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The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded enirely on experience. If we reafon à priori, any thing may appear able to produce any thing. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the fun; or the wish of a man controul the planets in their orbit. "Tis only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one Such is the foundation of

object from that of another *.

moral reasoning, which forms the greateft part of human knowlege, and is the fource of all human action and behaviour.

Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as alfo all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.

The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, phyfic, chymistry, &c. where the qualities. caufes and effects of a whole fpecies of objects are enquired

into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of fouls, is compofed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reafon, fo far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.

That impious maxim ofthe antient philofophy, Ex nihilo, nihil fit, by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, according to this philofophy. Not only the will of the fupreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we know à priori, the will of any other being might create it, or any other cause, that the most whimfical imagination can affign.

Morals

Morals and criticism are not fo properly objects of the underftanding as of taste and fentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt more properly than perceived. Or if we reafon concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, viz. the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, perfuaded of these principles, what havock must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for inftance; let us afk, Does it contain any abstract reafonings concerning quan-tity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasonof fact or exiftence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but fophiftry and illufion.

ings concerning matters

A

DISSERTATION

ΟΝ ΤΗ Ε

PASSIONS.

I.

SOME

SECT. I.

OME objects produce immediately an agreeable fenfation, by the original structure of our organs, and are thence denominated GOOD; as others, from their immediate disagreeable sensation, acquire the appellation of EVIL. Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good; exceffive heat painful and evil.

Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to paffion, excite an agreeable or painful fenfation; and are thence called Good or Evil. The punishment of an adverfary, by gratifying revenge, is good; the fickness of a companion, by affecting friendship, is evil.

2. All good or evil, whence-ever it rifes, produces various paffions and affections, according to the light in which it is furveyed.

When

When good is certain or very probable, it produces Joy: When evil is in the fame fituation, there arifes GRIEF or SORROW.

When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rife to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on one fide or the other.

DESIRE arifes from good confidered fimply; and AVERSION, from evil. The WILL exerts itself, when either the prefence of the good or abfence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body.

3. None of these paffions feem to contain any thing curious or remarkable, except Hope and Fear, which, being derived from the probability of any good or evil, are mixed paffions, that merit our attention.

Probability arises from an oppofition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either side; but is inceffantly toffed from one to another, and in one moment is determined to confider an object as exiftent, and in another moment as the contrary. The imagination or underftanding, call it which you please, fluctuates between the oppofite views; and though perhaps it may be oftener turned to one fide than the other, it is impoffible for it, by reason of the oppofition of caufes or chances, to reft on either. The pro and con of the question alternately prevail; and the mind, surveying the objects in their opposite causes, finds such a contrariety as utterly deftroys all certainty or established opinion.

Suppose, then, that the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produce either defire or averfion; it is evident, that, VOL. II. according

C c

according as the mind turns itself to one fide or the other, it must feel a momentary impreffion of joy or forrow. An object, whose existence we defire, gives fatisfaction, when we think. of those causes, which produce it; and for the fame reason, excites grief or uneafinefs from the oppofite confideration. So that, as the understanding in probable questions, is divided. between the contrary points of view, the heart must in thefame manner be divided between oppofite emotions.

Now, if we confider the human mind, we shall observe, that with regard to the paffions, it is not like a wind inftrument of mufic, which, in running over all the notes, immediately loses: the found when the breath ceases; but rather resembles a stringinftrument, where, after each ftroke, the vibrations still retain fome found, which gradually and infenfibly decays. The ima-gination is extremely quick and agile; but the paffions, in comparison, are flow and reftive: For which reason, when: any object is presented, which affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other; though the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each ftroke will not pro-duce a clear and diftinct note of paffion, but the one paffion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the paffion of grief or joy predominates in the compofition; and thefe paffions being intermingled by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the paffions of hope or fear.

4. As this theory feems to carry its own evidence along with it, we shall be more concife in our proofs.

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