that precife degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the affiftance of exaggeration and flattery to fupply the defects of argument and reafoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at prefent, appear, fo far may we conclude thefe attributes to exift. The fuppofition of farther attributes is mere hypothefis; much more, the fuppofition, that, in diftant periods of place and time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to fuch imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to JUPITER, the cause; and then defcend downwards, to infer any new effect from that caufe; as if the present effects alone were not intirely worthy of the glorious attributes which we ascribe to that deity. The knowlege of the cause being derived folely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other, and the one can never refer to any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclufion.

You find certain phænomena in nature. or author.

You feek a cause

You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become fo enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impoffible but he muft produce fomething greater and more perfect than the prefent fcene of things, which is fo full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this fuperlative intelligence and benevolence are intirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reafon; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you fee he has actually exerted and difplayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O philofophers, be fuited to the

prefent

present appearances of nature: And prefume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary fuppofitions, in order to fuit them to the attributes, which you fo fondly ascribe to your deities.

When priests and poets, fupported by your authority, O ATHENIANS, talk of a golden or a filver age, which preceded the present scene of vice and mifery, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But when philofophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the fame discourse, I pay them not, I own, the fame obfequious fubmiffion and pious deference. I ask; Who carried them into the celeftial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rafhly affirm that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose, beyond what has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual afcent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I ftill infift, that they have aided the ascent of reafon by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; prefuming, that a more perfect production than the present world would be more fuitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celeftial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the prefent world.

Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature, and fave the honour of the gods; while we muft acknowlege the reality of that evil and diforder, with which the world fo much abounds. The obftinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the obfervance of general laws, or fome fuch reafon, is the fole caufe, which

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controlled the power and benevolence of JUPITER, and obliged him to create mankind and every fenfible creature fo imperfect and fo unhappy. These attributes, then, are, it feems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greateft latitude. And upon that fuppofition, I own, that fuch conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible folutions of the ill phænomena. But ftill I afk; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon fuppofitions, which, for aught you know, may be intirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?

The religious hypothefis, therefore, must be confidered only. as a particular method of accounting for the visible phæno-mena of the universe: But no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any fingle fact, and alter or add to the phxnomena, in any fingle particular. If you think that the appearances of things prove fuch caufes, 'tis allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In fuch complicated and fublime fubjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to reft. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred caufes, conclude, that any other fact has exifted, or will exift, in the courfe of nature, which may ferve for a fuller difplay of particular attributes; I must admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the present fubject, and muft certainly have added fomething to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwife you could never, with tolerable fense or

pro

propriety, add any thing to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause.

Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the fecurity of good morals, or the peace and order of fociety is in the leaft concerned?

I deny a providence, you fay, and fupreme governor of the world, who guides the courfe of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and fuccefs, in all their undertakings. But furely, I deny not the course itself of events which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowlege, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice; and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am fenfible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only fource of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious courfe of life; but am fenfible that, to a well difpofed mind, every advantage is on the fide of the former. what can you fay more, allowing all your fuppofitions and reafonings? You tell me, indeed, that this difpofition of things proceeds from intelligence and defign. But whatever it proceeds from, the difpofition itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and confequently our conduct and deportment in life, is ftill the fame. 'Tis ftill open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of paft events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence

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is allowed, and a fupreme diftributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect fome more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course, of events; I here find the fame fallacy, which I have beforeendeavoured to detect. You perfift in imagining, that, if we grant that divine exiftence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may fafely infer confequences from it, and add fomething to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attri-butes which you afcribe to your gods. You feem not to re-member, that all your reafonings on this fubject can only be drawn from effects to caufés; and that every argument, deduced from causes to effects, muft of neceffity be a grofs fophifm; fince it is impoffible for you to know any thing of the cause, but what you have, antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect..

But what must a philofopher judge of those vain reasoners, who, instead of regarding the present scene of things as the fole object of their contemplation, fo far reverse the wholecourse of nature, as to render this life merely a paffage to fomething farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vaftly different building; a prologue, which ferves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can fuch philofophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination furely. For if they derived it from the prefent, phænomena, it would never point to any thing farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may poffibly poffefs attributes, which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot difcover to be satisfied: All this will freely be allowed. But ftill this is mere possibility and

hypothefis..