction to be made between the object of the paffion and its caufe. The object of pride and humility is felf: The cause of the paffion is fome excellence in the former cafe; fome fault, in the latter. The object of love and hatred is fome other perfon: The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults.

With regard to all these paffions, the causes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for inftance, raises

pride;